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An apparent discrepancy in the literature on mental verbs between findings of 
experimental studies (young children fail to contrast terms) and observational studies 
(children use terms correctly in conversation) can be reconciled using Nelson and 
Lucariello’s (1985) theory of word meaning development. According to their analysis, 
three aspects of word meaning develop in order: reference, denotation, and sense. For 
success at experimental tasks, children must have attained a system of interrelated word 
meanings (sense). However, children’s initial uses of think and know take their meanings 
from the roles in the language games in which they occur (Wittgenstein, 1953).
In this study, 12 two-year-old and 11 three-year-old children were observed at 
four one-hour sessions over six months in their homes with their mothers. The ways in 
which think and know were used by both the mothers and children were described. The 
mothers differentiated their uses of think and know by person reference, time reference, 
lexical frames, and conversational function. The children differentiated the two verbs by 
conversational function. In addition, the two-year-old children first used think and know 
in different language game roles.
Each child used think or know in a conversationally embedded manner at a visit 
before (or at the same visit as) they used denotation, supporting Nelson and Lucariello’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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model of word meaning development. The three-year-olds used denotation more than the 
two-year-olds, while only one three-year-old demonstrated any sense meanings.
Mother-child conversational processes that may support word meaning 
development were identified. For the two-year-olds’ initial embedded uses, these 
included repetition, use tied to a particular event, role reversal, use of wh-questions, and 
the mother’s contrast of related mental verbs. For the three-year-olds, acquisition of more 
advanced forms of use may be supported by the mothers’ encouragement of discussions 
of the past, future, and general, suggestions of presuppositions of mental verbs, contrast 
of related mental verbs, use of relevant time vocabulary, logical statements and purpose 
explanations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The acquisition of the words think and know by the young child is an important 
topic of study for several reasons. First, the previous research on the relation between 
maternal speech and children’s word meaning development has looked primarily at the 
acquisition of object words. It may be, however, that the process of learning object 
words differs from that of learning more abstract terms. Objects can be looked at, 
handled, pointed at, manipulated, and then named; thus joint attention can readily be 
established between adult and child. This is not the case for non-object words, and a 
significant portion of words that the child must and does leam to speak are not words for 
objects. What processes, then, are involved in the acquisition of more abstract words by 
the child in conversation, if not ostension? What clues does the mother provide for the 
child as to the meanings of non-object words? How do children first begin to use abstract 
words? Think and know are good choices for researching this topic because children do 
begin to use them at a fairly early age, despite the invisibility of reference.
Second, research on the child’s understanding of the mind has led to an apparent 
contradiction in the literature: while observational research has demonstrated that 
children as young as two and a half years use words for mental states (including think and 
know) appropriately in naturalistic conversation, studies under the aegis of research on 
children’s theory of mind have turned up failures on the part of three- and even four-year- 
olds on experimental tasks which contrast the use of mental terms.
In this literature review, I will argue that Nelson and Lucariello’s (1985) theory of 
word meaning development can reconcile the differences in these research claims.
Further, the research conducted and reported on here on the development of meaning for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the words think and know can be used to test their theory. Validation of this theory is 
important because, if correct, it will provide a better explanation for changes in children’s 
performance on theory of mind tasks: not that they first lack a mature understanding of 
mind, and later attain one, as theory of mind experimentalists would argue, but because 
reorganization of the lexical system places meanings of individual words, already having 
some conceptual founding, into relation with one another, so that correct performance on 
tasks calling for the contrast of related terms becomes possible. This explanation is better 
because it incorporates the observational data on children’s appropriate usage of mental 
terms in conversation. It is also better because it is simpler; it does not require the 
assumption of theory change, a change in stance towards the topic matter, on the part of 
the child, but rather a systematization of the child’s lexical entries, already having a 
conceptual basis.
In the literature review which follows I start with a review o f the different 
meanings of think and know that researchers from varying perspectives have based their 
work upon, including the radial polysemous developmental view. In order to incorporate 
children’s uses more closely into their definitions of the words, I introduce Finch’s (1977) 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s idea of the language game (1953). Next I provide a brief 
review of some current theoretical approaches to early lexical development. I then 
present the experimental work on children’s theory of mind tasks that use contrasting 
mental terms, and the observational work demonstrating children’s competence in using 
mental terms. Then I attempt to reconcile these findings using Nelson and Lucariello’s 
(1985) theory of word meaning development. To complicate the picture, I show how 
Bartsch and Wellman’s (1995) observational research from a Theory of Mind perspective
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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contrasts with the Nelson and Lucariello view. Montgomery’s (1997) discussion of 
Wittgenstein’s private language argument is also compared with the Nelson and 
Lucariello view. I then move on to the presentation of research on word meaning 
acquisition via mother-child interaction, with a special emphasis on the role of context in 
this process. As I mentioned before, most of this research has looked at children’s 
acquisition of object terms [but see Tomasello (1992), and Tomasello & Merriman (Eds.) 
(1995) for work on children’s acquisition of verbs]. One significant exception to this 
trend is Nelson, Hampson, and Kessler Shaw’s (1991) study on children’s learning of non­
object nouns. This last study is used as a basis for the development of the present study 
on the acquisition of think and know.
Definitions of Think and Know
What do think and know mean? In this section I make an attempt to present a 
framework within which to answer this question that includes both the variety of 
meanings for each word and the structure of the relations between the meanings. To 
accomplish this task I bring together dictionary definitions for the verbs with Lakoffis 
account of radial category structure. This framework is followed by a brief presentation 
of some other views of the word meanings from the related literature: those of the theory 
of mind experimentalists, theory of mind observationalists, and Booth and Hall’s 
hierarchical view.
The Radial category view
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This view begins with an attempt to answer the question of what the words mean 
to adults. One useful place to start looking for adult word meanings is in a standard 
dictionary. On my shelf stands a medium-sized dictionary, The American Heritage 
Dictionary. Second College Edition. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985.) In its 
introduction, it specifies that, unlike other dictionaries that present senses 
chronologically, it "endeavor[s] to present the most prevalent, contemporary sense or 
meaning of a word first, with the other shades of meaning following logically from this 
current, central concept". With this in mind, here are the dictionary’s entries for the two 
words of interest:
know (no) v. knew (noo, nyoo), known (non), knowing, knows. — tr. 1. To perceive
directly with the senses or mind; apprehend with clarity or certainty. 2. To be certain of; 
regard as true beyond doubt. 3. To have a practical understanding of or thorough 
experience with: know how to swim. 4. To be subjected to; experience: "a black stubble 
that had known no razor" (Faulkner). 5.a. To recognize (something) as being the same as 
something else previously known, b. To be acquainted or familiar with. 6. To be able to 
distinguish; recognize: Do you know him from his twin brother? 7. Archaic. To have 
sexual intercourse with: "And Adam knew Eve his wife; and she conceived" (Genesis 
4:1). —intr. 1. To possess knowledge. 2. To be cognizant or aware, —idiom, in the 
know. Possessing correct or secret information.
think (thTngk) v. thought (thot), think-ing, thinks, --tr. 1. To have or formulate in the 
mind. 2.a. To reason about or reflect on; ponder: Think how complex language is. Think
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the matter through, b. To decide by thinking: thinking what to do. 3. To judge or regard; 
look upon: I  think it only fair. 4. To believe; suppose: always thought he was right. 5.
To expect; hope: thought he’d  arrive early but couldn’t. 6. To remember; call to mind: I  
can't think what his name was. 7. To visualize; imagine: didn’t think so many people 
would come. 8. To devise or evolve; invent: thought up a plan to get rich quick. 9. To 
bring into a given condition by mental preoccupation: She thought herself into a terror o f  
going. 10. To concentrate one’s thoughts on: does nothing but think profits, —intr. 1. To 
exercise the power of reason. 2. To weigh or consider an idea: They are thinking o f  
moving. 3. To recall a thought or image to mind: thought o f his childhood when he saw 
the movie. 4. To believe; suppose: thinks o f herself as a wit. 5. To have care or 
consideration: think first o f the ones you love. 6. To dispose the mind in a given way: 
Think rich. — idioms, think better of. To decide against after reconsidering, think much 
of. To consider satisfactory; approve: didn’t think much o f her new outfit, think nothing 
of. To regard as routine or usual, think twice. To weigh something carefully.
These dictionary definitions, while extremely useful, are inadequate for a full 
understanding of the adult meanings of the words. Some questions remain unanswered: 
what are the relations between the numbered definitions of each word? One has a sense 
even at a casual reading that they are not independent from each other, but what is the 
nature of this interdependence? Know and think both seem to belong to a related domain, 
roughly of verbs for mental phenomena, but what is the relation between the two sets of 
meanings? To answer these questions we must seek guidance beyond the dictionary 
definitions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
Lakoff on Category Structure
Lakoff provides a helpful way to view the relations between the numbered 
definitions. In a book (1987) dedicated to exploring the forms that human categories 
take, one form, the radial category, seems especially applicable to the cases of think and 
know. Lakoff explains in detail the relations between the different meanings of mother, 
as an example of the radial category:
The category mother... is structured radially with respect to a 
number of its subcategories: there is a central subcategory, defined by a 
cluster of converging cognitive models (the birth model, the nurturance 
model, etc.); in addition there are noncentral extensions which are not 
specialized instances of the central subcategory, but rather are variants of 
it (adoptive mother, birth mother, foster mother, surrogate mother, etc.).
These variants are not generated from the central model by general rules; 
instead, they are extended by convention and must be learned one by one.
But the extensions are by no means random. The central model 
determines the possibilities for extensions, together with the possible 
relations between the central model and the extension models. We will 
describe the extensions of a central model as being motivated by the 
central model plus certain general principles o f extension.
Lakoff, 1987, p.91
While Lakoff does not discuss think or know, we can make an attempt to extend 
the radial category to these cases. In the commentary that follows, I make no claims to 
giving a full description of the scope of the meanings and their relations. This is in
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contrast to Lakoff, who provides fully detailed descriptions of the cognitive models 
involved in the subcategories, not only for mother but for a variety of abstract categories, 
and who is more successful than I am in identifying the motivations of the radial 
subcategories from the central cases. This is a first pass, a pointing to what is necessary to 
incorporate in an understanding of the complexity of their meanings. Despite its 
incompleteness, I believe the following outline is useful in giving us a picture of the 
complexity of the problem.
First of all, what is the central subcategory for the words? Conveniently, the 
dictionary we are using puts the central definitions first; let us use these as our central 
category. For know, the dictionary gives the central definition as "to perceive directly 
with the senses or mind; apprehend with clarity or certainty". Breaking this down to its 
simplest elements, we get four alternative statements:
1. To perceive directly with the senses
2. To perceive directly with the mind
3. To apprehend with clarity
4. To apprehend with certainty
Can four alternative statements together make up a central subcategory? If the dictionary- 
makers can place them all together as a single, central definition, we will have to assume 
they can. What makes these four statements different from each other? There are the five
senses (sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste) to include in the first statement; the second
calls into consideration what sorts of things can be perceived directly with the mind, 
without the immediate help of the senses: perhaps episodic and general memories, and 
logical phenomena such as mathematical insights, inference and deduction could be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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included here. Apprehending with clarity, and apprehending with certainty could be 
applied to both the phenomena in statement 1 or 2, but understanding is emphasized here 
and not perception per se. But do the four statements cohere in some way that justifies 
their placement together? All four may be said to involve mental content plus an attitude 
toward that content, justified truth value. We have to remember, however, that there are 
several ways provided for arriving at this general condition.
What of the central subcategory for think? The dictionary gives us, "To have or 
formulate in the mind".
Here we have only two statements:
1. To have in the mind
2. To formulate in the mind
These two statements provide both a static and process view of the contents of 
mind: "having" with no question of origin or change, but "formulating" as a process. In 
relation to know, while both involve the mind, for think the contents of mind are not 
perceived in any specified way, but are merely held or processed; as well, thinking or a 
thought is not necessarily clear or certain.
So far we have discussed only the central subcategories of think and know, as we 
extracted them from their primary dictionary definitions. What of the other definitions? 
How are they motivated from the central subcategories? I will not attempt here an 
exhaustive analysis of all the definitions, but shall look at only the first two or three from 
each word to demonstrate what needs to be taken into consideration when envisioning the 
radial structure.
The second definition given for know is:
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2. To be certain of; regard as true beyond doubt
This appears to be related to statement 4, to apprehend with certainty. How do the 
two definitions differ? This second definition appears to be so related to statement four as 
be to be redundant. Why did the dictionary-makers include this as a second definition? 
To understand why, we have to back up a step. We may not be able to arbitrarily take 
statement four away from its other three statements in the central definition. The four 
statements in the central definition work together as a whole to point to a central concept 
that implies them all: direct perception via the senses or mind, and apprehension with 
clarity or certainty. When we look at definition two now, we can view it as applying to, 
used in, situations in which only part of the central condition applies: the case of being 
certain of something, without necessarily having the perceptual or mental justification 
that is included in the central definition. It is a subcategory of knowing that is a deviation 
from the central case, just as a birth mother or an adoptive mother are subcategories of 
the central model of the mother who provides the egg, gives birth to, and cares for the 
child.
Let us now consider the third definition of know: to have a practical 
understanding of or thorough experience with: know how to swim. How is this motivated 
by the central definition? This sort of knowing has a different sort of content than the 
central definition. Certainty, clarity, and justification are not as important; but 
understanding, apprehension is shared with the central definition: in both conditions, 
there is something known. In the central subcategory, what is known is something 
mental; in definition three, it is a skill or familiarity with a phenomenon. It is not attitude 
towards mental content that matters here; it is the mastery of broader subject matter. As
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Lakoff would argue, it is a matter of convention that the same word, know, is used to 
describe knowing that and knowing how, but it is nevertheless a motivated convention. 
Two of the remaining transitive definitions of know (4 and 5b) emphasize this dimension 
of experience or familiarity, de-emphasizing mental process; two others consist of 
variations on attitudes toward mental content (5a and 6, involving recognizing and 
distinguishing). (Archaic meaning 7 on sexual intercourse I leave aside as probably 
irrelevant to the early developmental problem, and perhaps to most modem adult 
individuals’category structures, as well.)
I move on now to further definitions of think. Definition 2.a. is: to reason about 
or reflect on; ponder: Think how complex language is. Think the matter through. This 
definition is more closely related to the second, process statement of the central 
definition: to formulate in the mind. Reasoning, reflecting, and pondering could be said 
to be specialized forms of formulating. What other sorts of formulating might there be? 
One alternative to be included in the central case is creative formulation: composing, 
inventing, improvising, dreaming up. The second part of the second definition, 2.b., to 
decide by thinking: thinking what to do, is another process, a specialized sort of 
formulating. Again it is a matter of convention that the processes of reasoning or 
decision-making can be specially emphasized and understood using the word think, 
despite their noncentral status. Definition three, to judge or regard; look upon: I  think it 
only fair, demonstrates yet another conventional, noncentral variation of the central 
definition: judging, regarding, or looking upon are special instances of the process of 
formulation. Further definitions for the most part give further variations on the central
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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formulation model: believing, supposing, remembering, calling to mind, visualizing, 
imagining, devising, evolving, inventing, considering.
What can be said about the relations between the meanings of know and think? 
Think in its several meanings includes both a static having of mental content and a 
variety of mental processes. Know includes justified perception and understanding, but 
also familiarity, experience, and recognition. When the spectrum of uses is laid out is not 
possible to specify the relations any more than to say that both can, (but do not always) 
involve mental processes. The multitude of uses of each verb brings up the problem of 
how it is known what shade of meaning is implied on each occasion of use. Here 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) notion of the language game, to be spelled out in much greater 
detail in another section, is useful: words’ meanings are inextricably woven into the 
language activities that they occur in. To more completely describe the meanings of the 
words know and think, one must look in detail at their uses in actual human conversations 
and activities. This is one of the goals of this dissertation: to learn more about the shades 
of meanings of the words by looking at their actual uses in conversation. Little is known 
about the roles these words play in adult conversation. Despite this hole in the literature, 
it is possible to explore the roles they play in child-adult conversations.
To summarize this view of the adult meanings of the verbs, each verb has a radial 
structure with a central subcategory that motivates the secondary subcategories by 
convention. More needs to be discovered about the roles that these subcategories play in 
conversational activities. The dictionary definitions give us clues as to the variety of roles 
they might play, but how they actually fit into conversations is not known. The verbs 
both belong to the domain of mental verbs, but the relations between them also remains
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
unknown. More could be uncovered about the relations between the verbs by seeing how 
they are compared and contrasted in conversation.
What of the meanings of the verbs to children? Children start out by learning the 
roles that the verbs play in conversation piece by piece. There is no question at first of a 
central subcategory and motivated radial subcategories; all the pieces are unrelated. At 
this point, word meanings are embedded in conversations. Exploration of the roles that 
the words play in Wittgensteinian language games can show how they are embedded in 
conversational routines. At some later point in time, the central subcategory is formed, 
and the secondary subcategories are linked to it. This marks the move to denotation. Only 
finally are the relations between verbs formed- an overarching domain with contrasts and 
similarities noted. These are sense meanings. This hypothesized view contrasts with the 
current prevalent view of word meaning development, a mapping of concept to word.
Other Views
Many experimentalists have defined the verbs know and think with respect to 
their factivity. Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) differentiated between two types of mental 
verbs that are followed by sentential complements: those that presuppose the truth of the 
complement (factives) and those that do not (nonfactives). The verbs know and think are 
said to differ in their presuppositions of the truth of their complements. Thus, for 
example, Abbeduto and Rosenberg (1985) claim that for know, a factive verb, the subject 
of the mental verb has unambiguous evidence, either perceptual or inferential, as to the 
truth of the complement, whereas for think, a nonfactive, the subject does not have such 
evidence. Other experimentalists who defined the verbs think and/or know with respect 
to their factivity in this way include Macnamara, Baker, and Olson (1976), Johnson and
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Maratsos (1977), Miscione, Marvin, O’Brien, and Greenberg(1978), Johnson and 
Wellman (1980), and Bassano (1985).
Moore and colleagues [Moore, Bryant, and Furrow (1989), Moore and Davidge 
(1989)] have looked to the work of Urmson (1963), who pointed out that a common 
function of mental verbs is to mark the degree of certainty with which a statement is 
made. Thus know is used to indicate that the speaker has a high degree of certainty, 
whereas think marks less certainty.
Whether the focus is on factivity or certainty, the experimental researchers 
indicate that the verbs differ from each other by one feature only. As I have shown 
above, this is far from the case: each verb has a number of related meanings. The danger 
in limiting the definitions in this way is that the conception of the development of the 
meanings of the verbs is oversimplified; the gradual accrual of meanings to the verbs and 
their gradual organization is instead reduced to an all-or-none phenomenon.
What of the meanings of the verbs ascribed by observational researchers? Shatz, 
Wellman and Silber (1983) identified seven functional categories for the early use of 
mental verbs as a group: reference to mental state, modulation of assertion, directing the 
interaction, clarification, expression of desire, action-memory, and the fixed phrase, "I 
don’t know". The adult meanings of the verbs are not given; the question of how these 
categories relate to adult definitions is not addressed. Whether or not children 
differentiate between the verbs in some way is also not addressed: the assumption seems 
to be, that if the verbs share common communicative functions, then their meanings as 
well are shared. Similarly, Furrow, Moore, Davidge, and Chiasson (1992) coded for five 
functions: mental state reference, modulation of assertion, directing the interaction,
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directing reflection, and other. However, unlike Shatz et al., they reported on specific 
form-function tendencies: both mothers and children predominantly used think to direct 
the interaction. Know was used by both mothers and children more to direct reflection 
than to direct the interaction. Again, it is not clear how these functional categories relate 
to fully-fledged adult differentiated definitions of the terms. While an argument could be 
made that children first learn to use the words as conversational devices, it is less 
plausible to maintain that the definitions remain solely this way for adults (not that I 
doubt that these observationalists might agree with this assessment.)
Bartsch and Wellman (1995) dispense with a large proportion of uses by 
considering only "genuine mental references", thus limiting the possible range of 
definitions. Within this limit, however, they do include several types of uses: for think, 
they identified three kinds of references to mental state: thought-as-belief, thought-as- 
imagination, and thought-as-activity. Here I report their categories (p.40):
1. Thought-as-belief: using think to refer to a prepositional belief state, to 
attribute a prepositional conviction.
2. Thought-as-imagination: referring to a mental state that is fictional or 
imaginary.
3. Thought-as-activity: referring to mental activity, to a mental process.
Their definition of know runs as follows: "Adults use know to refer to (1) a belief 
that is felt to be justified, (2) assumed to be true, or (3) that enjoys markedly higher 
conviction than one described by think" (p. 40, numeration added).
How do their definitions correspond to those of the American Heritage 
Dictionary? Think as thought-as-belief corresponds to dictionary definition 4: to believe
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or suppose. Think as thought-as-imagination calls on definition 7, to visualize or 
imagine. Thought-as-activity is a catch-all category, for transitive dictionary definitions 
2 through 10 include a variety of different mental processes. What of know? Their three 
definitions are covered by transitive dictionary definitions 1 and 2, dealing with justified 
perception and apprehension; and certainty.
Bartsch and Wellman’s definitions thus stand between the very limited definitions 
offered by the experimentalists, and the inclusive radial category scheme. (Further 
comparisons of their coding scheme with the Nelson and Lucariello scheme are reported 
in the discussion chapter.)
Booth and Hall (1995) also present a view that reflects an allowance that each 
verb can have more than one meaning. For them, each verb can refer to more than one 
mental process. They provide what they call a "hierarchical", informational model of 
meaning - hierarchical in the sense of level of difficulty, not in the sense of 
subordination. They identify six general levels of mental process that account for 
differences in meaning and difficulty of acquisition. In order of difficulty from lowest to 
highest, these are (paraphrased from the original, p. 532):
1. perception: reporting the act of perception
2. recognition: acknowledging familiarity
3. recall: referring to remembered factual information
4. understanding: referring to a conceptual framework or reasoning
5. metacognition: focussing on discussing the awareness of mental acts
6. evaluation: referring to attitudes and beliefs about the truth of statements
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Their model predicts that children will acquire the lower levels first because they 
are less abstract, less conceptually demanding.
While laudable in presenting a polysemous view of word meaning, their 
presentation of the six levels of meaning is insufficient to account for (1) word usages 
that are embedded in conversational procedures and do not necessarily refer to mental 
processes, (2) subtle meaning differences between and within the many mental verbs in 
the lexicon, (3) simultaneous and gradual acquisition o f more than one of their 
informational levels, (4) knowledge of the cultural conventions governing the functions 
of the verbs within conversations, as well as conversations as a source of meaning 
acquisition. Indeed, one or more of these criticisms could be directed to each of the 
alternative accounts presented here. What Booth and Hall account for is not so much the 
development of word meanings per se, but the development of levels of cognitive 
knowledge that are intertwined with word meanings. Their model is most useful in that it 
provides testable predictions of order of acquisition of meaning groupings, along with a 
theoretical, developmental basis for these predictions. Their work is part of a series of 
studies [e.g., Hall, Nagy, and Linn (1984), Frank and Hall (1991), Booth and Hall, 1994a, 
1994b, 1994c)] that has as one of its goals the refinement of the hierarchical model to 
accord more closely with data from multiple methods over a wide range of ages.
Wittgenstein’s Language Games 
In this analysis of the two-year-olds’ uses of think and know. I use Wittgenstein’s 
idea of language games to explore how the words are embedded in conversational 
routines. What is a language game? The answer to this question is not a straightforward 
one. Finch (1977) devotes an entire chapter to explaining the role of the language game
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in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Finch lays out the four meanings Wittgenstein offered 
for the language game in the Philosophical Investigations, Section 7:
(1) "I... will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language game."
(2) "...those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will 
call these games 'language games'..."
(3) "And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone 
might also be called language games.”
(4) "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which 
it is woven, the 'language-game'."
For Wittgenstein, a primitive language is a simplified language - one concerned 
with how words or sentences are used in a "clear and simple" way, such as the use of 
color terms and numbers in the activity of "shopping for five red apples". One way of 
interpreting these four meanings is that children learn a primitive version of language by 
learning how particular words are "woven" into activities. One example is laid out in 
meaning (3), the language game of naming an object and repeating a word after someone 
(This is part of Wittgenstein's builder's game in which a speaker calls out an order for a 
building material, and the other participant carries out the order by fetching it). Yet as 
Finch elaborates, the process of repeating a name is only one example of the myriad 
language games that Wittgenstein describes.
For Wittgenstein, a crucial reason for looking at language games was to establish 
philosophical clarity. He wanted to show that philosophical "puzzles" can be avoided by 
making evident dissimilarities in the functioning of language. Using the same word for 
different phenomena can mislead us into putting together phenomena that don't belong
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together. Wittgenstein’s practice of teasing apart the various functions - and thus 
meanings - subsumed by the same word can be applied to the cases of think and know. 
What appear to be two words each with one meaning, related to the other by one element 
should not be assumed. What needs to be done is to step back and look at actual uses, to 
see what functions they play in children’s conversations. Only then can we discover what 
the words mean to the children.
What, then, are the language-games that think and know are part of? Where can 
we begin to look? Although Wittgenstein writes that there are countless language games 
(PI Section 23), with new ones all the time invented and others becoming obsolete, it 
would be advantageous to have a starting point, an idea of what kinds of language games 
there are that a child’s words might belong in. Finch assists us by expanding upon a list 
Wittgenstein "carefully constructed" of "the very best examples" of language games he 
could find (PI Section 23). By primarily limiting ourselves to this list we can make an 
attempt to see if children’s early uses of think and know are incorporated into the types of 
language games that Wittgenstein specifically described.
Here then, from PI Section 23, is Wittgenstein’s list of language games (the 
numbering is added).
(1) Giving orders, and obeying them. (Finch notes that this is related to guiding and being 
guided by)
(2) Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements
(3) Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)
(4) Reporting an event
(5) Speculating about an event
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(6) Forming and testing a hypothesis
(7) Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams
(8) Making up a story; and reading it
(9) Play-acting
(10) Singing catches
(11) Guessing riddles (Finch includes here other language games Wittgenstein identified 
involving guessing, such as guessing intentions or thoughts.)
(12) Making a joke; telling it
(13) Solving a problem in practical arithmetic
(14) Translating from one language to another
(15) Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying
In Section 27, Wittgenstein also puts forth:
(16) Asking something’s name, with its correlate, ostensive definition
(17) Inventing a name for something (as when children give names to their dolls and then 
talk about them and to them)
He goes on to emphasize, however, that it is not possible to define a thing 
ostensively without also specifying what place in language the name is meant to occupy. 
The definition must take place with respect to the word’s overall role or use: red is a 
color, five is a number.
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Some current theoretical approaches to lexical development
Some current theoretical approaches to children’s early lexical development 
include the constraints/principles view, the social-pragmatic view, and the expressive 
view. Here I briefly summarize these three approaches.
Constraints and principles. Proponents of the constraints/principles view have 
been influenced by a problem described by Quine (1960): how does the language learner 
limit possible hypotheses regarding what the meaning of a new word may be? Their 
answer has been that children have, or construct, language-specific constraints or 
principles that help the child to limit the possibilities. In an article co-ordinating the work 
on principles proposed be several authors, Golinkoff, Mervis, and Hirsh-Pasek ( 1994) 
placed six principles into a two-tiered developmental framework. According to the 
authors, the principles of the first developmental tier help the child to enter into word 
learning. These first tier principles are that words refer: they map on to the child’s 
concepts of objects, actions, and attributes; words are extendible beyond their original 
referents; and words label objects - whole objects, not their parts. The principles of the 
second tier are necessary for word learning to become quick and efficient. They are that 
words can be extended to other objects in the same basic level category; that new words 
map on to nameless categories; and that the conventional forms of words are preferred.
Soon afterwards, an attempt was made to extend these principles beyond words 
for objects to the acquisition of verbs [Golinkoff, Hirsh-Pasek, Mervis, Frawley, &
Parillo (1995)]. They focus their discussion on action verbs. The principle of reference 
was transferred by saying that words can refer to actions or events just as they can refer
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to objects. They can be extended as well to label instances other than the original action 
exemplar. What of the object scope principle, stating that children assume that words 
map on to objects, and that the objects are whole objects? The authors get around the 
hurdle of applying this principle to verbs by stating that indeed, a child will assume that a 
new word labels an object - children will only entertain the hypothesis that a new word 
refers to an action if the child already knows a label for the object undergoing the action 
Also, children will assume that words for actions apply to larger rather than smaller 
actions.
To account for categorical scope, rather than posit a basic level for actions, the 
authors claim that children will extend words for actions to other actions that entail the 
same semantic components as the original referent. As for novel words naming nameless 
categories, this can work for verbs because a new label for an action will apply to a 
nameless action category. Labels are identified as referring to actions, by the use of 
syntactic cues. The principle of conventionality will motivate children to learn the 
conventional label for actions as well as objects. In the discussion I will examine how 
well these proposed principles hold up in the cases of think and know.
The social-pragmatic view. To illustrate the social-pragmatic view, I present 
some of the work of two of its proponents, Bruner and Tomasello. In contrast with 
constraints and principles, the social-pragmaticists argue that there is no need to posit 
language-specific limitations to the possibilities of word meanings. Instead, the learning 
of word meanings is possible both because the culture, in the guise of the adult partner, 
provides structure to conversational interaction, and because the child comes to the
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interaction equipped with the social skills to interpret the meanings of adults within the 
structured interaction.
Bruner (1983) was successful at incorporating Wittgenstein’s later work into the 
area of early language development. Rejecting both strict empiricist and nativist 
positions, he argues for a  middle ground in which both biological endowment and 
environmental support are necessary to the child’s language development. To counter 
nativist Chomsky’s inborn modular Language Acquisition Device (given the homunculus- 
reminiscent acronym LAD), Bruner presents the social/cultural Language Acquisition 
Support System (the LASS). Bruner’s goal is then to describe the LASS.
In order to describe the LASS, Bruner first lays out the cognitive endowments that 
the infant brings to the task of acquiring culture through language. Infant cognitive 
processing supports goal-directed activity; even before language, the infant’s activity is 
social and communicative; infant activity shows much order and systematicity, taking 
place in familiar situations; and much of the systematicity is abstract. Although language 
does not grow out of these cognitive endowments, they do enable language acquisition.
Bmner’s emphasis in language acquisition itself is on the development of 
pragmatics (in contrast with syntax or semantics). Calling on the Speech Act theory of 
Austin (1962), Bruner argues that pragmatics leads the way into the acquisition of 
language. The child’s entry into discourse requires the participants to interactively 
interpret each other’s communicative intent. The adult is seen as a communicative 
partner who negotiates the communication of the expression of intent with the child. 
Parents "fine tune" their speech to the level of the child’s understanding in a way that 
promotes the child’s increased regulation of language use. The child is an active
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participant as well, striving to master the cultural conventions of language in order to 
make her communicative intentions clear.
The Language Acquisition Support System provided by the adult communicative 
partner consists of formats: highly routinized and familiar settings in which the child can 
interpret language use and learn the conventional signaling of intentions. Here is where 
Wittgenstein comes in. Bruner applies Wittgenstein’s language games almost literally: 
for Bruner the routine formats in which language is encountered and interpreted are the 
games of childhood: peekaboo, object exchange, hide-and-seek. Game formats such as 
peekaboo provide the structure of self-contained, ordered sequences o f events involving 
language. As the child becomes familiar with the structure of the game she gradually 
takes over control of both the game and the performative language that can both 
accompany and constitute the components of the game.
Having established the importance of the structure of games in providing the 
context for the production and interpretation of language, Bmner goes on to show how 
formats can become independent from the specific settings in which they were acquired, 
and furthermore can be incorporated into more complex discourse, evolving into 
Austinian speech acts. Bruner’s analysis, however, concentrates on the transition from 
prelinguistic to linguistic communication. It remains to be demonstrated how more 
abstract words learned after this early transitional period are learned as part of routine 
formats, and if so what sort of formats these might be.
Tomasello is another proponent of the social-pragmatic view. In a major diary 
study of his daughter (Tomasello 1992) as well as in laboratory and observational studies 
[Tomasello and Kruger (1992), Tomasello and Barton (1994), Tomasello (1995)],
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Tomasello has studied one- and two-year-olds’ acquisition of verbs. He argues for the 
importance of explaining the acquisition of verbs for any successful theory of children’s 
language acquisition for several reasons: they require a richer characterization of 
children’s cognitive processes than one based solely on children’s understanding of the 
perceptual and functional features of objects; they necessitate a fuller characterization of 
the social-cognitive processes involved in word learning rather than one based on joint 
attention on objects; and because of their role in relating lexical items with one another, 
verbs play a crucial role in the child’s transition to grammar (Tomasello, 1995).
In Tomasello’s description of the social-pragmatic view, language, like other 
mental processes, depends on both the culture’s structuring of routine activities, and the 
individual child’s social cognitive skills, such as intersubjectivity and perspective taking, 
that allow the child to enter as participants into the culturally structured activities. The 
child is able to assign meanings to the words she hears only in situations when she can 
interpret the intentions of the other activity participant/speaker. The culture’s structuring 
and the child’s skills together make this possible. The child’s nonsocial cognitive skills 
are by no means left out of the process either: Tomasello explores the representational 
structures underlying children’s early action and change of state verb meanings.
In his diary study of the uses of verbs by his daughter Travis from her first to 
second birthdays, Tomasello’s goals were to describe the cognitive structures underlying 
her early use of verbs and the social-pragmatic contexts in which they were learned. He 
also found support for the "Verb Island" hypothesis: that in the beginning syntactic 
devices are lexically specific; in other words, that each verb appears in its own sentence 
frames that are not shared with other related verbs. This is to say that early on, children
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do not have a syntactic category of "verb" that allows them to interchange verbs in 
syntactic frames in a grammatical rule-governed way.
For the most part, the verbs that Travis produced during the period of study were 
words for activities and changes of state. The activities are subdivided into activities 
involving objects and those that do not. Under the latter are included several internal 
state activities: sorry, try, hungry. listen, feel, remember. In contrast with the in-depth 
child-centered semantic analysis he provides for change of state verbs, Tomasello does 
not offer an analysis for the semantic content of internal state verbs.
Tomasello describes four main pragmatic contexts for early verb learning: a 
parent comments on the child’s activity or state while the child is engaged in it; or 
comments on a state or activity of another person or object; the parent asks the child 
about the child’s intentions or desires; or the parent requests the child or another person to 
do something. The first two contexts he compares to the ostensive learning situation; the 
second two are nonostensive learning contexts. Tomasello showed that all four types of 
pragmatic contexts served as parental models for Travis’ acquisition of verbs prior to 18 
months of age. Tomasello concludes that verbs can be and are learned in nonostensive 
contexts; he argues that the assumption that children’s early words are object labels 
learned in ostensive contexts needs to be adjusted.
The expressive view. Bloom (1993, 1994) argues against the instrumental- 
function view of language held by social-pragmaticists. She places emphasis on the 
individual side of the individual/social equation: children are motivated to learn language 
in order to express their individual thoughts. With cognitive development, as their 
thoughts become increasingly discrepant from perceptual data, the acquisition of
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language becomes necessary in order to share their thoughts with other people. As well, 
increases in cognitive development leads to more elaborated contents of thought, and thus 
the need of more elaborate language to express those thoughts. Bloom argues for a 
bottom-up approach to meaning, saying that "complex sentences connect the structures 
underlying simple sentences, and the meanings of early complex sentences are acquired 
sequentially; they are also semantically cumulative." [Bloom (1994), p. 217]. In other 
words, the meanings of sentences are the additions of the meanings of the individual 
words.
While Bloom’s bottom-up account of meaning may be applicable to much of 
children’s earliest word meanings and their acquisition, it is less applicable to the 
explanation of why and how children learn words for abstract concepts that are tied up 
with cultural practices and institutions, and are not individually constructed (she points 
out herself that "words like citizen, honor, and trust are learned indirectly, through the 
words a child already knows" [ Bloom (1994), p. 221], as well as how it is possible for 
early sentences to mean something other than the sum of their cumulative parts.
If we take the meanings of mental words such as know and think to have 
meanings restricted each to one or two mental states or processes, it is plausible that the 
child could map the words onto pre-constructed concepts for these meanings; but if we 
take the view that the child must construct a more complex conventional system of intra- 
and inter-word meaning relations and how the words fit into larger speech activities, then 
experience with the many ways of using the words within different contexts becomes 
crucial to the construction of meaning. I believe a top-down approach to word and 
sentence meaning is also necessary: children often learn larger units of speech wherein
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sentence meanings are tied to activities, and only later analyze the sentences into their 
component parts.
Experimental Studies
Here I summarize experimental studies that have been carried out on children’s 
understanding of mental verbs, all of which include either the term know or think, or 
both. While they differ in the details of their procedures, all of the researchers make the 
assumption that the meanings of the verbs differ by single semantic features; all find age- 
related differences in the ability to contrast related verbs.
Johnson and Maratsos (1977) found differences between 3- and 4- year-olds on an 
experimental task designed to investigate children’s understanding of the presuppositions 
of the terms think and know. In this task, the participants were presented a brief story 
about how one person (the Hider) tricks another person (the Seeker) by hiding the 
Seeker’s toy in one location (under Box A) and telling the Seeker it’s in a different 
location (under Box B). The children were asked whether the Seeker and Hider think it’s 
under Box B, and whether they know it’s under Box A. Then they were asked to choose 
whether the Hider and Seeker think or know that the object is under Box A or B, 
respectively.
Six of the 16 4-year-olds answered all four questions perfectly, while none of the 
16 3-year-olds did. Looking at the answers to individual questions, the 3-year-olds 
tended to answer indiscriminately that yes, the Seeker thinks the toy is under Box B 
(correct) AND that the Seeker knows the toy is under Box A (incorrect), logically 
incompatible responses. On the other hand; the 4 year olds tended to answer correctly to 
both questions: the Seeker thinks the toy is under Box B, he doesn’t know it’s under Box
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B. This pattern o f indiscriminate "yes’s" by the 3-year-olds for questions about the 
Seeker was only somewhat improved for questions about the Hider. While the 4-year- 
olds tended to respond that yes, the Hider knows the object is under Box A, and no, he 
doesn't think it’s under Box B, both correct responses, the 3-year-olds answered correctly 
that the Hider knows the toy is under Box A, but then answered at close to chance level - 
44% saying no - when asked if the Hider thinks the toy is under Box B. On the forced 
choice questions, most of the 4-year-olds answered correctly both that the Hider knows 
the object is under Box A and that the Seeker thinks the toy is under Box B. The 3-year- 
olds answered at close to chance levels both that the Seeker thinks it’s under Box B 
(36%) and that the Hider knows it’s under Box A (65%). Many of the 3-year-olds (6 and 
5 of the 16, respectively) could not even comprehend these questions sufficiently to give 
responses. Johnson and Maratsos conclude that "4-year-olds understand that thinking 
may be false and that knowing must be true," while 3-year-olds do not.
Miscione, Marvin, OBrien, and Greenberg (1978) asked 48 preschool children in 
three age groups (3;6 to 4;5,4;6 to 5;5, and 5;6 to 6;5) to report on their own internal 
states of knowing or guessing during an object location guessing game. In the guessing 
game, the object was hidden in one of three boxes, which unbeknownst to the children 
could be manipulated by the researcher to make the object disappear. In this way the 
researcher was able to control whether or not the child’s choice of location was correct or 
not, one of the experimental variables. Another variable was whether or not the child 
saw the object being hidden. Finally, there were two points in the sequence of the game 
at which the child’s knowledge state report could be gathered: either before or after the 
outcome of the choice of location was revealed to be correct or incorrect. Combining
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these three variables, there were five conditions (the possible condition of the child being 
shown where the object was hidden but then having their choice turn out to be incorrect 
was not attempted!). Each child was tested on five trials for each of the five conditions, 
for a total of 25 trials each, and were given a point for each trial for which they said know 
having watched the researcher hide the object, or guess having not watched the 
researcher.
The researchers found that there were four general patterns of responses, which 
they labeled Undifferentiated, Outcome, Transitional, and Adult. The Undifferentiated 
pattern occurred when a child said either know or guess under all conditions, or answered 
in a random pattern. The Outcome pattern consisted of saying know for both those trials 
in which information was given beforehand and those in which the child guessed 
correctly despite not having seen the object hidden, and guess for those trials in which the 
choice was incorrect. The Transitional children answered all conditions correctly except 
for correct outcome without having seen the object hidden, for which they answered 
randomly. The Adult pattern consisted of answering know and guess correctly under all 
conditions.
A significant relation was found between age and pattern, with most children 
under four displaying an Undifferentiated response, most children over 5;5 falling into 
the Adult pattern, and the Outcome and Transitional patterns occurring from the ages of 
4;0 up to the age of 6;5. The authors argue that these results suggest that children giving 
undifferentiated responses - those under age four - have not acquired " any of the adult 
semantic knowledge for these words" (p. 1112). Children in the Outcome classification 
were using the incorrect semantic criterion - correct or incorrect outcome - as the basis
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for distinguishing between the meanings of these words, rather than the adult basis, 
which they define as encoding whether the decision from a process of transforming or 
operating on information is (know) oris not (guess) logically necessary (p. 1108). 
Furthermore, they suggest that the pattern displayed may be dependent on the child’s 
cognitive stage, in the Piagetian sense: the Outcome children may be in the 
preoperational stage, attuned to the external, perceptible, surface aspects of phenomena, 
while those answering in the Adult pattern may be in the concrete operational stage, able 
to think about phenomena in a more abstract, conceptual manner.
Johnson and Wellman (1980) investigated children’s understanding of the terms 
remember, know, and guess. Again, they assumed that these words differ in meaning 
from each other by single features: remember is a special case of knowing based on prior 
apprehension; knowing can be based on memory, but also on present apprehension, 
inference, or deduction; guess contrasts with know and remember in that there is an 
absence of a knowledge base. The participants in this study were 4 and 5 year-olds, and 
first graders (ages six and seven) and third graders (ages eight, nine, and ten), who were 
tested on a series of hidden-object tasks. The conditions of the tasks varied as to 1) 
whether the child had prior knowledge of the object’s location (whether or not they were 
shown where the object was hidden), 2) whether the child had present knowledge of the 
object’s location (opaque and clear boxes were used for this condition) and 3) whether 
there was correct performance, and the child found the object (the researcher used trick 
boxes to manipulate the outcome of the child’s performances). For each task, the 
researcher asked three questions varying only the target mental verbs to probe for the 
child’s understanding of the words: "Do you [know/remember/guess] it’s there?".
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The four year olds tended to answer "yes" that they remembered, knew, and 
guessed under all conditions. The exception to this consistency was in the "guess wrong" 
condition, in which no prior knowledge was given of the opaque boxes’ contents, and by 
using the trick boxes the researcher ensured that the child’s performance on guessing 
which box the object was hidden in was incorrect. For this task, the 4 year olds answered 
at close to chance levels for remember (40% said yes) and guess (47%) while 27% said 
(incorrectly) that they knew. Johnson and Wellman interpret these results as showing 
that 4-year-olds "remain largely oblivious to conceptual differences between mental 
states". The major difference between the 4 and 5 year olds was that more of the 5 year 
olds said that they guessed under the guess wrong condition. Otherwise the 5 year old 
performed much like the 4 year olds, saying indiscriminately that they remembered, 
knew, and guessed in all the experimental conditions. The first and third graders 
performed in a much more adult-like fashion.
In their study Abbeduto and Rosenberg (1985) investigated children’s 
understanding of five cognitive verbs (know, forget, remember, think, believe), using 
three different tasks. Their goal was to find out when children understand the 
presuppositions associated with each verb, and when children differentiate between the 
verbs on the basis of these presuppositions. The participants were 3,4, and 7 years old. 
The tasks included a comprehension task, a verb-choice task, and a definition task. In the 
comprehension task, the children were presented sentences containing that-object 
complements and each of the verbs (e.g., "Mary forgets that the cat is slow."). For each 
sentence, the children were asked a question about whether or not the complement is true 
(e.g., for the sample sentence given above, "Is the cat slow?"). In the verb-choice task, the
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children were presented with stories about characters who observed events either under 
favorable or unfavorable perceptual conditions. For each story the children were asked to 
choose between two verbs expressing the character’s cognitive state (think, know, and 
believe were the only possible choices). In the definition task, two questions about each 
of the five verbs were asked. The first question was, "What does it mean to (verb)?" For 
the second question, the verb was embedded in a sentence, and the child was asked to 
explain the meaning of the entire sentence.
On the comprehension task, the 7-year-olds performed significantly better than 
the 3-year-olds (with no significant differences between the 4-year-olds and other age 
groups). There was also a significant verb x age interaction, with 3-year-olds performing 
better on forget, remember, and know than on think or believe: the 4-year-olds doing 
worse on believe than on the other four verbs, and better on remember than think, and the 
7-year-olds like the fours doing worse on believe than all four other verbs, but also worse 
on think than on all three factives (know, remember, forget). The authors suggest, 
however, that the 3-year-olds’ success on the factive verbs may be a fortuitous result of 
responding to all the verbs as if they were factives; thus they displayed no differentiated 
understanding between the verbs.
On the verb-choice task, the 7-year-olds performed better than both the 3- and 4- 
year-olds. Very few 3- or 4-year-olds answered correctly on any verb for all stories 
having the particular verb as one of the choices, while many of the 7-year-olds did. On 
the definition task, very few of the children at any age spontaneously mentioned any 
presupposition for any of the verbs. The children were better at stating, either directly or 
indirectly, the presuppositions in response to question two, which asked for the meanings
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of sample sentences containing the verbs, especially for forget, remember, and know, but 
there were no significant age differences.
Moore, Bryant and Furrow (1989) point out that much of the experimental 
research that had been done on children’s understanding of mental state verbs had 
investigated children’s knowledge of the presuppositions of the verbs - whether or not the 
complement of the verb is true. For example, in "John knows that it’s raining", "it’s 
raining" is presupposed to be true - while in "John thinks that it’s raining", "it’s raining" 
may or may not be true. Verbs like know which presuppose the truth of their 
complement are called factives, while verbs like think or guess that don’t presuppose the 
truth of their complements are nonfactives. Thus in Johnson and Wellman (1980), the 
conditions of the tasks were manipulated to change the presuppositions - whether or not 
prior information was given about whether the object was in the box - to see if children 
are sensitive to the effects of these conditions on the meanings of the words. Other 
studies identified by Moore et al. (1989) which investigated children’s understanding of 
the presuppositions of mental verbs are Abbeduto and Rosenberg (1985), Bassano 
(1985), Johnson and Maratsos (1977), Miscione et al. (1978) and Wellman and Johnson 
(1979). Moore, Bryant, and Furrow extend these works by investigating another aspect 
of the acquisition of these terms: how they are used to signal the certainty with which a 
statement is made. Moore et al. call these usages pragmatic, in contrast to what they say 
is the semantic differences of the factive-nonfactive distinction (whether or not 
differences in certainty are just another type of semantic difference is a point not worth 
arguing here; however the recognition that the previous studies were concerned with but 
a limited aspect of meaning is laudable).
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In Moore, Bryant and Furrow’s study, 3-, 4-, 5-, 6- and 8- year-olds were given a 
series of tasks of choosing in which of two boxes an object was hidden. They were given 
verbal clues as to which one to choose by two puppets manipulated by the researcher.
For each trial, each of the two puppets indicated a different location and used a different 
verb, saying "I [know/think/guess] it’s in the [blue/red] box." The three possible 
combinations of two of these verbs were presented in each set of trials. They found that 
for the know-think and know-guess contrasts, the 3 and 4 year olds performed worse than 
older children at choosing the box indicated by the more certain statement (know). The 4 
year olds did better than the 3 year olds, however. Moore et al. interpret these findings as 
indicating that by 4 years of age, children are starting to differentiate between know and 
think, and know and guess, and that this pragmatic understanding of the certainty implied 
by each term is complete by 5 years.
In a study similar to Moore, Bryant and Furrow (1989), using the same 
methodology, Moore and Davidge (1989) set out to see whether children’s understanding 
of certainty (again called pragmatic understanding) is differentiated from their 
understanding of the factive - non-factive distinction (deemed a semantic understanding). 
Were children using the pragmatic or semantic distinction to differentiate cognitive 
verbs? In order to investigate this, three cognitive verbs were contrasted: know, think, 
and sure. (Know is a factive implying certainty, think a non-factive which doesn’t imply 
certainty, while sure is a non-factive which does imply certainty.) They found that 3- 
year-olds performed poorly on all distinctions. Four, 5, and 6 year olds differentiated 
between know and think, and sure and think, but not between know and sure. They
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conclude that these older children were using the pragmatic basis, certainty, to 
differentiate between the terms, and not the semantic basis, factivity.
To summarize, in the experimental work on children’s understanding of the verbs 
know and think, the researchers have assumed that the verbs differ from each other only 
by single semantic features. While their results all show age differences between 
younger and older children, it is not possible to tell from this approach what the source of 
the age differences is, what the actual meanings of the verbs are for the children at 
different ages, and what developmental processes lead to more mature understanding and 
use. The attainment of more basic levels of meaning is not addressed.
Observational Studies 
We move now from the experimental work to a summary o f observational studies 
that have been carried out on children’s acquisition of mental state terms.
Shatz, Wellman, and Silber (1983), in setting out to study two-year-olds’ uses of 
mental state verbs, were concerned that children may be able to use these verbs 
conversationally without actually making reference to mental states. They point out that 
in adults the verbs can be used for example to fill pauses ("you know") or mitigate a 
demand ("I think I want a cookie"). These conversational uses in the adult presuppose 
the verbs’reference to mental state, but Shatz et al. wanted to be careful not to count such 
productions by the child as instances of reference to mental state, since the child could 
produce such utterances without understanding or awareness of the presupposition of 
mental state associated with these words. Thus in their conservative coding scheme, the 
functions of the utterances were classified, using contextual cues, into one category for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
reference to mental state, and several others for utterances which did not provide strong 
evidence for their explicitly referring to mental state. These latter categories included, 
for example, ’modulation of assertion’ (e.g., "I think this is a lamb"), and ’directing the 
interaction’ (e.g., "Remember where the dirt is?"). In addition, those utterances classified 
as referring to mental state were further examined to see whether they served to point out 
a contrast between mental state and reality. According to Shatz et al., these ’contrastive’ 
uses are especially informative not only because they provide good evidence for 
understanding of mental phenomena, but also because they indicate that the child’s 
understanding is similar at least in this way to adults’ understanding - it is claimed that 
among adults "making the difference explicit seems to be a prime motivation for 
expressing mental state" (p.304). The children’s contrastive utterances, then, are taken as 
paradigmatic examples of expressions of mental state.
Their results are based on two studies of spontaneous speech in young children: 
the first followed one child (Abe) intensively, using speech samples collected twice 
weekly from age 2 years;4 months to 4;0. In the second study speech samples were 
collected by audiotape from 30 children on 4 occasions at 2 month intervals during their 
third year.
Abe used the verbs know and think most frequently of the 17 mental verbs 
reported. The earliest age at which he used a mental verb to refer to a mental state 
according to their conservative classification was at age 2;8 - the verb think. Most (13) 
of the verbs were used over the course of the study for both mental state reference and 
"nonmental" uses. Eight of these 13 verbs were used in nonmental ways at earlier ages 
than mental uses. The modal function of these verbs changed over the course of the
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study from using the phrase "I don’t know" (65%) at 2;4-2;8, to expressing mental state at 
3;7-3;ll (43%). By 2;9-2;l 1, nearly a quarter (23%) of his mental verbs were used to 
refer to mental states, and 20% of the utterances coded as mental state references were 
used contrastively to differentiate mental states from reality. Results from the second 
study are comparable to and corroborate those obtained in the first study from Abe’s 
earliest productions (age 2;4-2;8) and are not summarized here.
In a study of mothers and their toddlers videotaped longitudinally in a variety of 
contexts, Beeghly, Bretherton, and Mervis (1986) found that the mothers’internal state 
language to their toddlers changed over time, increasing with the increasing age of their 
13-, 20-, and 28- month-old children both in frequency and variety. At 13 months, 
mothers attributed internal states primarily to the child; by 28 months, the mother was 
attributing them to other people as well. The category of internal state talked about also 
changed with the age of the child: at 13 months, the mothers talked most about 
perception, and volition/ability, while at 28 months they were also using words for 
cognition, moral judgment/obligation, and physiology. Measures of the frequency and 
variety of maternal internal state language at each age of the child were correlated with 
maternal report of their children’ ability to use internal state words and other measures of 
the children’s production and comprehension of these words at 28 months. The 
frequency of use of internal state words by the mothers differed by social context at 28 
months: more during the snack and book reading situations than during free play. While 
the overall variety of internal state words produced was highest during the snack context, 
the category of internal state words most often used differed by the three contexts.
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In conjunction with another study reported in their paper which showed that 
mothers use less internal state language with toddlers who have Down’s Syndrome, the 
authors interpreted the results as suggesting that mothers fine-tune their internal state 
language according to their beliefs about their children’s development. In turn, amount of 
exposure to internal state language seemed to influence their children’s acquisition of this 
vocabulary. An important finding for the present study is that the category of internal 
state language used differed by social context (fairly broadly defined), leaving open the 
possibility that children use differing cues present in the differing contexts to interpret the 
meanings of the words. How internal state language is parceled out over more finely cut 
divisions of context was not addressed in the Beeghly et al. study.
Hall, Scholnick and Hughes (1987) observed the cognitive state word usage of 
somewhat older children, aged 4 1/2 to 5 years. The children in this study differed by 
race (black or white) and socioeconomic class of their parents (working or professional). 
All children were audiotaped during three settings: free play at school, teaching time at 
school, and dinner at home. The speech of the adults interacting with them in these 
settings was also recorded, and usage of cognitive state words noted. Besides the 
frequency and variety o f words used by the children and adults, the usages were 
classified according to a scheme that categorized them into six progressively more 
advanced levels, based on depth of processing and abstractness: Perception, Recognition, 
Recall, Understanding, Metacognition, and Evaluation (see Hall, Scholnick and Hughes, 
1987, p.294-295 for level descriptions; see also Booth and Hall, 1995, for a refinement of 
this scheme.) These levels are based on the content of the mental verb - for example, for 
Perception, the speaker reports the act of perception, "I heard your story"; for Recall, the
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speaker refers to factual information that he or she remembers: "I know his phone 
number"; for Metacognition, the speaker discusses awareness of a mental act:
"Pretending can be fun". These researchers support an information processing view of the 
development of meaning; according to their interpretation, the lower levels are acquired 
first because they are closer to the perceptions of the child-observer, while the higher 
levels are acquired later because they require more processing of perceptual input. 
(Because these levels are based on an information processing model, they are difficult to 
compare to the levels in Nelson and Lucariello’s scheme which assumes that meanings 
are formulated by the child in relation to event representations, and that words eventually 
become related to each other in a lexical system; see next section, Reconciliation.)
Because they are of the most relevance to this project, I will focus here on 
differences by setting contexts and meaning level. Because the focus for the authors was 
instead on social class and race differences, significant differences by setting are not 
always reported. In these cases I rely on inspection of their data for comparisons. Also, 
the length of time to which their data correspond was not reported, so the frequency 
values in their tables are difficult to interpret, and are not recounted here.
The children used significantly more cognitive state words (tokens) at home than 
in either school setting. Level 1 meanings (Perception) were the most frequent at both 
home and school; Levels 3 (Recall) and 5 (Metacognition) were more frequent than 
Levels 4 (Understanding) and 6 (Evaluation). Significance tests on the frequencies by 
setting were not reported for the adults, but inspection of the frequencies presented 
suggests that the adults at home used cognitive state words more frequently than the 
adults at school.
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The white working class, white professional class, and black professional class 
children produced a greater variety of different types of cognitive state words at home 
than at school; the black working class children produced as varied speech at school as at 
home. The black working class children produced the least varied speech at home, when 
compared to the three other groups of children.
The variety of cognitive state words in speech directed to the children in the 
different settings differed by the socioeconomic level of the children. The children of 
professional parents heard more varied speech at home than at school; however the 
working class children heard an equal variety of cognitive state words at home as in the 
directed school activity (but more in both situations than in free play). The overall 
variety of cognitive state words heard by the children was significantly correlated with 
the variety in their production.
The level of meaning used also differed by setting. The proportion of the child’s 
internal state lexicon devoted to each of the three most advanced meaning levels was 
highest at home. There was a correlation between the proportion of internal state words 
devoted to the three higher levels directed to the child and that produced by the child.
The tentative conclusions to be drawn from these results are that setting makes a 
difference to the use of internal state words, but it may affect different groups of people 
in different ways; and that adult ways of using internal state words may influence how 
they are used by children. What this study didn’t address is what aspects of the situation 
call forth the different patterns of usage, and whether different sets of words might be 
used more often or with particular meanings in particular contexts. As well, their account 
of meaning development tells us little about how word meanings come to be related to
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each other in a lexical system, or how children manage to move from lower levels of 
abstraction to higher.
Bloom, Rispoli, Gartner, and Hafltz (1989) approaching the problem from a 
linguistic-structural rather than a functional perspective, looked at a large subset of 
children’s uses of think and know, complementation: their uses in complex sentences 
having two verbs, expressing two propositions, in which one proposition serves as an 
argument within another proposition, as in their example, "I think I can put him in a 
house". Four children were studied longitudinally in naturalistic contexts from two to 
three years of age. Aside from short routine phrases (such as "I don’t know" and "Think 
so?"), know and think were used mostly as complement-taking verbs.
They found that children’s complement-taking uses of think and know had a high 
degree of contextual contingency - that is, the complement and/or complement-taking 
verb were previously introduced into the discourse by the adult speaker.
Bloom et al. distinguished two types of sentences with complementation: 
sentential complements (s-complements) and wh-complements. Think appeared only 
with s-complements (e.g., "I think I can put him in a house") while know appeared 
predominantly with wh-complements ("You know what’s in this bag?"). The 
complementizer connectives what, where, and how were used by the children with know 
but not with think. That was rarely used as a complementizer connective. The 
participants of the subordinate verbs varied much more than those of the mental state 
verbs: think occurred mostly with I as a participant; know appeared with both I and you, 
but the order of acquisition varied by child. Little morphological marking was used with
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the mental state verbs. The subordinate verbs used with think often appeared with a 
modal such as should (as in, "I think we should put this in a house.’’).
Bloom et al. use these findings to support their proposal that children use think 
and know to express uncertainty and certainty, even before the ’’truly cognitive 
meanings" of the terms are acquired. They emphasize that even at this early age, these 
and other complementizing verbs (see, look) are used with differentiation and specificity. 
These findings call out for the examination of mother-child conversation. Where do the 
lexical and semantic differentiations reported for the verbs at ages two and three come 
from? How closely do children’s uses match those of their discourse partners?
Furrow, Moore, Davidge, and Chiasson (1992) investigated the relations between 
mothers’ and children’s uses of mental terms. They looked at 19 mother-child dyads; 
when the children were 2;0 years and again when they were 3;0. They measured the 
functions of the usages: true mental state reference, modulation of assertion, directing the 
interaction, directing reflection. These categories were an improvement based on Shatz et 
al.’s (1983) scheme - an improvement because Furrow et al.’s descriptions of the coding 
categories provide clearer criteria for an utterance’s category assignment.
Because I base these coding categories on their work, here I briefly summarize the 
category descriptions and examples presented by Furrow et al. (pp. 621-622).
Mental state reference. The utterance’s topic was the mental state of a person, as 
in "Think about it in your head".
Modulation of assertion. Marking of the certainty o f a statement, recasting the 
speaker’s own previous utterance, as in "Did you chew that or did Liam chew that? I think 
you chewed that."
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Directing the interaction. An utterance that gave information or specified an 
action which might be carried out, as in "Do you think that’s a garage?"
Directing reflection. An utterance made reference to information or an action but 
did not specify it directly, instead using a wh-word, as in "Do you know where that goes?"
Furrow et al. provide an important and arduous-to-obtain statistic: the percentage 
of all mental term utterances of the total number of utterances in the samples: 3.93% and 
8.32% for mothers of 2;0 and 3;0 year old; and 0.40% and 3.82% for the children aged 
2;0 and 3;0. These were significant differences for both speaker and age. (A count of the 
total number of utterances made by the speakers in the current study, no matter how 
desirable, was not attempted.)
Think and know were the two most common mental terms used by both mothers 
and children at both ages. Utterances containing these two terms, like the total of all 
mental terms, showed increases from age 2;0 to 3;0 for both children and mothers. The 
most common function for mental term use by mothers and children at 3;0 was directing 
the interaction. There was a difference between terms, however: mothers and children 
used think more often to direct interaction, while mothers used know to direct reflection. 
The children used know both to direct reflection and in the phrase "I don’t know".
Correlations were performed for proportions of total utterances containing mental 
terms, and for the functions of the mental terms, with all the mental terms grouped 
together. Although it is understandable that they view the mothers’overall use of mental 
terms as contributing to the children’s global understanding o f mental phenomena, given 
their findings that the different mental terms had different functions, their results would
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have been clearer for unraveling the development of word use if they had reported on 
each term as well as grouping them together.
They found significant positive correlations between the mothers’ and children’s 
proportion of use of mental terms at age 2;0 and children’s use at 3;0. As for the 
functions of the mental state terms, mothers’ use at 2;0 of mental terms to make 
utterances actually about mental states and to direct reflection were both significantly 
correlated with children’s total use of mental state terms at 3;0.
Despite their focus on language, Furrow et al. speculate that the mother’s use of 
mental state language contributes to the child’s theory of mind by overtly focussing the 
child’s attention on mental processes; using utterances which "direct reflection", in 
particular, would ask children to reflect on their own mental states.
In research focussed on the influence of conversational partners, Brown, Donelan- 
McCall, and Dunn (1996), studied a relatively large group (38) of 47-month-old, second- 
bom children with three different conversational partners: the mother, the older sibling, 
and a friend. Audiotape recordings were made under naturalistic conditions, in the target 
children’s homes. For the mother and sibling observations, the family’s daily routine was 
recorded in the presence of the researcher. For the observations with the friend, the target 
child and friend were provided with a set of dress-up clothes and other toys and were left 
to play on their own. As well, the target children were tested for false belief 
understanding at 40 and 47 months. It is not clear from Brown et al.’s description of the 
observational method as to how much direction was given to the mothers and siblings to 
focus their attention on the younger child; the participants were free to move from room 
to room and to engage in their "daily routine".
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Brown et al. did not focus on mothers’ or children’s differential uses of different 
mental state terms; rather, all mental state terms were grouped together and reported on 
globally. This is because they were concentrating on differences in mental state talk in 
general in different relationships- Dunn, the third author, has in her work consistently 
been interested in the family, especially sibling relationships - and not on the 
development of word meaning. Their work is nevertheless based to a  large extent on uses 
of know (47% of mental state turns) and think (14%), and thus their findings bear direct 
importance to the study reported on in this dissertation.
Brown et al. found that the children used mental state talk much more with their 
friends than with their mothers or siblings. For all speakers, the conversational function 
of the mental state term was most likely for referring to mental states themselves; but the 
children also often used mental terms to direct the interaction with their friends. The 
children referred to shared mental states more often with their friends than with their 
mothers or siblings. Much of the child-friend mental state term use occurred during 
pretend play. Mental state talk was positively correlated with cooperative (as opposed to 
conflictual) play between friends and siblings, and more with girl friends than with boy 
friends. The strength of the friendship (measured in length in time of the friendship and 
frequency per week in playing together) was also positively correlated with amount of 
mental state talk. Positive correlations were also found between false belief task 
measures and use of mental state terms with siblings and friends as measured by total 
mental state turns, use of terms to modulate assertions and direct the interaction, to make 
contrastives, and to talk about shared mental experiences.
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Brown et al. argue that among 4-year-olds who have clearly demonstrated an 
understanding of mental representation, it is overly conservative to assign 
"conversational" uses of mental state terms to a simple rote, non-mental status. They 
point to the important pragmatic role such utterances take in collaborative pretend play, 
and suggest that "the activity of creating fantasy worlds and sustaining interactive games 
with other children must surely provide multiple opportunities for the fledgling theorists 
to appreciate the workings of the mind" (p.847). These authors acknowledge that they 
have studied these children at a relatively late age, when use of mental state terms is 
fairly well established; they recommend the study of naturalistic mother-child interaction 
for the investigation of the development of these abilities. They recommend also that 
attention should be focussed on the type of play conditions under which mental state 
terms are used and learned.
While the observational work demonstrates the early competence of young 
children in using mental state terms, including think and know, there are important issues 
that it skirts. The development o f the meanings of individual words is largely bypassed: 
mental state terms are grouped together, their differing meanings and functions often 
undistinguished. The relations between words, emphasized in the experimental literature, 
are largely ignored in observational studies. One significant exception to these 
generalizations is Bloom et al.’s study; however, they look only at complement-taking 
uses. And while mother-child interaction is emphasized in the observational work, how 
conversation leads to the development of individual word meaning and meaning relations 
is not.
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A Reconciliation between Experimental and Observational Studies:
Development of Meaning 
The apparently contradictory results offered by the observational and 
experimental work summarized above showing that children under 3 years of age use 
mental state terms appropriately under naturalistic conditions, but fail on experimental 
tests of their discrimination between cognitive terms, may be reconciled by placing them 
into a broader perspective provided by Nelson and Lucariello’s (1985) classification of 
theories of early word meaning, and their developmental solution to the inadequacies of 
these theories. Here I will briefly describe their classification framework and their 
proposed solution, and then show how the mental state term work fits into their 
classification scheme. Then I will show that their developmental perspective on early 
word meanings provides a satisfactory explanation for the differences in findings 
between the observational and experimental studies on internal state terms. Continuing 
on to Nelson and her colleagues’work on the relation between generalized event 
representations and early language acquisition (1986) will set up a springboard for 
proposing a new study on the acquisition of the two mental state terms, think and know.
Following Lyons’ (1977) description of three aspects of adult word meaning, 
Nelson and Lucariello divided theories of early word meaning into three groups: 
referential/perceptual, denotational/conceptual, and sense/semantic theories. 
Referential/perceptual theories are those which propose that children use perceptual cues 
as a basis by which to form meanings of words. Acquisition consists of learning what 
labels stand for which things in the world (usually objects), using perception as a guide. 
Extension precedes intension - children leam what words refer to what things without
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previously having a concept on which to map the word. As Nelson and Lucariello point 
out, there are drawbacks to referential/perceptual theories: for one, many words do not 
have clear real world referents, such as abstract, or relational terms.
Denotational/conceptual theories of early word meaning propose that children 
map words onto their previously existing concepts. Intension precedes extension - 
children form concepts based on their experience in the world and only then pair words 
and objects. Word meaning is based on the child’s experientially derived concepts.
Sense/semantic theories, rather than positing that children base early meanings on 
perception or prior concepts, claim that children early on have available linguistic 
primitives or semantic features. Working out the relations between words within various 
domains in terms of their contrasting features is seen as the way children accrue meaning 
to words. A problem with these theories as applied to internal states, as with other 
domains, is that it is not clear that young children recognize from the start that there are 
linguistic (or real-world) domains of emotion, cognition, or physiological states, etc., 
which they proceed to differentiate.
Nelson and Lucariello argue that all three types of theory are flawed in that each 
presents a limited view of what word meaning consists of: the referential theories don’t 
take into account denotation and sense, the denotational theories don’t address reference 
and sense, and the sense theories ignore reference and denotation. An adequate theory of 
the development of words meaning must take into account all three aspects of word 
meaning, since all will eventually be present in the adult system. At the same time, an 
adequate theory must account for the changes in the child’s ability to mean; rather than 
claiming that all three aspects are available from the start, Nelson and Lucariello propose
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that there is a developmental progression proceeding from the ability to refer, to 
denotation, to making sense (in the technical sense of the word).
To accommodate all three aspects of meaning in a way that accords with the 
evidence from studies of the meanings of children’s early words, Nelson and her 
colleagues (1985) have proposed a model of meaning development which revolves 
around generalized event representations. Generalized event representations are, as their 
label implies, internal representations of familiar events in the child’s everyday life.
Much effort has gone into demonstrating that these representations are general - 
representations of the way events usually go - and not simply memories of specific, 
individual events. GER’s are the cognitive counterparts to the routinized formats of 
Bruner’s (1983) formulation, the point being that the children’s representations may differ 
from the formats of the actual events, and once established can be manipulated 
independently of the events themselves. From an early age, young children represent 
events in a holistic manner, without conceptually distinguishing the parts (actors, actions, 
objects) which make up the event. During the first half of the child’s second year, many 
of the children’s words are prelexical - they don’t refer to particulars within the event, as 
the event has not yet been analyzed into its component parts. Instead they have a more 
event-bound, performative quality, inseparable from the situations in which they occur. 
Some words at this age do seem to refer - the naming of pictures in books, the naming of 
objects in specific situations - but the meanings of these words are solely referential, 
lacking a conceptual basis. During the second half of the child’s second year, children 
start to analyze their event representations, developing independently manipulable 
concepts for the parts of the event: objects, actors, actions. At the end of the child’s third
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year, words not only refer, they also denote, as word meanings are now based on 
concepts of these parts o f events. However, sense meaning is still not present. Only with 
further differentiation and integration of the conceptual system and linguistic experience, 
occurring through the preschool years, does a semantic (sense) system come into being.
It is only then that the relations between the meanings of words - relations of contrast, of 
similarity, of hierarchy - become established.
In this dissertation, I will use the terms conversationally embedded (rather than 
referential/perceptual), denotation (rather than denotational/conceptual), and sense (rather 
than sense/semantic) to refer to the levels of word meaning for think and know attained 
by children. I use conversationally embedded instead of referential/perceptual because 
children’s first meanings for abstract words such as think and know do not refer to any 
particular object or concept or perceptual phenomenon; they are inseparable from the 
types of conversations in which they are used. I use denotation and sense because I want 
to emphasize linguistic development, and the first term in each pair speaks to word more 
than thought.
Since 1985, Nelson and Lucariello have toned down their strong claim that initial 
words are non-conceptual and dependent for their meaning on their undifferentiated 
embeddedness in general representations of familiar events (Nelson, personal 
communication). This change was prompted by research carried out by Lucariello (1987) 
which demonstrated that even infants in the beginning of word acquisition (under 50 
words in their vocabularies, in the middle of their second year) were able to form 
concepts of and leam words for experimental objects. These words were also generalized 
by the infants to novel exemplars of the categories of objects signified by the new words.
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Rather than learning ungeneralizable words for objects, embedded in event schemas, as 
the theory predicted, even these beginning learners seemed to base their learning of 
words for objects on object concepts.
Nelson has further suggested (1990) that the single-word period may consist of 
three distinct phases: first a "holistic" phase, in which words are embedded in unanalyzed 
event schemas; secondly an "exemplar" phase, in which word meanings are beginning to 
depend on object and action concepts, but these concepts are holistic, based on single 
exemplars; and third a "conceptual" phase, in which words are extended on the bases of 
analyzed features (labels for phases, in quotes, are mine). In her 1988 paper 
("Constraints on Word Learning?") Nelson provides an overview of three periods of word 
learning which correspond to those of the Nelson and Lucariello 1985 paper but which 
rely less heavily on the disembedding of words and concepts from generalized event 
representations. In the 1988 scheme, in the first period, the child faces the problem of 
what words do and how they refer. Word production is marked by over- and under­
extension, complexive uses, idiosyncracity of meaning. The second period begins when 
the child has about 30 words in his productive vocabulary, and "seems to have achieved 
the realization that words name categories of objects and events" (p. 89). During this 
period word meaning are based on conceptual categories which are in turn based on the 
child’s experiences. It is not until the third period when the relations between words 
begin to be worked out, and the child forms a lexical system through the reorganization 
of the conceptually-based words acquired during the second period.
These tentative modifications of their theory do not appear to affect its application 
to the acquisition of mental state words. These changes are meant to address new
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research on the early, one-word phase, especially as it relates to the learning of object 
words. Children are well past the one-word phase of development when they begin to 
use words for mental state. Their description of word meaning development may be an 
even more useful guide to how children acquire the meanings of more abstract words 
such as mental state terms, which cannot be taught by simple ostension or be based 
simply on readily available perceptual cues.
Using this framework, we can now return to the issue of the apparent 
contradiction between the experimental and observational findings on children’s mental 
state terms. Now we can see that the contradiction is indeed only apparent. The 
experimentalists have focussed on the development of sense meanings - whether or not 
children differentiate between the features of related words in a particular lexical domain, 
cognitive terms. Studying 3-, 4-, and 5- year- olds, they have mostly found 3- and 4 year- 
olds’knowledge to be deficient. It would be acceptable if the researchers acknowledged 
that what they were studying is only one, later-developing aspect of word meaning - 
sense - which develops through the preschool years and beyond. But instead these 
researchers tend to claim that 3- and 4- year- olds lack the conceptual basis for these 
words. This makes it seem as if they were saying that these words mean nothing to pre­
schoolers. Yet the observational data make it clear that 2- and 3- year- olds can use 
mental state terms appropriately, when supported by the appropriate context. It may be 
suggested then that the meanings of two- and three- year- old children’s mental state 
terms might have a conceptual basis; perhaps at two they start to be differentiated within 
the holistic event and at three they can be manipulated independently of the event itself -
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but as the experimental evidence shows, at three years the words do not seem to have 
been located in an abstract lexical system complete with sense contrasts.
Observational Data for Theory of Mind Purposes:
The Research of Bartsch and Wellman 
In service of their goal of describing the state of young children’s knowledge 
about the mind, Bartsch and Wellman, in their 1995 book, Children Talk About the 
Mind, present an analysis of children’s uses of mental state terms - but only those that fall 
under the category of "genuine psychological reference". Bartsch and Wellman present a 
strong argument in favor of their "theory theory". They describe children’s understanding 
of the mind as the development of different theories as to how the mind works.
Children’s understandings can be described as theories, in their view, because they 
explain and predict people’s behavior and actions. The constructs involved in the theories 
- beliefs, desires, actions, etc. - are related to each other in important ways which serve to 
explain and predict. Bartsch and Wellman describe three phases in the child’s 
developing knowledge about people’s minds: an early desire phase, in which people’s 
behavior is understood in terms of their wants (desire psychology); a second phase in 
which children begin to talk about people’s beliefs and thoughts, but do not consistently 
relate them to people’s actions - their explanations for people’s actions still rely on desires 
(desire-belief psychology); and a third phase, in which people’s beliefs and thoughts are 
increasingly used to explain behavior (belief-desire psychology).
Rather than collect original transcripts, Bartsch and Wellman have used 
previously collected transcripts from other longitudinal studies of individual children - 10
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children in all- which had already been entered into CHELDES , the Child Language Data 
Exchange System (MacWhinney & Snow, 1985, 1990). The children included in the 
study were Adam, Eve, and Sarah (Brown, 1973); Abe (Kuczaj & Maratsos, 1975); Ross 
and Mark ( contributed by Brian MacWhinney); Allison (Bloom, 1973); Peter (Bloom, 
1970); Nathaniel (contributed by Catherine Snow ); and Naomi (Sachs, 1983). They 
searched the records for uses of a short list of target mental terms, including think and 
know. They also studied desire terms, such as want and like, but because they relate 
more directly to this research, I present here a summary only of some of their findings on 
children’s use of mental terms. Verbs included in their analysis were think, know. 
wonder, dream, believe, and expect, but 96% of the uses were of think or know.
According to Bartsh and Wellman, the children began to refer to thoughts and 
beliefs just before age 3; by age 4, 25% of their uses of the terms were genuine 
psychological references. Their uses included two different types of contrastives: those 
in which the child contrasted thoughts and reality, and those in which they contrasted the 
thoughts of two different individuals. Only a small percentage (less than 4% at its 
highest point for thought-reality contrastives) of mental term uses were contrastives, but 
Bartsch and Wellman argue that the demonstrated ability to make these kinds of 
contrasts, beginning about age 3, are significant because they provide insight about the 
child’s early conceptions of thoughts and beliefs. To this end, they analyzed the children’s 
contrastives further. The children’s individual contrastives not only juxtaposed two 
differing mental states, they were differing states about the same object or contents. This 
indicated that children understand the subjective quality of mental states - that different 
people can simultaneously have different thoughts about the same object. As well,
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beginning at age 3, the children in their thought-reality contrastives demonstrated their 
knowledge that thoughts can reflect the real world - be epistemic - and not only about 
fictional imaginings. The children also, from age 3, produced false belief contrastives: 
statements contrasting false representations of the world with true real world content - 
demonstrating their understanding that thoughts are representations of reality, which can 
match (or not) the state of affairs in the world. The emphasis here is on their grasp of the 
representational quality of mental events - that they are representations of, and not mere 
connections to, external events. From age 3, the children also asked questions about, and 
made assertions about sources of knowledge - such as seeing or hearing, or being told by 
another person. Bartsch and Wellman report that the children used think and know 
differentially; their genuine psychological references using think referred to the contents 
of thought, while they used know to talk about ignorance of true things. (Perplexingly, 
they provide only examples of differential use, and no data to back up their statement.)
Bartsch and Wellman also looked at children’s references to the self’s and others’ 
thoughts and beliefs (again, data are provided only for "true psychological references", 
not all uses of the mental terms). While references to the selfs thoughts and beliefs 
predominated, the delay between first referring to the selfs and first referring to another’s 
thoughts was not long, on average only one month. Bartsch and Wellman conclude that 
the predominant reference to the selfs thoughts stemmed from the child’s general 
tendency to talk about the self, and not from the absence of a conception of thought in 
other people.
While providing us with a useful, if overgenerous, description of young 
children’s knowledge of people’s mental states, their approach and method give us little
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idea of how this knowledge originates and develops. They dispense with a bulk of useful 
information: the uses of mental state terms which were judged not to be genuine 
psychological references.
I challenge the notion that mere "conversational" uses of mental terms (as if the 
other uses were not made during conversation!) are unrelated to the development of 
genuine psychological ones. There is a reason why common phrases are used in 
conversation the way they are, having to do with their relation to the more core meanings 
represented by the words. Take two common conversational uses of know: "You know 
what?" and "I don't know". "You know what?" is used in conversation to gain attention 
and introduce new information. Literally, though, the phrase questions the listener as to 
whether or not the listener possesses the new information to be given by the speaker. "I 
don’t know", in conversation, is an answer given by a listener when the speaker asks 
whether or not the listener possesses a piece of information - new or otherwise- and the 
listener does not possess that information. Queries and answers about the possession of 
information can be interpreted as references to mental state. Admittedly, these are the 
literal interpretations of these phrases; the child does not need to understand these literal 
meanings in order to participate in conversations containing them; they can use them 
simply by rote. Yet the potential is there for a deeper analysis of the repeated 
conversational contexts in which they occur. These, in conjunction with hearing more 
"advanced", more obviously mental uses, can contribute to the child’s interpretation of the 
meaning of mental terms. The argument is that it a mistake to disregard conversational 
uses of mental terms as irrelevant to the disentangling of meaning of the terms by the 
child; on the contrary, the stable conversational contexts in which they occur can aid the
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child. To rephrase the argument in terms of Nelson and Lucariello’s theory, the children 
might first be using the word such that it is embedded in the conversational events - but 
with repeated use in a number of different contexts, the child disembeds the term from 
the conversational events, arriving at a concept of what the term denotes. The use of 
mental terms in "conversational" ways with adults is part of how children gather the 
evidence which they later use in the disembedding process.
As I read their book, I attempted to clarify how the categories they coded would 
have been placed in this study’s coding scheme. The differences in emphasis are a good 
example of how the same data can be coded differently to serve the purposes of two very 
different theories with diverging goals. Bartsch and Wellman’s conversational uses, 
rejected by them as not genuine mental references, become conversationally embedded 
uses, tied to the here and now, in the word meaning level coding scheme. Bartsch and 
Wellman’s contrastives- except those that contrast two mental terms - become Nelson and 
Lucariello’s denotational uses, as they indicate that the child has disembedded concepts 
corresponding to the terms. (In the word meaning scheme, references to the past, future, 
and generalizations are also included as denotational references.) The contrasting of two 
mental terms - not specifically coded for by Bartsch and Wellman but overlapping in part 
with their contrastives - those that use two related verbs for mental state - are included in 
the sense meaning category of the word meaning level scheme, along with assertions 
about sources, described as mention of presupposition in the meaning level scheme. 
Questions about sources alone in the Bartsch and Wellman scheme were not included as 
sense meanings in the word meaning scheme because their form - consistently appearing 
in the frame, "How do you know?" - led me to think that the question can be understood
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as functioning as a fixed mode of additional information acquisition in a given context, 
and not necessarily as a  true inquiry about source. Further, many of Bartsch and 
Wellman’s codings are generous in ascribing children with knowledge about mental states 
from rather bare conversational evidence. Until they gain a more fluid flexibility in 
using the terms in more varied lexical and situational contexts, it is presumptuous to 
claim they are using an organized theory of mind when the children could simply be 
starting to use phrases which they have heard more advanced speakers using in s i m i lar  
contexts.
General Event Representations and Language
I move on now to a selected review of literature which supports the view that 
language in general and word meanings in particular are acquired in the context of adult- 
child interaction.
Lucariello, Kyratzis, and Engel (1986) present three studies which explore the 
relation between event representations and language. (The first two will be discussed 
here; the third is omitted because it deals with the influence of maternal language on 
event knowledge acquisition, rather than on language acquisition, the focus here.) In the 
first, mother-child language in Event Contexts, situations in which mother and child 
share event knowledge, was compared with their language in non-Events, for which the 
dyad did not share such knowledge. The authors predicted that language in the Event 
Context would be facilitated for three reasons: (1) mother and child share knowledge 
about the situation, and this in itself should promote discourse; (2) mothers may promote 
their children’s speech to a greater extent during the routines played out in Event
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Contexts; and (3) child speech may be facilitated in Event Contexts because there is less 
of a processing demand on the child in a more familiar situation, leaving more processing 
capacity to be devoted to language.
In this first study, ten mother-child dyads were audio- and video-taped in their 
homes. The children ranged in age from 2;0 to 2;5. Three contexts were studied: an 
Event Context situation which varied by dyad but was always familiar and routine to the 
particular dyad (e.g., lunch or getting dressed); and two non-Event situations: a Novel 
context consisting of play with an unfamiliar castle toy set; and a Free Play situation in 
which the dyad played with an unfamiliar set of unrelated toys. Transcripts of the 
sessions were examined for variation in language use. In general, their predictions were 
supported. Among the results supporting the prediction that the Event Context would 
support language use were that the children were better at answering questions during the 
Event Context than during the two non-Event contexts; the semantic breadth - number of 
different topics discussed per conversation - was greater during the Event Context; and 
more conversations about non-present activities - either in the past or in the future - took 
place during the Event Contexts.
A second study described by Lucariello, Kyratzis, and Engel and reported on 
more completely in Nelson, Engel, and Kyratzis (1985) examined the decontextualization 
of early object word use within an Event Context. Decontextualization was defined as 
the acquisition of pragmatic functions increasingly distant from the action: requesting, 
initiating, narrating, planning, invoking. The invoking function is seen as the 
"culmination of the decontextualization process": words can be used conceptually to refer 
to particular aspects of an object or to further a conversational topic. For this study, one
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dyad was audiotaped once a week for 8 months, starting when the child was 16 months 
old. The Event Context studied was the morning routine of getting dressed and having 
breakfast. In Nelson, Engel, and Kyratzis (1985), the development of four words were 
traced: book, shoes, juice, and Daddy (concrete nouns all). Through relevant examples, 
the authors present the increasingly decontextualized manner in which both the mother 
and child used the words. At first, the child’s uses were embedded within the action of 
the Event, and didn’t appear to have any meaning which was independent of the Event. 
Then, within the Event Context, in later sessions the child was able to accomplish more 
complex functions: requesting, initiating. Finally, the child was able to anticipate and 
plan using the words: for example, while getting dressed, she was asked what she was 
going to have for breakfast, and she replied, "Toast. Milk. Juice!" The authors suggest 
that the shared event knowledge between mother and child permitted the mother to 
interpret the meanings of her child’s words and for the child to acquire the meanings 
presented by the mother.
These findings support the view that dialogue within familiar, routine contexts 
facilitates word learning, although word meaning may be disembedded from the 
representations of the events earlier than was previously assumed, during the "exemplar" 
phase as presented above in the discussion of Nelson (1990). It may be that the learning 
of object words presents a special case in the relation between words and concepts; 
children may disembed words for objects from event representations earlier than other 
types of words because object concepts may be easier for the child to form than other 
types of concepts (Gentner, 1982). The evidence that Lucariello (1987) put forth 
prompting the revision that children do base their early word meanings on concepts was
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solely based on object words, and might not generalize to other types of words and 
concepts. [See arguments below supporting this view in the summary of Nelson, 
Hampson, and Kessler Shaw (1991)].
Nelson, Hampson, and Kessler Shaw (1991) argue against the claims that 1) 
children in their earliest word learning first learn object names, identify these as 
belonging to the word class of nouns, and later extend the word class to include other 
types of nouns (semantic bootstrapping) and 2) children in the earliest period of language 
learning are constrained to think that words are the names of whole objects. Not all 
children leam nouns in preference to other types of words, and even when nouns are 
learned, they are not necessarily basic level objects, as the two above claims would 
imply. Instead, they suggest that object names may be relatively easier to leam not 
because of innate constraints, but due to other factors working together: the child’s 
general interest in and experience with objects, resulting in prelinguistic object concepts 
to which object names can be readily mapped; the perceptual coherence of whole objects, 
made even more salient through pictures which can be pointed at, or otherwise displayed 
as a single entity; and the format of the "Naming Game", a familiar frame within which 
object names can be introduced by the mother or (later) provided by the child. In contrast 
to these supportive conditions for the acquisition of object names, how young children 
can leam other words, including non-object nouns (or mental state verbs) is not as 
evident.
In a longitudinal investigation of how mothers and children up to the age of 20 
months use non-object nouns in natural discourse contexts, Nelson et al. identified a 
number of regularities which may support acquisition of these words. Each tended to be
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used in specific pragmatic and sentential contexts: both particular pragmatic contexts 
centered on the child’s activities, and sentential contexts involving frequendy used lexical 
phrases containing the word. They suggest that children use these cues toward meaning 
in conjunction with their prelinguistic concepts of activities, events and other non-object 
phenomena, and also begin to form new concepts based on the way these words are used 
in the language. (The latter may be especially true of words for cultural constructs, such 
as money). Children too may use such words in appropriate contexts before they know 
what the words mean; by using the words and attending to their use by others, children 
can gradually work out their meanings.
In this project I propose to extend the work of Nelson, Hampson, and Kessler 
Shaw by looking at two verbs commonly acquired by young children that are much more 
abstract than object names: think and know. Unlike objects, these mental states cannot be 
bumped into or picked up or pointed at. They are more like actions and events in that 
they are experienced. Unlike actions and events, however, the mental states of other 
people are not so easily observed. Because of their very intemality, it may be more 
difficult for adults and young children to achieve joint attention on mental states. How 
then, is learning of these words accomplished? How can the child know when an adult is 
referring to a mental state?
Montgomery: Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument
Montgomery’s (1997) statement in his theoretical article on Wittgenstein’s private 
language argument, as applied to a critique of theories of the child’s theory of mind, fits
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in well with the view presented here that developments in word meaning account for 
discrepancies between observational and experimental data. Here I will summarize his 
statement, compare it with Nelson and Lucariello’s view of word meaning development, 
and discuss how it relates to the research conducted in this dissertation.
Montgomery contrasts three views of how children might come to understand 
other minds: the simulation view, the theory view, and Wittgenstein’s criteriological view 
( which he supports). In the simulation view, the child first experiences the selfs own 
internal states, and then by analogy imputes the same internal states in others; the child 
works from the inside, out. In the theory view, the child acquires a set of theory-like 
principles that interrelate mental states with each other and with behavior; it is a coherent 
conceptual system that allows the child to infer the presence of mental states in other 
people. Bartsch and Wellman support this view.
According to Wittgenstein, introspection, as used in the simulation view, is an 
inadequate method for acquiring knowledge of mental state terms, because the child 
could not be certain when the private language created for the self should be applied to 
others. For justification of the appropriateness of using a word, external input is 
necessary. The child must leam which terms apply to which publicly observable, overt 
cues. These criteria are the public, outward rules of a "language game" which children 
leam by participating in the language game with more experienced "players" (such as 
parents). The rules of the language game provide criteria by which a speaker knows 
when a word is applicable and when it is not. For Wittgenstein, a word has meaning only 
when it has rules governing its applicability.
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Montgomery uses Wittgenstein’s criteriological view as applied to research 
evidence to criticize the theory view. According to his reading of evidence from 
research on children’s understanding of the mind, children’s initial state of understanding 
is more criteriological than theory-like: they appear to be more influenced by external 
criteriological features than by interdependent mental constructs. To use one of 
Montgomery’s examples, Lillard (1993) presented four and five-year-old children with a 
story in which a person who had never seen or heard of a kangaroo was hopping up and 
down. The preschoolers said that the person in the story was pretending to be a kangaroo 
- they used overt behavior (hopping) to establish pretense rather than the possession of 
pertinent knowledge ( the related theoretical construct). Similarly, he argues, the 
evidence shows that young preschoolers use correct outcome to behavior ( an overt cue) 
more reliably than perceptual access ( a related conceptual assumption) to attribute 
knowledge to another person. He summarizes that only gradually do preschoolers 
acquire an interrelating of concepts that indicate a theory of mind; the experimental 
evidence points to their early reliance on overt criteria to establish the presence or 
absence of mental states.
Montgomery suggests that children’s understanding of the mind may follow a 
developmental sequence wherein at first understanding is criteriological, as early word 
meanings are established, and later may be more theory-like, when the meanings of 
words are placed in relation to each other. A criteriological view is an inadequate 
description of adult understanding of the mind; overt behavior may differ from mental 
states. Montgomery further suggests that the child’s observations of discrepancies 
between outward behavior and mental states necessitate rule clarification and may be
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what drives the child’s development to a more mature, theory-like understanding of the 
mind.
How does Montgomery’s description of the development of word meaning 
compare to Nelson and Lucariello’s? Simplifying for comparison, Montgomery 
described only two stages of development: a criteriological stage, in which overt cues are 
used by the child to decide when a word can be appropriately used, and a theoretical 
stage, in which word meanings are interrelated and incorporated into a coherent set of 
principles. Nelson and Lucariello described three stages: reference, in which word 
meanings are undifferentiated from the event representations in which they occur; 
denotation, in which words have been differentiated from the events in which they occur, 
and the child has a concept for the word independent of the events in which they occur; 
and sense, in which word meanings have been placed in a system of relations with each 
other.
Montgomery’s theoretical stage and Nelson and Lucariello’s sense stage 
correspond to each other fairly readily, if the emphasis is placed on the establishment of a 
system of word meaning interrelations and not on whether or not the child has a theory­
like understanding of other people’s minds. How the criteria stage and embedded use and 
denotation fit together is not as apparent, and requires some stretching beyond these 
authors’ work. Perhaps initially, when the overt criteria and their correspondences to 
mental terms are being established, and must be present for the child to use the 
appropriate term, the child is establishing embedded use. Later, when these 
correspondences have been established so that the child can use the terms even in the
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physical absence of the criteria, but has not yet interrelated the meanings of the terms, 
the child has achieved denotation.
Montgomery focuses on how the child learns which mental state corresponds with 
which mental term: for him, the child’s most important step in entering the language 
game consists of learning correspondences. What he doesn’t address is the complicating 
factor of the multitude of functions that mental terms such as think and know play in 
actual conversations. Children also must leam the recurring persons, topics, times, 
grammatical forms, and lexical patterns (including frozen idioms) in which these terms 
are embedded. The acquisition of word-concept correspondences alone is inadequate for 
the acquisition of competence in a language, just as the memorization of long vocabulary 
list translations by a junior high school student does not produce a fluent speaker of a 
second language. Non-object words especially are not learned or used in isolation but in 
sentential groupings, in appropriate contexts. Bloom et al. (1989) have shown that think 
and know have their own differentiated sentence patterns from their earliest uses, at least 
for uses with complementation.
The research in this study is designed to examine this aspect of the child’s entry 
into using mental terms - for both reference to mental states and other functions. This is 
not to deny the validity of Montgomery’s argument that the child must leam the public 
criteria for applying words to concepts. I am extending his argument to say that the child 
must attend to other aspects of the conversation beyond overt behavior. The emphasis 
here is on the child’s achievement of competence as a speaker, not simply as a gatherer of 
isolated word meanings.
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Chapter 2: Pilot Study
As a preliminary investigation into the patterns of use of think and know by 
mothers and children in naturalistic conversations, transcripts of mothers talking with 
their 13-20 month-old children were analyzed. The main purpose of this investigation 
was to gain a picture of how these words are used by mothers in an everyday context, and 
to find out what cues are provided by the mother in conversation as to the meanings of 
the words. The types of cues looked at were the general activity context; the time 
reference of the conversation; the person to whom the mental state was attributed; 
whether or not the word actually referred to a mental state at all or had some other 
purpose within the conversation; informational cues in which fairly explicit details were 
provided regarding the meaning o f the word; and lexical frames, phrases within which the 
word frequently appeared.
It was predicted that the words know and think would each have its own 
individual pattern of frequently recurring cues, providing a rich predictable backdrop by 
which children can work out the individual meanings of each word.
Method
Transcripts
Pre-existing transcripts of 12 mothers and their 13-20 month-old children 
interacting in their homes were utilized in this analysis. These transcripts were originally 
created by Hampson (1989) as part of a dissertation on children’s’ and mothers’ referential 
and expressive language styles. She videotaped the children at 13, 16, 18, and 20 months 
of age with their mothers in three situations: during play with toys provided by the
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researcher, a meal or snack, and a frequent activity context chosen by the mother, varying 
by dyad (often picture book reading). Fifteen minutes of each of three contexts at each 
age were transcribed, along with a running commentary on the actions performed by 
mother and child in relation to their utterances. However, because of a subsequent 
reanalysis of the transcripts (to be described), not all fifteen minutes of each context was 
available for this study.
In the second analysis of the Hampson transcripts, Nelson, Hampson, and Kessler 
Shaw (1991) searched the transcripts for all segments of conversation containing a 
predetermined list of non-object nouns. These segments were then entered with 
identifying headings into a word processor. An estimated one-half of the original 
transcripts were entered. It is these latter segmented transcripts, readily accessible to 
manipulation via the word processor, which were used in the current study of know and 
think. Since there is little reason to surmise that the frequencies or types of non-object 
nouns and these mental state words covary, it can be tentatively assumed that the filtering 
of the transcripts through the non-object editing had little or no selective effect on 
obtaining a representative sample of conversations including know and think. However, 
it does mean that the precise lengths of the transcripts from which these samples were 
obtained are not available. As a consequence, it is not possible to compare, for example, 
the frequencies of uses of a particular word by play or meal context; one can only achieve 
a more global picture. For this reason, context comparisons, while of importance, cannot 
be regarded as reliable in this preliminary study. (The use of original videotapes for 
transcription in the main work of this dissertation will eliminate this weakness.) For this
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study, the segments of transcripts from the non-object noun study were rearranged 
according to their inclusion of the two target words.
Coding
Context. Transcript segments were given on of three context codes according to 
the general activity engaged in by the dyad:
Code Context
P play: play, with or without toys provided by the
researcher
F food: during meal or snack
B book: during picture-book reading
Time. The time classification code designated when in time the target word 
referred. Conversational and situational cues as well as grammatical tense were used to 
determine the time reference. One example is the idiomatic use of the phrase "I thought 
so", which while couched in the past tense usually was used to refer to current situations, 







Person. The person code was assigned according to the person in the utterance to 
whom the mental state word was attributed.
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Code Person
M the mother in the dyad
C the child in the dyad
O other person or object
MC both mother and child
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Mental verb code. The main purpose of the mental verb code was to report 
whether or not the use of the word referred to an actual internal state on this occasion of 
use. Shatz et al. (1983) have reported on the different types of uses of mental state verbs, 
both to refer to mental states and other, non-mental uses. As they have stressed, mental 
state verbs may be used for a variety of conversational purposes which do not refer to 
mental states. Here the mental state verbs know and think are classified using the Shatz 
et al. scheme.
Mental verb codes. The following classifications and their abbreviated 
explanations are borrowed directly from Shatz et al., 1983, p. 307-308 (see their article 
for further details). Note that in the main study reported in this dissertation, a modified 
coding scheme based on Furrow et al., 1992 is used.
Code Classification
IS+ Mental state: an utterance is classified as mental state only if the
mental term is judged, with regard to its context, to refer to the
thoughts, memories, or knowledge of the speaker, listener, or a
third person.
MOD Modulation of assertion: these utterances mark the degree of
certainty with which a speaker makes an assertion.
DIR Directing the interaction: utterances in this category focus the
conversations or are used in a general way to aid interaction.
CLAR (Clarification: omitted because it was not applicable to the words
in this study.)
DES (Expression of desire: omitted.)
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ACT (Action-memory: omitted.)
DDK I don’t know: The phrase T. don’t know", without a
predicate complement.
Another type of use o f the word think was discerned, and was added to its coding 
in this study:
OP Opinion: An utterance which expressed, attributed, or asked for a
subjective opinion.
Sense meanings. The purpose of the sense meaning classification was to look for 
explicit clues as to meaning provided by the mother in conversation.
Code Classification
C Contrast: the mother makes a contrast or differentiates between the
mental state and another, related mental state.
PS Presupposition: the mother mentions a presupposition of the verb.
Lexical frame. These were repeated phrases within which the mental verbs 
frequently occurred. Frequently occurring morphological markers and irregular verb 
tenses are also reported under this classification.
Results
Table 1 presents the total number of uses, and the frequencies of the context of 
use, time reference, and person reference for the mothers’ uses of know and think with 
their 13-20 month-old children. Data on know used to refer to an internal state (IS+) 
are presented after its totals.
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Context. Time, and Person. Both of the words occurred in both the play and food 
contexts, without one context or the other predominating. Know and think were used 
most often in conversations about the present. The mother assigned think most often to 
herself, while know was attributed to both mother and child.
Mental verb code. The percentages of maternal uses which utilized the words to 
refer to internal states, along with other non-mental uses, are presented in Table 2. 
KnowC'Do you want to know what you can do with these blocks?") and thinkC'I think 
youVe had enough lunch for today.") were used to direct the interaction each about 40% 
of the time. They were also often used to modify statements ("Well take out some of the 
chicken and carrots, which I know you 11 only pick out." "We can’t see it from here. I 
think it’s someplace else.") Think was rarely used in an unequivocally internal way (9%; 
"You don’t believe me. You think I have another bag hidden somewhere."). Instead it 
was used in conversational ways.
Sense meaning. Table 2 also presents the percentages of sense meanings used by 
the mothers. The mothers did differentiate the verbs from other related verbs (16 for 
know, 7 for think) and mentioned presuppositions for know (11 total) but not think (only 
once).
Lexical frames. Table 3 presents the percentages of common lexical frames, 
phrases within which the words were often used. The two verbs were used in different 
lexical frames, with the most common "I think X" (39% of uses of think).
Summary
These preliminary findings show that the words know and think are used 
differentially but in predictable ways by mothers in conversation with their toddlers.
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They demonstrated that mothers were using the target verbs with children even this 
young, and that this coding scheme is a fruitful way of describing their uses.
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Chapter 3:Method
The two major goals of the main study presented here were (1) to see how 
mother-child conversations contribute to the child’s acquisition of two mental state verbs, 
think and know and (2) to investigate the development of meaning of the child’s uses of 
think and know, using Nelson and Lucariello’s (1985) description of the development of 
word meaning as a model. Pursuit of these goals is important for several reasons: it can 
contribute to our understanding of how lexical acquisition in naturalistic contexts 
proceeds; it can elucidate the Nelson and Lucariello model, which while consonant with 
previous research on lexical development, has had little research addressed to it directly; 
and it can provide evidence relevant to the proposed explanation for why the apparently 
contradictory experimental and observational findings on children’s internal state words 
are actually compatible.
In designing the study, it was thought essential to study children longitudinally 
from the time of early use of internal state words (roughly two and a half years) to the age 
of most interest to the experimentalists (four years). This age span should correspond to 
the time of greatest change in developing word meanings, according to the Nelson and 
Lucariello model. In practice, a more convenient design was used: two groups of 
children, ages two-and-a-half and three-and-a-half at the beginning of the study, were 
each visited four times over a span of six months. I predicted that by 30-32 months first 
uses of think and know would be established, as the evidence from the observational
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studies suggested; when the children would provide evidence that they had achieved 
denotation and sense was open to investigation.
I thought it important to observe the mother-child dyads in a variety of contexts, 
differing in familiarity and activity. This would both provide the dyads with a wider 
opportunity to display usage of the target words, and provide the researcher with the 
opportunity to investigate whether the individual words were used differentially in 
different contexts.
Participants
Twenty-three children and their mothers (one father) participated in the study.
Most were recruited through word of mouth. Five dyads were friends of families already 
participating in the study. One child was recruited through a nursery school. Twelve of 
the children were two-and-a-half years old (ranging from 2;3 to 2;8) at the time of the 
first visit, and eleven children were three-and-a-half years old (ranging from 3;4 to 3;7) at 
the first visit. Each child was visited in their home four times over the course of 6 
months: Visits 2, 3, and 4 took place one, two, and six months after the first visit, 
respectively. Thus by the end of the study the 2-1/2-year-olds were approximately 3 
years old (2; 10 -3;3) while the 3-1/2-year-olds were approximately 4 years old (3; 10 - 
4;1).
There were seven girls and five boys in the 2-1/2-year group, and five girls and 
six boys in the 3-1/2-year group. There was much variety in the birth order of the 
children. Five of the 2-1/2-year-olds were only children, and seven were second-bom; 
one of the second-bom children had a younger sibling, and one was a non-identical twin.
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Six of the 3-1/2-year-olds were only children; one was a first-bom, three were second 
children, and one was a third child.
The majority of the children came from white, professional class families with 
two parents. There were one African-American and one Latin-American 2-1/2-year-old. 
There were two African-American 3-1/2-year-olds, and one with a white mother and 
African-American father. Two 3-1/2-year-old children lived in single parent homes (both 
mothers); all of the 2-1/2-year-olds lived with both parents. Five of the 2-1/2-year-olds’ 
mothers, and 5 of the 3-1/2-year-olds’ mothers, worked full time outside the home. Only 
one child (a 3- 1/2-year-old) had parents who were psychologists (in this case, both 
parents). Mothers participated in the study with their children, except for one father of a 
3-1/2-year-old boy whose mother was ill. Other family members were discouraged from 
participating but were not completely excluded, as when a younger sibling had no other 
childcare, a father joined in for a meal, or a jealous older sibling would not be ignored.
Parents of potential participants were called on the telephone. The parent was 
told that the study was about children’s word meaning development, but that the words 
being examined would not be divulged to the parent until the end of the study. They 
were told that this was because knowing what the words were could change the way the 
parents or children used them. The parents were not told until the end of the final visit 
that they were being studied as well as their children. During this first telephone call the 
home visitation schedule was explained. They were told that their child would be 
videotaped for approximately one hour in the presence of the mother, in four contexts of 
15 minutes each: Play, where mother and child chose an activity they enjoyed; Meal - a 
time of day would be chosen when the child normally ate; and two activities with
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materials brought by the researcher: a Hide and Find game with cups and Doll House 
play. The home visits were to last approximately 1-1/2 to 2 hours and would be 
conducted by the researcher.
The parents were offered copies of the videotaped sessions if they provided blank 
tapes for this purpose to the researcher. Then the parent was asked if they wanted to 
participate, and if they did a first home visit was scheduled.
The participation rate of invited families was encouragingly high (23 out of 31 
families). This was probably due to the method of finding families to participate, word of 
mouth through the researcher’s friends and participants’ friends, perhaps facilitated by the 
researcher’s self-description as a heavily pregnant young graduate student, a suitably non- 
threatening figure. All 23 families remained in the study for its duration. Only 3 of the 
92 scheduled home visits (all Visit #3) did not take place, all due to the upcoming 
childbirth of the researcher. I was accompanied on most of the fourth home visits by my 
young infant daughter and either my mother or husband to care for the baby during 
videotaping. Bringing my own family along, far from interfering with the visits, 
enhanced the experimental process for everyone. Being welcomed and pampered in the 
homes of so many families during my late pregnancy and early motherhood was an 
extraordinary experience. And bringing my own family to meet theirs broke down some 
of the formality and inequality inherent in the researcher-participant relationship.
Apparatus
Hide and Find Context. For the Hide and Find Context, originally 3 "magic 
boxes” were provided for use by the mothers and children, with two small toys to hide in 
them (a miniature brown, hard plastic violin, and a miniature gray, rubbery plastic wild
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pig), and a cardboard screen. The magic boxes, procured at a magicians’ shop, measured 
5" x 2" x 1/2". Each had a pull-out drawer and an inner compartment in which objects 
could be secretly hidden by tilting the box to one side with the drawer closed. The boxes 
were painted blue, red, or yellow. The use of these boxes was discontinued after three 
sessions in total, as they were found to be too complicated for use by even the mothers, 
and too fragile for use by the children.
To replace the magic boxes, three simpler containers were provided at subsequent 
sessions. These were cups with lids. The inverted cone-shaped lids were easily removed 
and replaced by the children. The cups each had one handle. There were one blue, one 
red, and one yellow cup. Holes in the lids (one per lid) at the apex of the inverted cone 
meant for drinking straws were taped over on the inside with black masking tape so that 
the participants could not look through them. The same two toys for hiding in the cups 
were presented as with the magic boxes: a violin and wild pig. The cardboard screen was 
provided as well.
Participants sometimes included their own materials in the hide and find game, 
such as extra containers or objects to hide. This inclusion was taken as a sign of 
enthusiasm for the task and was not discouraged by the researcher.
Doll House Context. For the Doll House context, a plastic Playmobil 1-2-3 doll 
house (20 inches long with the downstairs walls folded down flat, 9 1/2 inches wide, and 
5 1/2 inches high) with furniture and dolls were provided. The doll house had an upstairs 
and downstairs, with no enclosed side walls or roof on the upstairs. The rear wall had 
two windows downstairs, and one window upstairs. The downstairs interior had a 
partition to divide the house into two rooms. On the front wall was a door. The two
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downstairs side walls folded down flat on the ground to provide access to the downstairs 
rooms and extra floor space. The floors of the house had a network of square grooves 
which allowed the furniture to be affixed to it, Lego building-block style.
The furniture provided included: 3 beds, a cradle, and a changing table; a bathtub, 
sink, and toilet; a couch, two armchairs, a rocking chair, a bookcase, a clock, a fireplace, 
and a coffee table; a dining table with three chairs and a highchair; a stove, sink, and 
refrigerator. The furniture was arranged in the same way before each doll house session 
by the researcher to resemble a bedroom and bathroom upstairs, and a living room and 
kitchen downstairs. A set of removable stairs connected upstairs to downstairs. The 
participants sometimes moved the furniture around or even removed it entirely. This was 
not remarked upon by the researcher.
Five Playmobil 1-2-3 dolls were included: a mother, a father, a child (a girl doll 
for girl subjects, a boy doll for boy subjects), a baby, and a cat. The tallest doll was three 
inches high. The dolls could turn their heads and bend at the waist, except for the 
permanently seated baby, and the featureless, unarticulated cat.
The doll house was well liked by most of the children regardless of age or gender. 
Occasionally a participant would introduce an appropriate outside object into the doll 
house play - for example, a terrorizing toy dinosaur, a tennis ball representing the moon, 
a toy horse to give the dolls rides. This was not discouraged or otherwise commented 
upon by the researcher.
Recording and Transcription Equipment. All home visits were videotaped using 
an 8mm Ricoh R-861 video camera recorder. The recorder was powered by a small 
battery pack which allowed freedom of movement during recording. After recording, the
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8mm tapes were copied onto VHS tape for transcription. The VHS tapes were 
transcribed using a JVC HR-D960U stereo video cassette recorder, with headphones 
(SONY MDR CD350).
Procedure
Home Visits. After initial equipment setup and greeting, the mothers were 
reminded of the four videotaping contexts to be recorded. At the initial visit, the parent 
signed a permission form for the child’s participation in the study. A sequence was 
decided upon for the four contexts: usually Play, Meal, Hide and Find, and Doll House, 
but this order could be modified at the discretion of the parent, usually due to the hunger 
or lack thereof of the child. For the Play context, mothers and children were asked to 
choose an activity that they enjoyed doing together. Activities chosen included play with 
dolls, puzzles, art projects, construction toys, board games, reading books, fantasy play. 
For all contexts, the mothers were told that I was interested in recording everyday talk, 
and they were encouraged to engage their children in conversation.
Each context was videotaped for a maximum of 15 minutes. Taping of a context 
also stopped if the child lost interest in the activity. In general, the Play and Doll House 
contexts lasted the full 15 minutes, while the Meal and Hide and Find contexts did not 
(although there were exceptions). Sometimes breaks occurred in the middle of a context 
for the participants’ unrelated activities, such as a trip to the bathroom, a telephone call, 
retrieval of an object from a different room, the occasional temper tantrum, or scolding.
In these cases the videocamera was turned o ff , and turned back on when on-task activity 
resumed. A running clock on the videocamera showing hour, minute, and second was 
superimposed onto each recording.
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At each visit, an appointment was made for the next visit. These appointments 
were confirmed by telephone and if necessary modified, on the day before the 
appointment. At the end of the final visit, the parents were debriefed as to the focus of 
the study. They were told that I was studying children’s acquisition of the meaning of 
mental state words, and I was looking to see what clues the mothers gave the children as 
to the words’ meanings. While some parents expressed surprise that I was studying them 
as well as the children, none objected. Blank tapes were collected from those parents 
who wanted copies of their child’s videotapes. Copies were made and mailed to the 
parents within a few weeks.
Transcription. Each videotape was viewed at least twice. At the first viewing, the 
time of each utterance of the words think and know by either the mother or child was 
noted. At the second viewing, transcripts were made of the conversations in which the 
target words occurred. An attempt was made to include all preceding and following 
utterances for as long as the conversation remained on the same topic as the utterance 
which contained the target word.
Coding.
Context. Transcript segments were given one of four context codes
according to the activity engaged in by the dyad:
Code Context
P play: an activity chosen by the dyad
M meal: during meal or snack
HF hide and find: the dyad engaged in hide and find task with
materials provided by the researcher
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DH doll house: the dyad engaged in play with doll house materials
provided by the researcher 
Time. The time classification code designated when in time the target 
word referred. Conversational and situational cues as well as grammatical tense were 







Person. The person code was assigned according to the person in the 
utterance to whom thinking or knowing was attributed.
Code Person
M the mother in the dyad
C the child in the dyad
0 other person or object
MC both mother and child
Mental verb code. The main purpose of the mental verb code was to report 
whether or not think or know referred to an actual mental state on this occasion of use. 
Shatz et al. (1983) have reported on the different types of uses of mental state verbs, both 
to refer to mental states and other, non-mental uses. As they have stressed, mental state
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verbs may be used for a variety of conversational purposes which do not refer to mental 
states. The following classifications and their abbreviated explanations are borrowed 
directly from Furrow et al. (1992), in turn based on categories defined by Shatz et al.
(1983). (See these articles for further details.) The examples come from my study. The 
example utterance in each excerpt is underlined.
Code Classification and Example
IS+ Mental state: an utterance is classified as mental state only if the mental
term is judged, with regard to its context, to refer to the thoughts,
memories, or knowledge of the speaker, listener, or a third person.
ERi, 42 months, Visit 2, Doll House 20:18
E: I know, how bout if I put it there?/ lamp
E: Or there or there/
E: How bout there - there/
E: There we go/
E: I didn’t know there were two lamps/
F: Is there another lamp?/
E: Yeah there/
F: Well bring it on over/
DIR-I Directing the interaction: utterances in this category focus the
conversations or are used in a general way to aid interaction.
ERo, 49 months, Visit 4, Play 31:55
E: Look!/ Lego piece
M: Yay!/
M: Hooray!/
E: I think it goes this wav/
E: I open and close this way/
M: Okay/
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DIR-R Directing Reflection: these utterances made reference to information or an
action but did not specify it directly. Instead, a wh-word was used, in the
form of wh-questions or wh-complementation.
RW, 31 months, Visit 2, Doll House, 13:03
M: Why is she going in the window instead of doll
the door?/
R: You know where she going?/
M: Where?/
R: She going on the table/
M: On the table/
R: Yeah/
IDK I don’t know: The phrase 1 don’t know", without a predicate complement.
MD, 38 months, Visit 4, Doll House, 11:11
Md: I’m taking the ladder away!/
M: Taking the ladder away?/
M: How are they gonna get downstairs?/
Md: I don’t know/
M: I hope they have a phone up there/
M: They’re gonna have to call for help/
Lexical frame. These were repeated phrases within which the target word frequently 
occurred. These categories were determined after transcription, by examination of the 
mothers’ and children’s usages.
Think.
Code Lexical Frame
1 "I think (that) X"
2 "I don’t think (that) X"
3 (Do) you think X?"
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4 I/You (don’t) think so."




1 "I don’t know"
2 "I don’t know (if) X"
3 "(Do) you know how/what/when/where/which/who/why X?
4 "I know X" or "X, I know"
5 "X, you know" or "You know, X"
6 "(Do) you know X?" or "X, do you know?"
7 "I know"
8 "(Do) (you) know what?"
0 Other frame
Meaning Level. This was an attempt to categorize each usage of think or 
know according to the level of meaning it displays according to the Nelson and 
Lucariello theory of how meaning levels develop, in regards to conversationally 
embedded use, denotation, and sense. The operationalization is an interpretation based 
on their description, as their work is based on usages of object terms and needed to be 
extended here to abstract terms. Again, the examples are taken from my study, and the 
coded utterance is underlined.
Meaning level Code Description and Example





Speaker uses word in the here and now
situation, with use tied to the immediate context.
RW, 31 months, Visit 2, Doll House, 14:03
R: Who do you think this is?/ doll
M: I don’t know/
M: Who do you think that is?/
R: That’s the Mommy - baby/
Speaker uses word to refer outside of 
the here and now, to a past or 
future occasion, to make a 
generalization, or to make a 
contrast between a mental state and 
reality.
Past
KP, 42 months, Visit 2, Play, 39:15






SL, 44 months, Visit 2, Play, 58:21
M: Oh, you’re just making that food for me/ 
M: Are you gonna get mad if I don’t eat it?/ 
S: I think you’re gonna get, really 
tummvache/
Generalization
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DV, 38 months, Visit 4, Play, 29:10
D: This is our chimney/
M: That’s our chimney?/
M: What comes out of it?/
D: Smoke/
M: Yeah, you’re right/
D: I know - 1 know mv words/
M: Yes, you do know your words/
Contrast Mental State with Reality
AF, 41 months, Visit 3, Meal, 06:21
A: There was a pre - there was a pretend, um, ghost/ 
M: You were not afraid?/
A: Nn-nn/
A: I thought it was a real ghost, but it wasn't/
A: It was a -/
A: A pretend ghost/
Sense S Speaker makes a contrast between two
related mental states, or mentions a presupposition
of a mental verb.
Contrasts Two Mental States
ERo, 44 months, Visit 3, Meal, 3:08
M: Who ate the other half?/ pizza slice 
E: Laurie’s babysitter/
M: Oh, good/
E: I think but not - 1 don’t know/
Mentions Presupposition.
ERo, 44 months, Visit 3, Meal, 06:47
M: Where’s his busy balls?/ cat
E: I don’t know/
E: I don’t - 1 don’t see them/
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M: He must have hidden them away/
Reliability. Variables for ten percent of the utterances for each of think 
and know were recoded by a developmental psychology graduate student. The variables 
recoded were time reference, person reference, mental verb code, meaning level, and 
lexical frame. For know, the percentages of interrater agreement were 90% for time 
reference, 100% for person reference, 89% for mental verb code, 83% for meaning level, 
and 96% for lexical frame. For think, the percentages of interrater agreement were 79% 
for time reference, 100% for person reference, 84% for mental verb code, 91% for 
meaning level, and 90% for lexical frame.
Two-year-olds’language games. I attempted to categorize each two-year- 
old child use of think or know into one of Wittgenstein’s language games, from the list of 
17 as given in the introduction. I was assisted in this task by Finch’s interpretive 
descriptions of the first 15 language games, and his pointers as to where in the text 
Wittgenstein expanded upon each of the games. Once the game categorization was done,
I attempted to identify the roles played by the two words in each of the language games. 
As will become clearer when they are reported on in the results section, roles were 
defined by the lexical frames in which the words occurred, the utterances’relations to 
adjacent utterances, and the functions the utterances held within the conversation.
The four language games that both think and know most often appeared in were 
guessing, play-acting, ostensive naming, and guiding. (See Table 29). Know and think 
were used in each of these language games at least six times (with a maximum of 33, for 
know in play-acting). The occurrence of the guessing and play-acting conversational 
activities came as no surprise; they are intrinsic to the Hide and Find, and Doll House
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contexts that the dyads were provided with. However, these were not the only 
conversational activities to occur in these contexts; Hide and Find also gave rise for 
example to naming the toys and the colors of the cups, and negotiating turn-taking; the 
Doll House activity also included naming the pieces of furniture in the house, inventing 
names for the dolls, relating the activities of the dolls to real-life situations, as well as 
others.
To show how language games were identified, here I give, where available, 
Finch’s interpretive descriptions of these four language games, remarks provided in 
Philosophical Investigations ( abbreviated PI) by Wittgenstein, as well as additional 
information about the children’s uses that led to the assignation to these language game 
categories.
Guiding and being guided by. "Giving and obeying orders is related to guiding 
and being guided by, which can be involved in a great number o f language-games... ”
Here Finch directs us to PI 172. What does Wittgenstein say about the game of guiding 
and being guided by?
"Let us consider the experience of being guided, and ask ourselves: what does this 
experience consist in when for instance our course is guided? - Imagine the following 
cases:
You are in a playing field with your eyes bandaged, and someone leads you by the 
hand, sometimes left, sometimes right; you have constantly to be ready for the tug of his 
hand, and must also take care not to stumble when he gives an unexpected tug.
Or again: someone leads you by the hand where you are unwilling to go, by force.
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Or: you are guided by a partner in a dance; you make yourself as receptive as 
possible, in order to guess his intention and obey the slightest pressure.
Or: someone take you for a walk; you are having a conversation; you go wherever 
he does.
Or: you walk along a field-track, simply following it.
All these situations are similar to one another; but what is common to all the 
experiences?" PI 172
Let’s turn now to the children’s uses that were categorized as guiding. Unlike 
Wittgenstein’s examples concerning the guidance of a course, the data here involved the 
guidance of other types of action, including where to place an object, making a choice of 
objects or activities, deciding who will engage in an activity, choosing whether or not to 
participate in an activity at all. The cases were considered as examples of guiding rather 
than giving orders or obeying them because the language used to convey the direction 
was indirect: in most of these cases, the child’s utterance with think or know was 
preceded by an indirect request by the mother, as in, "You don’t want to eat the stem, 
right?"; "Want to try to make it work?"; "Shall we see if I can make it disappear again?"; 
"What Bible verse would you give? Remember the one about Jesus?". In other cases, the 
child used the target word in guiding her own activity, sometimes taking control of the 
action away from the mother, as in, "I know how it goes" while putting a doll in a train, 
or, "I’m taking this one, I think", while choosing a strawberry. As Wittgenstein showed, 
guiding can include varying levels of coercion: a child wanting to spread cream cheese on 
his bread without assistance from his mother insists, "I know how to!"; in contrast,
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another child half-jokingly answers her mother’s question about what to feed their non­
present snake, "I think it should eat this hard com."
In the guiding language game, then, think or know is involved in the 
conversational negotiation of the activity of guiding (or being guided by) the child or the 
mother.
Naming. "Asking something's name...we might say, [is] a language game on its 
own. That is really to say: we are brought up, trained, to ask: W hat is that called?’ - upon 
which the name is given." Wittgenstein, PI 27. Children's uses of think and know were 
assigned to the naming language game if the target word was used in either asking or 
giving the name of an object or entity.
Guessing. Finch points out that "There are many language-games involving 
guessing: as, for example, guessing the meaning of definitions (PI 32), what time it is (PI 
266,607), what a person means (PI 210), what a person is pointing to (PI 33), intentions 
or thoughts (PI pp.222-3). (We cannot, however, guess how a word functions (PI 340).)" 
Wittgenstein (PI pp.223) gave several variants of the game of 'guessing thoughts’. "A 
variant of it would be this: I tell A something in a language that B does not understand. B 
is supposed to guess the meaning of what I say. - Another variant: I write down a 
sentence which the other person cannot see. He has to guess the words or their sense. - 
Yet another: I am putting a jig-saw puzzle together; the other person cannot see me but 
from time to time guesses my thoughts and utters them. He says, for instance, 'Now 
where is this bit?' - 'Now I know how it fits!' - 'I have no idea what goes in here,' - ’The 
sky is always the hardest part' and so on - but I  need not be talking to myself either out 
loud or silently at the time. All this would be guessing at thoughts; and the fact that it
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does not actually happen does not make thought any more hidden than the unperceived 
physical proceedings." In this corpus much of the guessing occurred, as might be 
expected, in the Hide and Find context.
Play-acting. "This language-game is obviously related to pretending (PI 156) and 
simulating (PI 249-50), as well as to imitating (PI 285,450). We might say that it is a 
full expression of these other games and also the first game which has the element of play 
in it. Pretense for entertainment or edification would have to be distinguished from 
pretense for deceit, which is another language-game." Finch, p. 85
Wittgenstein, in the sections cited by Finch, discusses not children’s fantasy play 
but a beginning reader’s pretending to read by guessing from the context or reciting 
memorized passages(PI 156); the inability of a dog to simulate pain, and the impossibility 
of teaching one to do so (250); imitating a face without seeing oneself in the mirror (285), 
and similarly, mimicking a facial expression without imagining it first (450).
Despite the absence of a clear playful element or the symbolic use of props in 
Wittgenstein’s examples, the children’s uses of think and know during fantasy play fit 
most clearly into this category - as Finch would call it, play involving pretense for 
entertainment.
Language Game Roles. Because the roles played by think and know within the 
language games were unknown before examining the transcripts, it was thought that the 
identifications and descriptions of the roles should be considered as results rather than 
preconceived coding categories. Their identities and descriptions, along with frequencies 
and examples, are thus reported in the results section.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
Chapter 4: Results 
Orientation
In this section I introduce the questions that will be addressed in the results 
chapter under the headings of Maternal Input, Children’s First Uses, and Mother and 
Child Comparisons.
Maternal Input
Through examination of the maternal data, we can get an overall description of 
the ways mothers use the words think and know in conversations with their young 
children. While the child has other sources of input, in conversations with other people, 
such as siblings, friends, and other adults, and in other contexts, such as in daycare or 
other daily routines, I assume that the informal conversations like the ones examined here 
form the major source of input of the uses and meanings of these words for the child. It 
remains to be studied whether mothers’conversational uses differ in significant ways 
from other conversational partners’, or whether uses in other everyday contexts differ 
from the ones examined here. (My guess is that they do not, but I remain open to other 
possibilities.) With these assumptions, using these data we can get an idea of what input 
the children are hearing: in what contexts, in what lexical frames, with what time and 
person references, with what conversational functions, with what meaning levels. 
Especially in early conversations, words are not isolated building blocks that are 
combined in infinite patterns; rather, they are used in a finite number of patterns for 
repeated functions. Identifying these patterns is a goal of this research. I also presume 
that children reiterate these patterns in their early uses, using them to get their feet in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
door for entrance into the more abstract meanings and flexible uses that their languages 
allow.
Verb Comparisons. In much previous research on mental verbs, uses of the different 
verbs were grouped together, with data provided for mental verbs as a whole. Partly this 
was done for practical reasons: children’s early uses are so infrequent that the grouping of 
similar verbs can be required to assemble a large enough sample for statistical analysis to 
be possible.
Yet for the study of meaning this grouping is deleterious, as it obscures the 
differences in uses between the verbs. To the extent that the meanings of think and know 
differ, we would expect their uses to differ as well. And logically thinking, if they are 
used in too similar ways, how would the child ever differentiate their meanings? Yet 
because they belong to the same verb "family", we would expect their uses to be similar 
or to be explicitly contrasted in some way. This might be necessary if the child is to ever 
construct sense meanings for the words: to place them in a system in which their relation 
is understood. Luckily for the agenda of comparing uses of the verbs think and know, 
maternal uses in this corpus of data are copious.
Age comparisons. Comparisons of the uses of the two groups of mothers, those of 
two- year-olds and three- year-olds, can tell us both to what extent and how mothers 
tailor their uses to the age of the child, and how the input to children at the different 
ages differs. It’s the same data seen from two perspectives: from the mother’s 
perspective, changing her talk in response to the changing characteristics of her 
child, and from the child’s perspective, hearing a changing input over time. We 
might expect that some aspects of verb use would remain constant to both age
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groups (perhaps reflecting some invariant core to the language games roles in which 
they occur?) - while other variables might be more free to vary depending on the 
situation (perhaps reflecting differences in the understanding, participation, and 
types of conversations engaged in by the two age groups). Identifying the more and 
less invariant aspects of uses of think and know is possible through age by verb by 
variable (time reference, person reference, mental verb code, meaning level) 
comparisons.
Children’s First Uses
The children’s data can give us an overall view of how children initially use think and know: 
such as what functions they serve, what lexical frames they occur in, their time and person 
references. An examination of each child’s attainment of meaning level (embedded use, 
denotation, sense) by visit and comparison of the two- and three-year-olds are tests of Nelson and 
Lucariello’s developmental description of word meaning development. Does each child 
demonstrate the order predicted by the theory, with different aspects of meaning acquired over time, 
and do three-year-olds use more of the higher level meanings than two-year-olds? Or alternatively, 
is the learning of word meaning more of an all-or-none phenomenon, with labels quickly mapped 
on to previously existing concepts? If the latter is the case, children should be able to denote and 
use sense meanings from their first uses o f think and know. Age comparisons of the other variables 
can tell us about additional aspects of meaning development: are uses among two-year-olds more 
restricted than those of the three-year-olds, with three-year- olds’uses showing more flexibility? If 
so, what variables gain in flexibility? Do all children begin using think and know in a similar 
manner, or is there individual variation? And is individual variation related to maternal use? 
Correlations between children’s and mothers’ uses can contribute to answering this question.
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Questions about self and other can be examined using the person reference data. 
Do children refer to themselves with think and know before referring to others (perhaps 
implying self-knowledge before conceptualization of the knowledge states of others) or 
do they occur simultaneously within individuals?
Verb comparisons. Comparisons between the descriptions of how young children 
use the two verbs think and know can tell us to what extent they learn them as separate 
entities. We might expect verb by age differences as well, reflecting changes in verb 
differentiation with development.
Mother and Child Comparisons
Do children’s initial uses depend heavily on the type of input they receive? If so, 
individual children’s uses should closely resemble the uses of their particular mothers, 
and child-mother uses will be positively correlated. If word or child characteristics are 
more influential in determining initial child uses, then positive correlations would not be 
expected. Also, the variables studied may differ as to their dependence on the input, with 
some positively correlated with maternal uses and others not. Optimally, mother-child 
comparisons could show what aspects of use serve as clues to meaning, with higher uses 
of those variables correlated with higher overall rates of child use, higher meaning levels 
attained, and more flexible use, as measured in a greater variety of lexical frames.
Organization of Results
In this results chapter I will provide a description of the most important findings 
of this study. I have included here only the most important significant findings, and to 
increase readability I have placed a more detailed description of the overall statistical
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analyses undertaken and their outcomes and significances in the appropriate appendices. 
Because there were a large number of analyses carried out on the same data sets, a strict 
alpha level of .01 was chosen as the cutoff point for significance. However, the 
exploratory nature of the study and low rate of child usage justify the report of some 
findings which met the .05 level criterion; these findings are considered strongly 
suggestive but not statistically significant. The reports and conclusions made on the basis 
of these differing criteria are clearly delineated below.
I provide here for the mothers general results, verb and age findings; for the 
children, general, verb, and age findings, and individual results for meaning levels, 
person references, and language game roles by two-year-olds; and mother and child 
correlations. Also included are three sections of a more descriptive nature, wherein I give 
examples of some of the acquisition processes that may be at work during the mother and 
child conversations.
Mothers
Before moving on to findings about verb and age differences, I start off with a 
brief summary of some general findings about how mothers used know and think. No 
significant differences were found between the mothers’ total rate of use of know and 
think, nor were there significant verb by age of child differences. (Table 4, Mother’s 
total uses o f think and know). The child’s gender did not seem to influence the frequency 
of the mothers’ uses; there was no difference in total rate of use to boys and girls for 
either age or for either verb. (Table 5 , Mothers’ uses o f think and know by gender.)
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Similarly, there were no significant differences in rates between the four contexts. (Table 
6, Mothers’ uses o f think and know in 4 different contexts)
The mothers’ meaning levels came out as was expected: there was a 
significant difference in their uses of meaning level [F(2,44) = 111.14, p < .001]. They 
displayed conversationally embedded uses at a higher rate than denotation (post hoc t =
11.48, p < .00001), and embedded uses at a higher rate than sense (post hoc t = 13.80, p < 
.001). Denotation was used at a higher rate than sense (one-tailed paired sample t =
2.57, p < .0085) (Table 7, Mothers’ meaning levels fo r  think and know) These findings 
are expected because making conversation away from the here and now, as in denotation, 
and contrasting the verbs or talking about their presuppositions, as in sense, are more 
complex than talking about the here and now, and thus should not occur as frequently in 
conversations with young children. (See Phillips, 1973; Snow et al., 1976.) As well, 
sense would be expected to be used less than denotation because the conversational 
circumstances for contrasting the verbs or making explicit their presuppositions would 
not be expected to occur as frequently as those for using them to talk about the child’s 
past or future experiences. It should be noted that the mothers nonetheless did use these 
higher meaning levels, and so we can be certain that the children are being exposed to 
these higher levels: a lack of use of these higher levels by the children could not be 
attributed solely to their complete absence in the input.
Maternal Variable Differentiation. The mothers differentiated in their uses of the 
verbs think and know in their conversations with their children. So from the start, the 
children are hearing them used differently. The mothers’ uses differed significantly as 
measured by four variables: person reference, time reference, lexical frames, and mental
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verb code. There was a significant person reference by verb interaction, F(l,21) =34.0, p
< .001. The mothers used think more to refer to themselves than to their children [F(l,22) 
= 212.5, p < .001]; this difference did not occur with know. They referred to the children 
more with know than with think [F(l,22) = 24.50, p < .001], but to themselves more with 
think than with know [F(l,22) = 10.53, p < .001], (Table 8, Mothers' person references 
with think and know) There was a significant time reference by verb interaction[ F(4,84)
= 4.53, p <  .01]. The mothers made more generalizations with know than with think 
[F(l,22) = 12.35, p < .002). Use o f more fantasy talk with think than with know 
approached significance [F(l,22) = 5.19, p < .033]. (Table 9, Mothers’ time references 
with think and know)
Lexical frame use also differed by verb. While a direct lexical frame by verb 
MANOVA was not possible because of the different sets of lexical frames the two verbs 
participate in, indirect comparisons can be made. For think, there was a significant 
difference in the rate of lexical frame use [F(4,88) = 33.69, p < .001]. "I think (that) X" 
was used at a higher rate than the other lexical frames (post hoc t = 11.88, p < .00001), 
and at a higher rate than the next most frequent frame, wh-questions (post hoc , t=6.85, p
< .00001]. Know also showed a significant difference in the rate of lexical frame use, 
F(7,54) = 4.23, p < .001. For know, however, wh-questions were the most frequently 
used frame (post hoc t=3.98, p < .001). Note that about 75% of the mothers’ uses are 
accounted for by the five frames identified for think and eight frames identified for know 
(listed in Table 10, Mothers' lexical frames: rates per hour).
The functions of the two verbs also differed. There was a significant mental verb 
code by verb interaction F(2,44) = 10.50, p < .001. The mothers directed the interaction
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at a higher rate with think than with know [F(l,22) =29.44, p < .001], but they directed 
reflection at a higher rate with know than with think [F(l,22) =8.41, p < .01]. (Table 10, 
Mothers ’ lexical frames with think and know)
We get a general picture then that think is used more for a planning function, for 
the mother to express what she herself thinks, to suggest ideas for the ongoing direction 
of the activity. Know, on the other hand, is used more by the mothers to talk of 
generalizations, to direct reflection, by the use of wh-questions, to ask about what the 
child, rather than the mother, knows. These general pictures of course are only 
descriptive of the most common usages by the mothers; the actual uses by the mothers 
are more overlapping for the two verbs than these descriptions suggest. However, the 
evidence supports the view that the mothers use the verbs think and know not as nearly 
interchangeable units in identical types of utterances, but as carrying different functions 
in different types of utterances.
Age differences. Do mothers of two- and three-year-old children tailor their uses 
of think and know depending on the age of the child? There was not much quantitative 
evidence that they do: mothers’constitutive uses of think and know did not vary 
according to the age of the children. These negative findings are evidence for the 
stability of the mothers’uses over age: the constitutive measures of lexical frame, person 
reference, time reference, and meaning level, remained the same. This suggests that the 
utterances the verbs participate in do not vary according to child age, and that children 
hear similar versions of the verbs, that remain stable over the ages of the children 
sampled. In a later section, however, I suggest that mothers may fine tune their uses 
depending on the age of the child in other ways.
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Children
For the children, after a presentation of general results, I move on to verb 
and age differentiation, including individual children’s data on meaning level 
development, data on individual children’s references to self and other, and two-year-old 
children’s language game roles.
First I briefly present general data about totals, gender, context, person 
references, time references, and meaning levels. In total, the three-year-olds used the two 
verbs more than the two-year-olds; F(l,21) = 13.66, p <.001. The children used know 
more than think: F(l,21) = 30.24, p < .001 .(Table 12, Children's totals) There were no 
differences between boys and girls in total uses of either verb in either age group.(Tafc/e 
13, Children’s think and know by gender) Neither were there significant results for 
differential use in the four contexts.(Table 14, Children's think and know in four 
contexts) The children used the verbs to refer to themselves more than to their mothers 
[F(l,21) = 3.87, p < .001]. (Table 15, Children’sperson references with think and know) 
In the section below on individual children’s person references, I expand on this finding 
to show as well that most children refer to themselves at an earlier visit than they refer to 
their mothers.
There were significant differences in their reference to different times with the 
two verbs [F(3,66) = 33.19, p < .001]: they referred to the present more than they referred 
to an average of fantasy, the past, and generalizations (t = 6.32, p < .001), and they used 
fantasy talk more than an average of referring to the past and making generalizations (t = 
6.35, p < .001). There were no differences between referring to the present and fantasy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
talk, nor referring to the past and making generalizations. (See Table 20, Children’s time 
references) Like the mothers, the children used the verbs more in embedded ways than in 
denotation [there was a significant main effect for meaning level, F(l,21) = 78.23, p < . 
001]. (See Tables 17 and 18, Children's meaning levels).
Verb differentiation. In the section above on the mothers’verb differentiation, I 
demonstrated that at the level of the utterance, mothers use the verbs think and know with 
their young children in different ways. Do the children also use these verbs in different 
ways, from their first uses, as measured by these utterance-level variables?
In contrast with the mothers, who differentiated between their uses of think and 
know in a variety of ways, the children’s uses were not as clearly differentiated. Other 
than differences in total uses (know was used more by the children than think).(See table 
12) significant results were found only between the children’s mental verb codes for the 
two verbs [F(l,21) = 3.87, p < .001 for the mental verb code by verb interaction].
Directing the interaction was done more with think than with know [F(l,22) = 13.17, p < 
.001]. (Table 16, Children’s mental verb codes with think and know)
The children, from the start, then, differentiate the functions of the verbs even 
when they haven’t differentiated person references and time references, and lexical frame 
domination is unclear (See Table 19, Children's lexical frames). Their grasp of how the 
verbs differ constitutively is thus most advanced in terms of the action (function) of the 
verbs, and is less advanced in terms of personnel, time, and space.
Age differences. What age changes, or developments, take place over the course 
of the ages of the children studied? The uses of think and know by the two-year-olds and 
three-year-olds were compared to examine this question. Other than total uses,
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significant differences at the .01 level were not found for any o f the variables tested 
(gender, context, person references, time references, mental verb code, meaning level).
Individual Children’s Meaning Levels: Conversationally Embedded Use 
Before Denotation. An examination of the patterns of individual uses supports Nelson 
and Lucariello’s theory. Tables 21 through 24 present what are some of the most 
important findings of this study: they report on the individual children's meaning levels 
over the four visits. In brief, they demonstrate that children do not use th in k  and k n o w  
with denotational meanings (or sense, although the evidence, as shall be seen, is weaker) 
without using conversationally embedded meanings first.
Table 21 shows the two-year-olds' meaning levels with know over the four visits. 
Five of the twelve children show the predicted pattern: they displayed conversationally 
embedded use at an earlier visit than denotation or sense (CB, DV, IK, LB, RW). Five 
other children demonstrated embedded use only (EM, JA, SM, WH, LV). This finding is 
also consistent with the prediction of conversationally embedded meanings first. Two 
children (CF and MD) displayed embedded uses and sense together at the same visit. 
Perhaps these two children were early embedded users; CF used know these ways at her 
first visit, and MD at her second.
Since seven of the two-year-olds used know with higher level meanings by their 
fourth visit, it is not surprising that many of the three-year-olds, on average six months 
older at their first visit than the two-year-olds at their final visit, demonstrated both 
conversationally embedded and higher level meanings from their first visit. (See Table 
22, Three-year-old children’s meaning levels with know over 4 visits) This was true for 
five of the children (AF, BE, ERo, KP, and NP). Three others fit the predicted pattern of
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embedded use first, higher level meanings later (LS, NR, and SL). Two demonstrated 
embedded uses of know only (BC and PD). One child showed embedded and 
denotational uses of know from Visit 2 (ERi). None of the children’s patterns of onset of 
usage violated the predicted one, by the use of denotation or sense without embedded 
uses first (or at the same early visit).
Lower total uses of think make the argument less forceful regarding order of 
acquisition, but the data are still consistent with predictions. Table 23 (Two-year-olds’ 
meaning levels o f think over 4 visits) shows that four two-year-old children followed the 
predicted pattern of conversationally embedded uses at an earlier visit, and higher levels 
later (CF, IK, LB, and WH). Of the other two-year-olds, four used think only embedded 
in conversation (DV, LV, MD, RW); three didn’t use think at all (EM, JA, and SM); and 
one child’s usage (CB) violated the prediction: at Visit 4 she used denotation, without 
ever displaying embedded use. None of the children used denotation or sense initially 
with conversationally embedded use at the same visit.
While all eleven three-year-old children used think at least once during the course 
of the study (Table 24, three-year-olds’ meaning levels with think over 4 visits), seven of 
them showed embedded use only (BC, BE, ERi, KP, LS, NP, and PD). Two followed the 
"ideal" pattern of embedded use at an earlier visit before higher levels (AF and SL); and 
two showed both embedded use and higher levels at the same visit (ERo and NR). There 
were no outright violations of the predicted pattern. Indeed out of the 46 total cases of 
child by word (23 children x 2 words), there was only one case of violation, CB’s use of 
think with denotation without embedded use. Thus the evidence is in favor of the 
proposal that children use think and know embedded in conversation before using it
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denotationally. The evidence also is somewhat supportive of the proposal that they use 
denotation before sense, but this rests on the absence of sense meaning display: 13 of the 
23 children used know with denotation but never used sense; and 7 of the 23 children 
used think with denotation but not sense. The absence of sense demonstrations is not due 
to their total absence in the speech of their mothers: almost all of the children were 
exposed to examples of sense meanings with both think and know during the course of 
the study.
Even the oldest children in the study do not seem to have placed the two verbs 
into relation with each other. This has strong implications for experimental studies in 
which a researcher insists that children choose between think and know: three and even 
young four-year-old children haven't yet worked out how the two verbs compare and thus 
have great difficulty with these questions. Would older children than the ones in this 
study use sense meanings with think and know? This possibility remains open for further 
exploration.
The children’s uses of think and know did not change in many respects over the 
age range in the study. Their patterns of use do not match those of the mothers, either, as 
will be demonstrated further in the section below on mother-child correlations. This 
suggests that they have still more to learn about how the verbs are used in everyday 
speech, and even at age four they have not completed their acquisition of conversational 
patterns.
Individual Children’s References to Self and Other. Tables 25 through 28 provide 
data on individual children's person references over the four visits. These are of interest 
because they can help address the question of whether children simultaneously have an
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idea that both other people and themselves have mental states, or they first have 
knowledge of their own mental states, that they then ascribe to other people. Table 25 
shows the two-year-old children’s person references with think for the four visits. Small 
numbers here make reporting sketchy at best. Only three children referred to the mother 
or another person at all (CB during Visit 4, RW at Visit 2, and WH at Visit 4). CB did 
not refer to the self using think although she did with know at an earlier time, Visit 3.
RW referred to the self at an earlier visit before referring to the mother, as did WH. Six 
two-year-olds referred only to the self.
Table 26 shows individual three-year-old children’s person references with think 
over the four visits. Of the eleven three-year-olds, only two (ERi Visit 4, KP Visit 1) 
referred to the mother using think at a visit before (or without ever) referring to the self. 
However, ERi referred to himself using know at Visit 2, as did KP at Visit 1. The other 
nine children referred to the self at a visit prior to referring to the mother (SL, NP) or 
other (BE), or else didn’t refer to the mother or other person at all.
The two-year-old children’s person references with know over four visits are 
shown in Table 27, and the three-year-old children’s in Table 28. Although all twelve 
two-year-old children produced the word know over the course of the study, only eight 
used it to refer to someone other than the self. Of these eight, all but one (DV) referred to 
the self either at a previous session (CB, EM, IK, JA), or at the same session (CF, LB,
MD, RW). DV referred to the mother at Visit 1, and didn’t refer to herself until Visit 2. 
Four three-year-old children (AF, ERi, LS, PD) produced know for the self at a visit 
before using it to refer to the mother or another person. Five three-year-olds (BE, ERo,
KP, NP, NR) used know to refer to both self and mother and/or other from Visit 1. One
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three-year-old (BC) never referred to the mother or other with know, and her first self 
reference was at Visit 4. One three-year-old (SL, Visit 1) referred to the mother and 
another person before referring to the self; she did use think to refer to herself at this 
initial visit.
In summary, the children in general used think and know to refer to themselves 
before using them to refer to other people. Although this is not the main focus of this 
study, these data can be used to support the argument that children first conceive of, and 
refer to mental states in themselves before they do for other people. It’s important to keep 
in mind when thinking about these results, however, that most of the children’s uses of 
think and know are not for actual reference to mental states (See Table 16, Children’s 
Mental Verb Codes).
Two-year-olds’ language games and roles. As shown in Table 29, most of the 
two-year-old uses of think (80%) and know (72%) occurred in four language games: 
guiding, naming, guessing, and play-acting. The roles that think and know occurred in 
were determined by looking for regularities in lexical frames, conversational functions, 
and relations with adjacent utterances. Table 30 shows that for think, one (guiding, 
naming, guessing), or two (play-acting) roles accounted for most of the uses within each 
language game; these five roles accounted for 73% of the uses of think that occurred in 
these four language games. There were more roles for know (See Table 31); but two 
(guiding, naming, guessing) or three (play-acting) roles accounted for most of the uses 
within each game; the nine roles accounted for 80% of the uses of know in the four 
language games.
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Guiding. There were 9 cases of two-year-old use of think in the guiding language 
game. In 6 of these cases, the child accompanied a choice (where to put an object, what 
object to take) with "I think" + the choice. In four of the six examples, the child’s choice 
was preceded by a question asking the child to make a choice.
IK V4 Doll House 46:37
I: Where’s this go?/
M: What?/
M: Where do you want to put it?/
I: I think - right here 111 put it/
There were 19 two-year-old uses of know in guiding. In one role (9 cases), either 
the mother or child first makes a suggestion about an action, and the child either takes 
control of performing the activity or gives it to the mother by saying," I/You (don’t) 
know how [4- X]".
Abate VI Meal 11:38
J spreading cream 
cheese on bread
M: Can I hold your hand?/
J: No, 111 do it, 111 do it/
M: Okay/
J: I know how to/
Flanagan V4 Play 31:56
Drawing pictures on chalk 
board
M: Want me to do it, or you want to try?/
C: Um, you know how do it/
In the second role of know in the guiding activity (5 cases), "I/you know [+X]" 
was used in either giving, accepting, or rejecting guidance.
Davis V4 Play 55:57
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M: Her ear is very delicate/
M: Why don’t you give it to Lily on the side, here, a pretend vaccination
where it’s nice and fleshy/ 
Md: I know, I have to do it/
Davis V2 Play 13:26




G: You know you have to hold this part right here/
Of the five remaining cases of know in the guiding game, 2 were unclear, 1 was a 
direct repetition of the mother’s preceding utterance, and 2 were a response of "I don’t 
know" to a mother’s what-question.
The two words’ roles in the guiding language game differed. Think was used 
mainly to announce the child’s own choice; know on the other hand was used in 
negotiating control over who would perform an activity, or in initiating or 
acknowledging a specific suggestion.
Naming. Think was used by two-year-old children in giving a name; but in doing 
so it was used when contradicting or making a contrast with either the self or mother.
This was the case in five of the six cases of the two-year-olds’ uses of think in naming.
IK V3 Play 43:21
M: That’s a sheep/
I: Cow/
M: Cow?/
I: I think, two cows/
WH V4 Play 04:17
W picks up hammer
W: I think this is a axe/
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Know, on the other hand, played two roles in the naming game: in answering "I 
don’t know" to a mother’s "What’s that?" question (6 of the 15 uses of know in the 
naming game); and in asking the mother what something is, with a what-question (4 of 
the 15 uses. The contrastive role played by think is not present in either of these roles of 
know.
In this example, the child replies "I don’t know" to the mother’s "What’s that?":
MD V3 Play 13:16
Md: What is it?/ alphabet puzzle piece
M: What’s that?/
Md: I don’t know/
M: Cl
Here the child asks and then provides the mother with a name:
DC V4 Meal 06:22




Guessing. In most, but not all, of the guessing situations in which think or know 
was used, the guessing was of location in the Hide and Find situation. Other guessing 
occurred, however, such as the meaning of words ("cats oh nine nine"; "hussy"), and 
what a child had in mind (sipping from a spoon, nail polish).
Think was used in 5 of 7 cases of its uses by two-year-olds in guessing, to answer 
the mother’s where-location question with "I think" [+ location]. The location could be 
either verbalized or implied through action.
RW V4 Hide and Find 40:32,40:33
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M: Okay, without touching, can you guess?/
M: Where do you think the violin is?/
R: I think it’s in that one/
M: Which one?/
R: That one/ R points to red cup
Two roles used three times each were identified for know in guessing situations. 
Know was used in 3 of its 9 uses by two-year-olds to initiate guessing (about location, the 
child’s sipping action, nail polish) with the question, "You know what [+X]?"
CFV3 Play 01:24
C: You know what I can do?/
C sips tea from spoon
Another role for know was to answer "I don’t know" to the mother’s location 
question.
EM V4 Hide and Find 26:28
M: So where are they?/
E: I don’t know/
Again we see here think and know used in different roles in similar language games: 
think to make a guess, know to initiate guessing or say "I don’t know" when invited to 
guess.
Playacting. Think was used to set up pretend situations in two ways: to pretend 
about what a doll wants, and to set up larger pretend contexts such as an "earthshake" or 
it being "hot outside".
Think was used in the role "I think s/he wants" + [what the doll wants], to 
express pretending about a doll’s desire. This role for think occurred 5 out of the 11 total 
play-acting uses.
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WH V4 Doll House 48:56
M: Waah, waah, waah/ baby doll
W: No, don’t cry/
M: Waah, waah, waah/
W: I -1  think he wants - ababa/ baba = bottle
M: Okay/
M: Here, give him a baba/
Another role was used in 4 of the 11 play-acting uses of think: the child said "I 
think" + [ pretend state of affairs] to create a pretend situation for dolls. The four 
situations thus created were an "earthshake", a broken house, it’s hot outside, and a baby 
that can’t sleep.
WH V4 Play 11:14
W: What’s that?/ playing with dinosaur toys
W: I think there’s a earthshake/
M: Earthshake?!/
W: Let’s get out of here/
Know was also used in introducing pretend activities, but in a different way: first 
the child used know in a wh-question, then the mother would optionally restate the wh- 
word, and finally the child would introduce the pretend situation:
C: (Do) (you) know wh- (X)?
(M: Wh-?)
C: [Pretend situation]
Know was used in introducing pretend situations in this way in 11 of its 33 play­
acting uses. The pretend situations introduced were "She going on the table" "He look 
right in the mirror", "The little baby going in the bath", "The clock is tick tocking", "I’m 
going to turn off the clock", "The kittycat got to go run down the stairs", "Emily gonna 
give me a present", and "Time to take a bath now". (Two situations were repeats of these; 
one was not stated by the child because the mother changed the topic.)
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RW V2 DoU House 13:03
R: You know where she going?/
M: Where?/
R: She going on the table/
Another role for know in the play-acting game was in saying that a doll "(doesn’t) 
know(s) how" [+ activity]. This was used 8 of the 33 total times know was used in play­
acting.
DV V2 Play 24:37
D (to Lea): Her Mommy is jumping/ doll
Lea: Mm-hm/
D: Cause she doesn’t know how to walk/
A third role for know in the play-acting game (used in 9 cases of the total of 33) 
was for the child to respond "I don’t know" to the mother’s wh-question about a doll’s 
activity or other pretend activity. (In one case, the child answered her own wh- 
question, "Where is him?" with "I don’t know":) Here are the mother’s wh-questions in 
pretend play contexts that received the response of "I don’t know": "What are you gonna 
make for them for breakfast?", "Whose birthday was it at Grandma’s house?", "What are 
they going to do next?", ’'What are we having for lunch?", "How are they gonna get 
downstairs?", "But who’s gonna bring it there?", "Where are your friends?", and "You 
know how to get to Ebony’s grandma house?"
Individual two-vear-old children’s language games and roles. How do two-year- 
old children first using think and know get their feet in the door of appropriate usage, if 
the uses they hear are varied? I hypothesized that each child may latch on to a particular 
role within a particular language game for each word, a game closely tied to the ongoing
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conversational activity that may be practiced and mastered before additional games for 
that word are tried. The hypothesized roles chosen could differ by the individual, or 
could be held in common by a number of children; these possibilities were open to 
investigation.
Does each child produce a limited number of games and roles in his/her initial 
uses, perhaps starting out with just one role in one language game? Tables 32 and 33 
present the individual two-year-old children’s uses of think and know over the four visits. 
Although small numbers of uses make our comments speculative, the patterns of use for 
the individual children look like the group data: for the most part we do not see each 
child limited to use in just one particular language game or role; but within each 
language game, the roles are limited to one or two.
The trajectory of acquisition seems to differ by individual. Just as important to 
conclude, however, were the limited number of roles the two-year-olds acquired for each 
verb, how readily definable the categories were, and how easily categorizable each 
utterance was. For the two-year-old, think and know are not, on the one hand, terms that 
are used only to describe people’s mental states; but nor are they, on the other hand, the 
flexible terms accorded the full variety of meanings as presented in a standard adult 
dictionary. Note also that the roles that the two verbs participate in are virtually mutually 
exclusive. When actual uses are examined, we see that these are not terms that share 
meaning but for one differing element (such as factivity or degree of certainty). Rather, 
they are independent words, learned independently with different roles tied to particular 
language games.
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Mother and Child Correlations
It was predicted that the mothers’ and children’s specific categories within 
variables would be positively correlated in a fairly straightforward manner. Thus for 
example, mothers’ using a particular lexical frame would be associated with the children’s 
using the same lexical frame within the same age group. With some exceptions, the 
prediction of large numbers of positive correlations between corresponding variable 
categories for mothers and their children was not substantiated. The total number of 
Spearman rank-order correlations performed was 271; the number of significant 
correlations was 22; this is 8% of the total number run. A report on the correlational 
analyses performed and their results is given in Appendix 3.
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Chapter 5: Processes 
Language game role processes. In this section I give some examples of individual 
children’s uses of the different roles that think and know play in the language games of 
guessing and play-acting. For each game/role combination, if possible a previous 
maternal demonstration of the use is given. These examples were chosen because they 
lend support to the suggestion that a child can use the words correctly in conversation by 
using a rote-learned lexical frame to carry out a fixed function in limited contexts. 
Without the recognition that this is what the child is doing, their uses can appear fairly 
sophisticated, inviting overinterpretation of the child’s word meaning by both parent and 
investigators. However, I don’t wish to downplay the child’s accomplishment; the child is 
adept at interpreting the social situation and figuring out the roles that words play in 
conversational situations. Each example is preceded by an identifying header: [child’s 
initials, age in months, visit (V) number, context, and time(s) on videotape of think or 
know in minutes:seconds].
Think: Playacting. In this series, WH experiments with the procedure of
pretending that a doll has internal states. He begins his use of this game by pretending,
like his mother, that dolls are sleepy. Later he moves on to play-act about other doll
desires: wanting to go home, to have a bottle, etc.
First WH’s mother uses think to suggest that a doll "wants to take a nap":
WH, 32 months, VI, Doll House, 10:31
M: Who’s that?/ doll
W: Ashley/
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M: She fell down/
M: Do you think she wants to take a little nap?/
W: Mommy, let me see outside/
Soon afterward, like his mother, WH uses think to suggest that a different doll 
"wants to take a nap":
WH, 32 months, V I, Doll House, 11:53
W: Let the kitty see something/ cat doll
W: I think he wants to take a nap/
M: He’s tired?/
M: Where’s the kitty’s bed?/
At his next visit, he uses think only once:
WH, 33 months, V2, Play, 24:22, 24:50
W: I think Mickey wants to go home/
M: He does?/
M: How’s he going to get home?/
W: Cause he wants to go home/
W: Where’s the house?/
M: Oh, the house went away/
WH again has a small doll in his hand, and remembers the (as yet absent) doll
house from the previous visit ("Where’s the house?"). This seems to call up the lexical
frame, "I think X wants to Y", his only recorded usage of think thus far. The unanalyzed 
nature of the unit is revealed by his inappropriate response to his mother’s question 
"How’s he going to get home?" - he repeats himself, "wants to go home". By Visit 4, 
WH is using think in other roles in other language games, but in doll house play he twice 
returns to the original one, and it is the only one he uses in the doll house play-acting 
context:
WH, 37 months, V4, Doll House, 48:56
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M: Waah, waah, waah/
W: No, don’t cry/
M: Waah, waah, waah/
W: I - 1 think he wants - a baba/ bottle
M: Okay/
M: Here, give him a baba/
M: In the kitchen/
W: He’s drinking/
M: Oh, he’s very happy now/
Note WH’s hesitation before he says "a baba". He more automatically says "I think
he wants", but has to consider what would be an appropriate something for the baby to
want.
WH, 37 months, V4, Doll House, 54:42
W: Does he turn his head?/ doll
M: I don’t know/
M: Does he?/
W: I think he wants to look at the cat’s chair/
Here WH has thought of something appropriate for the baby to want to do (look at 
an object in another direction), now that he has found out that the baby can turn his 
head! Take a nap, go home, a baba, and look at a chair are different slotfilling 
activities WH has put into the frame "I think s/he wants to X", all appropriate to the doll 
house play-acting activity of attributing pretend desires to a doll.
Know: Play-acting. DV used know in the role, [A doll] "(doesn’t) know(s) 
how" [+ action], to express the pretend competence of the doll, at two visits, the second 
and fourth. At Visit 2, she used it six times, all during Lego block play. The frame, and 
thus the word’s, meaning does not show evidence of going beyond pretending about the 
doll’s ability to perform the stated action.
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DV, 33 months, V2, Play 23:44, 23:47, 23:49
D: (?) fits right in the seat/ doll
M: That’s right/
D: It fits/
M: It fits inside the truck/
D: He doesn’t know how/
D: He doesn’t know how/
M: Can you help?/
D: He does know how/
D: There’s a -/
D: There’s a duplo in his way/
We suspect that the DV is concerned with toy’s physical performance rather than 
its mental processes because DV changes her mind about whether or not it "knows" when 
she discovers that there’s a physical obstacle - a duplo - blocking its action. DV’s frame is 
flexible enough that she can produce it in the question form, and with a real person 
instead of a doll:
DV, 33 months, V2, Play 24:37, 24:40
D (to L): Her Mommy is jumping/ doll
L: Mm-hm/
D: Cause she doesn't know how to walk/
D: Does that Mommy know how to walk?/ D points to M
M: (laughs)
L: Uh-huh/
M: Not the Duplo Mommy, right?/
D: Yeah, she’s a bigger one/
Here it is unclear whether "the red one" - a red doll - knows how to sit or drive:
DV, 33 months, V2, Play 25:11
D: He doesn’t want to sit like that/ doll in toy car
M: Doesn’t he have to sit down, to drive?/
D: No no, the red one knows how/ red doll
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DV has learned, then, that know can be used in a particular frame to pretend about 
a doll’s physical capability. Little further knowledge of word meaning needs to be 
imputed to explain the child’s initial productions.
Think: Guessing. In these conversations, IK leams that statements about 
location of an unseen object can be preceded by "I think", when answering where- 
questions. However, she doesn’t catch on that her mother uses "I think" only when a 
location is in dispute. This first excerpt shows that IK can answer "where" questions with 
a location. Her mother introduces "thought" to disagree with her child’s negative answer.
IK, 29 months V2, Play 22:31
M: Where’s your party shoes/
I: (?)
M: Oh, okay/
I: It’s not on the table/
M: Oh, I thought they were/
When IK agrees to go to look for the shoes, her mother first gives her specific 
directions about a location to look (on the table in the hallway) and then uses the 
utterance "I think that’s where they are". In saying "I think" the mother is emphasizing 
that the location contrasts with her daughter’s previous denial.
IK, 29 months, V2, Play 23:24
I: 111 go look for them/
M: Go look on the table, in the hallway/
M: I think that’s where they are, Izzy/ shoes
Here again, IK’s mother again says "I think that’s where they are" to talk about the 
location of unseen objects, to contrast with her daughter’s denial of the correct location.
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Argumentative IK demands, too late, that she doesn’t want her mother to "put" them in 
the location her mother has put them already!
IK, 29 months, V2, Hide and Find 32:09
M: I’m gonna hide ’em/
M: And then you try to guess, okay?/ 
M: Okay, ready?/
M: Okay/




M: I think that’s where they are/
I: Mommy, don’t put it in there/
At the next visit, IK can answer a where-question about the location of unseen 
objects with the frame, "I think" + the objects + location.
DC, 30 months, V3, Play 39:23
M: Um, where are all the rest of 
the animals, Izzy?/
I: I think they’re in my room/
M: They’re in your room?/
M: Should I go get them for you?/
I: Yeah/
In the next example, IK inappropriately answers a why-question, rather than a 
where-question, with the "I think" + object + location frame. (Alternatively, she may just 
be ignoring her mother’s why-question, and continuing on with location topic they were 
discussing previously):
IK, 30 months, V3, Doll House 58:00, 58:04
M hides toys
I opens blue cup 
I opens yellow cup
I opens red cup
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I: It’s up there, look!/
M: Yeah, it’s right there/
M: Why did this lamp fall all of a sudden?/
I: I think it fell off of -/
I: I think it fell off of here/
M: Okay/
M: The table by the bed?/ M puts lamp on
At the next visit, IK initiates a future-location conversation with a where- 
question, but her mother doesn’t respond with a location, instead asking the question back 
of her daughter with "put". IK then combines "I think" with a location and "put". This 
harkens back to IK’s consternation at Visit 2 about her mother’s putting of objects in an 
undesirable location. Perhaps her mother is unwilling to supply an answer to her 
daughter’s question about location because her daughter likes to be in control of "putting" 
decisions.
IK, 34 months, V4, Doll House 46:37
I: Where’s this go?/
M: What?/
M: Where do you want to put it?/
I: I think - right here 111 put it/
M: Okay/
Moments later, IK answers her own where + put question, with the answer, "I 
think" + location. She does not wait for her mother to choose a location, but chooses an 
unsuitable place herself. Her mother doesn’t let her choice stand, but suggests an 
alternative location.
DC, 34 months, V4, Doll House 46:57,46:59
M: You got it/
I: Now look/
I: Now where should I put this guy?/
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I: I think - it’ll go right here/
M: I don’t think there’s room right there/
M: How hout next to the refrigerator?/
In these mother-child conversations about where objects are or should go, four 
disagreements take place. This element of disagreement between the participants is what 
necessitates the mother’s preceding of location statements with "I think". However, DC 
uses "I think" in location statements even when there is no dispute. Here is indirect 
evidence that the child, while able to use the term correctly in conversation, has not taken 
into consideration the social presupposition - disagreement between conversants - of the 
term, at least as it is used in these cases by the mother.
Know: Guessing CF’s mother demonstrates at two visits the use of "you 
know wh-" to invite guessing. In both cases, the mother supplies the answer to her wh- 
question:
CF, 33 months, V2, Hide and Find 23:52
M: Now, here’s the - you know what this is?/
M: You just had that before/
M: That’s a violin/
M: A little bitty one/
CF, 34 months, V3, Play 55:58
M: Oh, you know what we need?/
C: What?/
M: Plates/
M: For our tea cups/
Soon after her mother’s demonstration at the third visit, CF uses know twice in 
inviting guessing. CF answers her own question either by physical demonstration 
(sipping tea) or verbally:
CF V3 Play 01:24
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C: You know what I can do?/
M: Mm/
CF, 34 months, V3, Play 01:46




C: I got nail polish/
L: Oh/
In contrast with IK and her mother’s use of think in a location - guessing game, 
know for CF appears in this limited corpus to be part of a general-purpose attention- 
securing device, perhaps related to Wittgenstein’s description of the game of guessing the 
thoughts or intentions of another person.
Summary: Initial Language Game Roles. What can we say then, about the first 
language games roles in which children use think and know? In these limited examples of 
just two of the four most common language games, children used the verbs initially with 
fixed frames in procedures for attributing internal states or physical competence to dolls 
in play-acting, and to give location of nonpresent objects or to initiate guessing. These 
conversational routines are a far cry from Montgomery’s claim that children in some way 
link mental verbs with their physical correlates. They have not much in common with the 
types of knowledge researchers probe for in theory of mind tasks. The child instead is 
learning what lexical frames are appropriate to what social, conversational situations. 
Their ideas do not remain fixed, but grow in response to their ongoing conversational 
experience. And they are not alone in their enterprise; their mothers provide assistance in
C sips tea from spoon 
M drinks tea from cup
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a variety of forms: entering into and encouraging pretend scenarios that expand the range 
of conversational topics, demonstrating new linguistic procedures.
Embedded Conversational Processes
In this section, examples of conversations between the two-year-olds and their 
mothers that contain think and know are provided. These are two-year-olds’ embedded 
conversational uses. (More advanced uses by three-year-olds are examined in the 
following section.) The emphasis in their interpretation is on finding links between the 
mothers’ uses and their children’s subsequent uses. A variety of processes are identified 
that may support the children’s initial uses of these words: direct repetition of the 
mothers’ utterances; use tied to a particular event; using the same lexical frame with the 
same topic; role reversal, in this case in the telling o f stories; the asking and answering of 
wh-questions; and contrasting related mental verbs. These processes are presented on a 
rough continuum from the more event-based to the more linguistically-based. The 
processes are reported in a speculative way, as the small number of examples of each 
present in the data prevented further quantification. Each example is preceded by an 
identifying header: [child’s initials, age in months, visit (V) number, context, and time(s) 
on videotape of think or know in minutes:seconds].
Repetition. Repetition of a mother’s previous utterance can support a child’s 
beginning uses of a word:
RW, 32 months, V3, Doll House, 34:58, 35:04
R: There it is/ clock
M: Oh, good/
M: Why, does one of these dolls want to know the time?/
R: Yeah, this doll/
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
127
M: Oh/
R: Wanted to know - time -/
RW’s faltering delivery may be due to his unfamiliarity with the vocabulary: perhaps he 
had never encountered the topic of time as something to know before.
Use tied to a particular event. CF, during her first visit, was asked by her mother 
with the phrase know how, to turn on a battery-operated train toy using a switch. (The 
train tracks were connected to a castle.)
CF, 32 months, V I, Play, 27:41, 27:49
M: Let’s see what this thing does/
M: Sit over here/
C: Okay/
M: Do you know how to turn it on?/ castle & train
A little over a minute after this exchange, CF uses know how under similar circumstances,
when
her mother asks her to turn on the train:
CF, 32 months, V I, Play, 28:54
M: Want to try to make it work?/ castle & train
M: With one of your little characters?/
C: Okay/
M: Oh/
C: I know how to work this/
Soon afterwards, CF uses know how to accompany another challenging aspect of 
playing with the castle and train toy, putting a figure into the train. Note that her mother 
has connected the two activities, making the train work and putting a character in, in the 
above example. CF connects the two activities too, extending her use of know how to 
cover putting the toy in the train as well:
CF, 32 months, V I, Play 32:12
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C: This goes right here/
M: Alright, well put it in/ figure in train
C: I know how it goes/
C: It goes in here/
C: I can’t do it/
Later in the Doll House context, CF’s mother uses know what to talk (negatively)about 
the identity of a piece of furniture:
CF, 32 months, VI, Doll House, 25:00
C: What’s this?/ cabinet
M: Is that the television set?/
M: Or-/
M: Hm/
M: What is that/
M: I don’t know what that is/
CF immediately uses know what, although in the positive, with the topic of 
identification:
CF, 32 months, VI, Doll House, 25:14
C: We need to watch the t.v./
C: I know what it is/
M: Maybe it’s the refrigerator/
C: Where?/
M: No, there is a refrigerator/
M: It’s just one of the kitchen supplies/
In these examples, CF, while not mimicking her mother exactly, leans heavily on 
the context and her mother’s previous utterances to produce her own utterances with 
know.
Same Topic. Same Lexical Frame, Different Event. In this example, CF extends a lexical 
frame to cover the topic of placement of an object, but during a different event. First she 
hears "I think the creamer goes here" while playing with a tea set:
CF, 34 months, V3, Play, 03:45
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C: Pretend we put it, okay?/
M: All right/
C: Pretend/
M: W ell pretend everything/
M: You know, I think the creamer goes here/
M: And - oops - the sugar goes here/
M: Oh, here’s - you’re looking for a place for your cup?/
CF may be asking her mother for a frame to express putting: ("Pretend we put it, okay?")
Her mother provides her with one, and CF uses it later, but in the doll house context
rather than the tea set context:
CF, 34 months, V3, Doll House, 40:05
M: Well who do you have now?/
C: This one on here/
C: I think this goes in here/
C: And this - /
C: And this lady goes here/
C: Right here/
CF thus uses the frame "I think X goes here" to describe the action of putting an object in 
its place.
Role Reversal. At the beginning of the fourth visit, RW and his mother began 
their play session, that consisted of the building of a bridge with large blocks, by 
retelling the story o f the building of the Brooklyn Bridge. This was a story that RW had 
heard before, and his mother encouraged him to participate in the retelling:
RW, 35 months, V4, Play, 18:55 
M: That’s right/
M: She did build the Brooklyn Bridge/
R: Why did Emily Roblin build the Brooklyn Bridge?/
M: Do you remember?/
R: Why?/
M: Why?/
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R: Why?/
M: Do you remember why?/
R: Why?/
M: Because - do you remember what the man’s name was, 
had the idea first to build the Brooklyn Bridge?/
R: Who?/
M: Was his name John Roblin?/
R: Yeah/




M: Remember, he died/
R: What?/
M: And then his son took over/
M: Remember his son’s name?/
R: And his son died, too/
M: That’s right/
M: And then his son’s wife, who was Emily Roblin, took over/
M: And she was the one who really built the bridge/
Note how the mother uses know in this conversation, to encourage the child’s provision 
of details for the story. What is to be known by the child is "what happened", and what 
happened was the next important event in the storyline - John Roblin died. The child, 
RW, has caught on to what is expected by his mother, as he demonstrates by giving the 
next important event in the story - that John Roblin’s son died, too (ignoring his mother’s 
request for the son’s name however).
Later during this visit, during his meal, RW initiates another storytelling, this 
time with himself as the storyteller and the investigator as the listener (later his mother 
takes over the role of listener).
RW, 35 months, V4, Meal, 19:10
R (to Lea): Would you like me to tell you a story?/
Lea: Yeah, would you tell me a story?/
R: I only know the story about Cookie (?)/
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Perhaps RW, after witnessing his mother’s Brooklyn Bridge story told partly for 
the benefit of showing Lea that RW and his mother know a good story, has decided that 
Lea is in their home to hear their stories. He is cheerfully willing to tell the "only" story 
he knows for her.
RW, 35 months, V4, Meal, 21:53
M: Does it taste extra good when it goes through 
the bagel?/ R puts straw through
bagel
R: Yeah, Mommy/
R: So you know what happened next to Big Bird 
and Cookie?/
Lea: No, what happened?/
RW uses know as his mother did earlier - with "what happened" - to draw the 
listener into the story. And later:
RW, 35 months, V4, Meal, 26:40
M: Reece, could you turn around so Lea could hear 
you better with her camera?/
M: Want to do that?/
R: So you know what happened then?/
RW then uses "you know" to encourage his mother’s active participation in the telling of 
the story:
RW, 35 months, V4, Meal, 25:18, 25:20, 25:22, 25:26
R: And who else?/
M: Who else?/
M: I don’t know/
M: Who else came?/
R: You know who else/
M: I don’t know who else/
R: You know/
M: Who is Big Bird’s big friend?/
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R: Who?/
M: That big elephant guy/
In this conversation, RW tries to get his mother to give the details of the story, 
telling her that she knows, as his mother did with him in the Brooklyn Bridge story. Here 
he has access to his mother’s input that "who else" is something that it is possible to know 
or not, and he is able to take the previously introduced utterances, "Who else" and "I 
don’t know" and incorporate them into "You know who else". RW does not take into 
account his mother’s lack of familiarity with the story he is telling - insisting that she 
knows "who else" even when she insists that she does not - perhaps revealing that even 
though he has grasped the conversational function of using "you know" to elicit the 
listener’s participation in the storytelling, he does not grasp the basis for her knowing the 
details: remembering previously encountered information.
Wh-questions. A child can correctly begin using a mental verb by answering a 
mother’s wh-question:
WH, 37 months, V4, Hide and Find, 17:17, 17:19
M: Okay, where do you think they are?/
W: I think they’re right in here/(whispers)
W opens red cup
W: No/
Soon after answering a wh-question prompt that contains think, WH is able to 
answer a similar prompt that does not contain think with a similar response:
WH, 37 months, V4, Hide and Find, 20:12




W: Oh, I think - they’re in here/
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M: No/
W: Yes it is/
M: No it’s not in there/ W opens red cup
W: Look and see/
Similarly, IK answers her mother’s questions about identity without, and then with
think. Her mother first asks a wh-question with think and gets an appropriate response:
IK, 30 months, V3, Doll House, 58:42
I: What’s this?/
M: What is that?/
M: What do you think it is?/
I: This is a potty/
M: Right/
Then IK identifies a related object, another piece of bathroom furniture, with think:
IK, 30 months, V3, Doll House, 59:54
M: And what’s this called?/
I: I think a shower or a bathtub/
M: Bathtub, yeah/
IK has learned that you may preface an identifying name with "I think".
RW’s mother often used know to direct reflection, asking wh-questions that
encouraged RW to participate in the conversation, or if that attempt failed, to introduce
new information herself that answered her own question, as in the following examples:
RW, 30 months, V2, Play, 10:43, 10:44, 10:49
M: Well you know, you know what you call this 
color?/
R: Yeah/
M: Not like yellow like Mr. Golden Sun, but -/ 
M: You know what you call it?/
M: You call it mustard color/
RW, 30 months, V2, Meal, 48:16,48:21
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M: Do you know what else Cathy made in it?/
R: Yeah/
M: She made almond butter/
R: Yeah/
M: You know what almonds are?/
R: Yeah/
M: They’re another kind of nut/
RW’s mother uses this function 11 times in Visit 2 before RW does, all with what 
as the wh-word. However when RW directs reflection, he uses where as the wh-word. 
RW has heard his mother use know where in this visit already, during the hide and find 
game:
RW, 30 months, V2, H & F, 21:25, 21:33
R: 111 put them in there/
M: Youll put them in there?/




M: So is that okay?/
M: Should I guess where they are?/
M: Or are they -/
M: I know where they are/
M: They’re in the yellow cup/
In this example, several potential clues to meaning are presented together. The
mother in protesting her son’s placing the toy in the yellow cup while she was still
looking, not only exposes him to the "know where" frame, but also indirectly gives him
information about a presupposition of know - that if she sees, she will know. She also
contrasts know with a related verb, guess. Finally she explicitly states what it is that she
knows - that where the toys are is in the yellow cup. When RW uses "know where", it’s
with the directing reflection function:
RW, 30 months, V2, Doll House, 13:03
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M: Why is she going in the window instead of 
the door?/
R: You know where she going?/
M: Where?/
R: She going on the table/
Here’s a sequence in which the child combines elements from her mother’s 
previous utterances to produce the directing reflection function. In the first two excerpts, 
the mother uses "You know" to try to elicit a name of a character in a book:
DC, 34 months, V4, Meal, 56:47
M: Babar’s Little Girl/ book’s title
M: What’s Babar’s little girl’s name?/
M: What is it?/
M: You know/
I: What is it Mom?/
M: What’s Babar’s little girl’s name?/
I: (?)
M: It’s Isabel!/
IK, 34 months, V4, Meal, 58:13




M: The baby was named Isabel/
Later the mother uses "You know what?" to introduce new information:
DC, 34 months, V4, Meal, 03:03
M: But you know what?/
I: (nods)
M: When Elvy gets here, you can go to the park/
M: By the fountain/
M: Would you like that?/
The mother introduces the word called to perform naming:
DC, 34 months, V4, Meal, 06:06
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M reading book
M: And she didn’t know it was time to go home/
M: So she walked and walked ’til she got to the 
special place called The Blue Valley/
IK combines these elements in "You know what this called?".
IK, 34 months, V4, Meal, 06:22
M: What’s that look like?/
I: You know what this called?/
M: What?/
I: Frog/
Here IK directs reflection for the purpose of establishing identity, during the same
book reading session, using the lexical item called introduced by her mother. Her
mother’s use of called may have flagged a previously encountered utterance; IK has heard
"You know what this is called" to identify objects at the previous session, although
during the doll house play, not during book reading:
IK, 30 months, V3, Doll House, 59:31
M: And what’s this called, Izzy?/
M: You know what this is called/
M: It’s where you wash your hands?/
M: What’s it called?/
I: Yeah/
In the following example, LB’s mother provides an unexpected slotfiller for her 
daughter’s answer to a wh-question with think: the child combines the response frame ("I 
think it should eat”) with the object ("com") to produce an appropriate (and humorous) 
answer:
LB, 39 months, V4, Play, 6:24, 17:08 
M: You know I brought some big Indian com back from
M points to book 
I drinking bottle 
I points to book




L: Bleh, that’s dusty/
M: Do you think anyone can eat this?/
L: Bleh/
L: Pee yew/
M: What do you think that snake should eat that we 
got - we found in Caanan?/
L: The one that I (?)/
M: No, the one that I have in ajar, that I gave to Hannah to 
take to show and tell/
L: Oh/
L: I think it should eat this hard com/
M: You think it should eat that hard com?/
L: Yeah, I think it likes hard com/
M: It doesn’t have any teeth, though/
Contrasting two mental verbs. CB’s mother, at the fourth visit, juxtaposed the
mental verbs know and think. In the second example it is CB who supplies the second,
contrasting utterance. In the first example, the mother establishes the pattern:
CB, 39 months, V4, Play, 09:37
M: We’re so close, aren’t we?/
C: Want to try this one?/
M: Hm?/
M: Ooh, okay/
M: I don’t know that that has very good wheels/
M: What do you think?/
M: No/
The mother has offered her opinion ("I don’t know that..."), immediately asks for the
child’s ("What do you think?"), and gives an opinion when the child fails to supply one. In the
next example, the mother expresses her doubt at finding seeds ("I don’t know that..."), and CB
supplies the opinion ("I think you can").
CB, 39 months, V4, Meal, 24:12, 24:32
M: Okay sweetie, we have to get some new dirt/
M: And a big pot/
M: And the seeds/
M: I don’t know that I can find the old seeds/
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C: I think you can/
C: Will you?/
M: I used to have them up there/ M points to shelf
M: And I don’t see the package/
M: I might have them - 111 look under the sink/
M: 111 look there/
C: Okay/
The mother provides additional potential meaning clues, in her statements related to her not 
knowing where the seeds are: she doesn’t see them in their old location, they might be under the 
sink, shell look there. Note that in this example, reminiscent of a false belief task in that an item is 
hidden on a kitchen shelf but is no longer in the expected location, the participants do not 
contrast think and know regarding location of the missing item (as in, "I don’t know where 
it is, but I think it’s in here"); they contrast the finder’s action, her ability to locate the 
package: ("I don’t know that I can..."/ "I think you can"). What is important to the 
participants is not so much where the object is, but whether it can be reobtained, for the 
social purpose of using it.
Processes Beyond the Here and Now: Three- Year-Olds’ Uses of Think and Know to 
Denote
Rather than look at three-year-old children’s embedded conversational uses of 
think and know as I did for two-year-old children, I looked at the three-year-old child’s 
attempts to use think and know in more advanced ways. These include using think and 
know in conversations about the past, the future, to make generalizations, to contrast 
thought and reality, and one girl’s uses of verb contrasts. Conversations about the past 
entailed confusion, non sequitors, argument, and negotiation. The absence of supporting 
details away from the here and now often necessitated the mother’s questioning to figure 
out what the child intended to convey. The children themselves confused different events,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
139
location in time, the general with the specific. However, the children were better at 
making generalizations. When possible, excerpts that contain parental demonstrations 
(one father was a main participant) of these advanced functions preceding children’s uses 
are also presented. However, the three-year-olds’ more advanced uses were not so tied to 
parental uses as the two-year-olds’embedded conversational uses were, and thus their 
relations to parental uses are more difficult to demonstrate. In addition, I identify parent- 
child processes which may assist the child in developing more advanced concepts of 
think and know, and in participating in the conversations with think and know in more 
advanced ways.
Each example is preceded by an identifying header: [child’s initials, age in 
months, visit (V) number, context, and videotaped time of think or know in 
minutes: seconds].
Talking About the Past. When three-year-old children talked about the past, the 
absence of supporting details sometimes led to confusion. Even when the child managed 
to use know or think appropriately, she often left out the information necessary to get her 
complete message across. It then became the job of the adult to ask for further details, or 
to guess at the child’s meaning. This process of questioning and correcting may 
contribute to the child’s understanding of what is needed to talk about a past event, 
including how the use of think or know fits into these conversations.
In the first example, KP wants to tell her mother about another girl’s toy rocket. 
But KP can’t remember the girl’s name, and she tries to ask her mother what it is. Her 
mother does not know who KP wants to talk about, and must elicit enough detail from 
KP to determine which girl it is. But the mother was not home for the event; "So how
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would I know who this is?" And if the girl didn’t bring the rocket, "How do you know
she had a rocket?" KP’s mother uses know in this excerpt to make explicit to KP some of
the necessary information for relating an event about the past. KP is confused about why
her mother can’t name the girl she visualizes, as if her mother can visualize her as well as
she can without any identifying clues - "Don’t you remember her? You’ve seen her
before." Her mother resorts to guessing: "Was it one of Jenny’s friends?" "Was it Katie?"
KP, 42 months, V2, Meal, 11:53
K: You know what?/
M: What?/
(Pause)
K: You know something?/
M: What?/
(Pause)
K: Let me think/
(Pause)
K: What’s her name again?/
M: What?/




K: Don’t you remember her?/
K: You've seen her before/
M: No/
K: Yes/
M: Where is she?/
K: I don’t know/
M: Oh/
K: I don’t know her name/
K: Somebody has a rocket/
K: That can turn into a big rocket/
M: Yeah?/
K: (nods)
M: Who is this person?/
K: I don’t know her/
M: Where’d you meet her?/
K: At our house!/
M: At our house?/
M: Somebody with a rocket came to our house?/
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
141
K: Uh huh/
M: Was I home for this?/
K: (shakes head)
M: No/
M: So how would I know who this is?/
M: Was it one o f Jenny’s friends?/
K: (nods)
M: Came to our house with a rocket/
K: Right/
M: Okay/
K: Not with a rocket/
M: Not with a rocket/
K: She left it home/
M: She left it home/
K: Yeah/
M: How do you know she had a rocket?/
K: Cause she told us/
M: Oh, okay/
M: Was this Katie?/
K: (nods)
M: Oh, okay/
M: Well why didn’t you say so?/
K: Cause/
M: Because/
Having unearthed the name of the child, the dyad move on to the day of their
meeting. In the ensuing humorous conversation, KP reveals her confusion about
tomorrow and the days o f the week, at the same time that she displays her exasperation
("Don’t you know?") that her mother won’t admit to comprehending the "obvious", that
Katie came on a Sunday in the past, not in the future.
KP, 42 months, V2, Meal, 11:53, 12:04, 12:06, 12:23
M: When did Katie come over?/
K: On Sunday/
M: No, tomorrow’s Sunday/
K: Don’t you know?/
K: She came over to - mor - row!/
M: She came over tomorrow?/
K: (nods)
M: No, I don’t think so/
K: (nods emphatically)
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M: You know this, huh?/
K: I know which day it is/
M: You do?/
M: Which day is it today?/
K: Mm - Saturday/
M: So when did Katie come over?/
K: On Sunday/
M: But Sunday is tomorrow/
K: I know that/
KP faces a number of difficulties in sharing her memory o f a specific event with 
her mother. 1) She doesn’t seem to realize that her mother can't provide the name of the 
child she’s thinking about without more explicit specification; 2) she needs to convey 
both past and general information - the girl came to the house at a specific time in the 
past, but has a rocket in general; 3) her time vocabulary - for days of the week, tomorrow 
versus yesterday - needs fine tuning. KP is able to use think and know and remember in 
appropriate conversational ways ("Let me think”; "You know something?"; "I don’t know 
her name."; "Don’t you remember her?"), but as her mother’s probing demonstrates, there 
is more to using them to talk about the past than this.
Her mother helps KP out by:
1. Telling KP that she doesn’t know who the child is because she wasn't there.
This gives KP information about an important source of knowledge: direct observation.
2. Summarizing the state of her understanding, she gives her daughter the 
opportunity to reject a statement confusing past and general:
M: Came to our house with a rocket/
K: Not with a rocket/
K: She left it home/
3. Steering the conversation to bring out and contrast different sources of
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knowledge: (a) knowing by direct observation ("came to our house with a rocket"), and 
(b) knowing from social sources ("she told us").
4. Challenging her daughter’s confusion over past and future vocabulary:
K: She came over to - mor - row!/
M: No, I don’t think so/
Later in the visit KP more successfully uses know to talk about the past, but this 
time rather than relating a rather complicated event (what a friend told her at a visit to 
her home in the past), she conveys a simpler fact: what she put on top of her Christmas 
tree, an angel.
KP, 42 months, V2, Play, 39:15




Here’s another case in which a mother has trouble understanding her daughter’s
statement about the past. First the mother and daughter discuss the habits of ghosts:
AF, 41 months, V3, Meal, 07:37
A: But he didn’t ate us up/
M: Ghosts don’t eat people up/
A: No/
M: What do they do to people?/
A: Um, they try to get them/
A: And they try to boil them and eat them up/
M: Really?/
M: I didn’t know that/
M: I thought that ghosts- just scared people away/
M: From their house, because they want the house all for themselves/
A: (?)
A: They eat people up/
M: Yeah, it’s true/
M: When I play ghost, I always pretend that I eat people up/
M: But I’m not a real ghost/
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M: I don’t know/
M: I don’t know what it means to be a ghost/
M: Um yum yum/
The mother "didnt know that" ghosts try to boil people and eat them up. (Notice
that she contrasts know with thought.) As well, AF’s mother tells her daughter about a
valid source of knowledge: she doesn’t know "what it means to be a ghost" because she’s
not "a real ghost". Introspection, then, gives us self-knowledge, which differs by type of
being. Do ghosts eat people up or merely scare people away from houses? She doesn’t
knows because she’s not herself a ghost. A ghost, presumably, would know.
Later in the visit AF inserts the phrase "I didn’t know that" into a recount of that
day’s lunch at school, that gets confused with pickup time. Her use of this phrase doesn’t
fit smoothly into the conversation - what is it that she didn't know?
AF, 41 months, V3, Meal, 13:34
M: Do you remember what you had for lunch today?/
M: I don't remember what I gave you for lunch/
A: I don't know either/
M: Hm?/
A: I don't know either/
M: You forgot?/
A: Mm-hm/
A: Forgot, I didn't see/
A: We had it so fast/
M: What-/
A: I didn't even see/
M: You ate it so fast, you didn’t even see?/
A: Nn-nn/
M: Why do you eat fast?/
A: No, you came right fast/
A: I didn't know that/
M: Oh, I came to pick you up fast?/
M: Quick, I mean, early?/
A: Mm-hm/
M: Well, I came to pick you up after your nap/
A: Oh, and um, what did I eat?/
A: Do you remember?/
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In the absence of perceptual evidence, disagreements about the past can arise, as 
in this argument between NR and his mother about where Cookie Monster doll was 
sitting:
NR, 42 months, V2, Meal, 15:50, 15:58, 16:12
M: It’s like between the rocks, in your 
bears at night/
N: Mommy I think this must be Cookie, this 
must be me, this must be you/
M: Really?/
M: See I thought, this was Cookie, this was 
me, and this was you/
N: No because I was sitting in the middle/
N: I was sitting in the middle/
M: Oh, you were sitting in the middle/
N: Yeah/
M: I thought I-was sitting in the middle/
NR resolves the conflict with think, proposing a third party as the one in the middle:
NR , 42 months, V2, Meal, 16:49, 16:53
M: So who was in the middle?/
N: I was!/
M: No, I think I was/
N: No, I was/
M: No/
N: I think Cookie was/
M: Mm/
N: Can I have a bite?/
Talk about the Future. The children’s uses of think and know to talk about the future 
were rare. One child who did, at her mother’s suggestion, SL, seemed caught up in the 
relation between what will happen and what usually happens. In this conversation, she 
discusses both a specific event in the future, a visit from her friend, and a generalization, 
how one plays tag:
Cookie 
Monster doll
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SL, 44 months, V2, Meal, 36:53
M: So do you have any idea what we should do 
with Lucy when she comes?/
M: Today?/
S: What?/
M: Do you have any ideas what games you want 
to play with her?/
S: Mm - tag/
M: You want to play tag?/
S: Y’know what tag is?/
S: Somebody chases you then you chases them, 
then you chase them, then you chase you, 
then you chase you, then you chase them/
M: How do you decide who should do the chasing?/
S: Uh, I think Lucy should do the chasing/
M: Oh, and then when do you chase her?/
S: Uh, after I’m done/
S: And I say, Lucy, now can I chase you?/
S: And then she says, I can (?)/
Her mother wants to talk about what they will do that afternoon ("You want to
play tag?") but SL switches to the general rules of tag ("Y’know what tag is?"). But when
her mother switches to the general with her, ("How do you decide..."), SL returns to
talking about the future ("I think Lucy should do the chasing.").
In another mother-initiated conversation about the future, SL again works back
and forth between a specific event (eating this food will give you a tummyache) and the
general (this food doesn’t make tummyaches). Working out this contrast takes
precedence for her over answering her mother’s question ("Are you gonna get mad...?").
SL, 44 months, V2, Play, 58:21
S: This is where I live/
M: Oh, you’re just making that food for me/
M: Are you gonna get mad if I don’t eat it?/
S: I think you’re gonna get, really tummyache/
S: Cause this stuff doesn’t make you have 
a tummyache/
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S: But if you eat all the food it’s gonna make 
you have a tummyache/
Making Generalizations. Making generalizations with know and think seemed to be 
easier for the children than talking about specific events in the past or future, and their 
conversations about the general are less confusing for the listener. Three o f the four 
children in the examples presented here use know to direct reflection, in wh-questions 
that introduce general topics. In the first example, after his father introduces the general 
topic, ERi asserts that his father doesn't know who is in the bathroom when he locks 
himself in, and he asks about the hypothetical situation of his father locking him in:
ERi, 43 months, V3, Doll House, 32:40
F: But in what room?/
E: In the bathroom/
F: Oh, in the bathroom/
F: You always lock that, don’t you, when you’re 
in there/
F: You always lock me out/
E: Yeah/
E: But you don’t know who’s in there/
F: But I don’t know who’s in there/
F: But I usually assume it’s you in there/
E: If you were out there you could lock me in?/
E: Couldn’t you?/
F: I could lock you out/
ERi’s father may not "know who’s in" the bathroom, but he "usually assumes" it’s 
his son, as his son "always lock[s]" the bathroom door. He may not have certain 
knowledge by direct observation - he cannot see his son - but he can make a good guess 
by deduction: inference by reasoning from the general to the specific.
ERi’s father had already introduced know with a wh-question as a way of presenting
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general information during the same visit, in the doll house context:
ERi, 43 months, V3, Doll House, 26:45
F: That cat needs a little nap?/
E: Mm-hm/
F: You know- you know where (Elaine?) 
usually sleeps?/
F: Here/ F points to armchair
F: She usually sleeps here/
F: Maybe that cat could take a little nap/
E: Oh/
F: In the rocking chair/
Here ERi’s father has made a suggestion about the specific (the doll cat can nap in 
the chair) using knowledge about the general (a real cat usually sleeps in a chair). In this 
way their doll house play can mimic reality.
BE is able to use know to initiate a general topic, what Natu drinks at school.
BE, 43 months, VI, Meal, 57:29 
B: Know when we go to school?/
B: That’s what kind -/ juice box
B: Natu gets stripes/ boy at school
B: But mine’s not sweet, Momma/
M: Well Natu has to drink special kinds/
M: Because he has allergies/
He also uses know to introduce the topic of the location of a general event, where he
eats lunch:
BE, 43 months, VI, Meal, 01:22
B: You know where I - where we eat?/
B: The children?/
B: We eat in the classroom/
B: Where we eat our lunch/
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In contrast to her difficulty in talking about what’s going to happen this afternoon,
SL enjoys talking about the general game of tag, using know to introduce new details: 
running fast, winning and losing:
SL, 42 months, V2, Meal, 37:16, 37:30
M: Do you guys play tag at school?/
S: No no no no no no no/
M: No no no no?/
S: Know how fast you got to run?/
S: You gotta go dh-dh-dh-dh/
M: YouVe gotta go as fast as you can 
go, right?/
S: So nobody can catch up with you/
M: Yeah, cause you don't want to be it, right?/
S: No/
M: You want to be able to run around/
S: But you know what?/
M: What?/
S: In that game, people are the winners
and sometimes people are the losers/
M: Really?/
M: What happens - why do people lose 
sometimes?/
S: Cause sometimes, when they don’t run that 
fast, they’re the loser and sometimes 
when they run fast, they’re the winners/
M: Oh/
KP, telling her mother about her gym class that morning, can switch between the past
and the general. She uses know to provide more general detail for her mother when her mother
doesn’t understand her:
KP, 41 months, VI, Meal, 39:02
K: But the sliding part is fun, too/
M: Hm?/
K: The sliding part was - my funnest/
M: A sliding part?/
K: You know there’s a slide on that you put - 
jump on/
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K: That I was kind of jumping on/
K: That I had-ed to do all by myself/
ERo uses know in warning her mother about couches:
ERo, 49 months, V4, Play, 34:12
E: That’s a couch - so it has -/




Contrasting Thought and Reality. Examples of this category of mental term use 
were rare, five in total for both think and know. I include these four examples to show 
that they did occur, however. (The remaining example is not included because it was 
partially inaudible.) In the first example, ERo provides a spontaneous demonstration of 
her understanding of her own false belief: she thought there was something in a manila 
envelope, but there isn’t.
ERo, 43 months, VI, Hide and Find, 48:38
E: I want this/
M (to F): Go look in your box/
E picks up envelope
E: (?)/
F: Uh oh/ E tries to look in 
envelope 
F leaves room
M: Well that’s - that’s something Lea has 
to use for, you know, the other
children/
M: Cause some children aren’t as good at 
keeping their eyes closed as you?/ E puts down envelope
E: Yeah?/
M: And so, and then you have to put it up 
like this - so you can’t see/ M demonstrates 
E looks at Lea
E: But what is in it?/
M: I don’t know/
M: Why don’t you look?/ M gives envelope to E
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E: Okay/
E: I’m going to look/
M: I know you like envelopes/
E takes envelope 
E looks at Lea
E: Yeah/ E puts hand & arm in 
envelope, opens it, 
looks in
E feels in bottomE: Nothing!/
of envelope
M: Nothing/
E: I thought there was something in it, but -/
M shakes head 
E still looking & 
feeling in 
envelope




L: There’s nothing in it/ E puts envelope down
AP also seems to have some grasp of her own false belief, at first thinking that a ghost
in the house was real, then realizing that it wasn’t:
AF, 43 months, V3, Meal, 06:21
M: So there was a ghost in the house/
A: Not you/
M: I wasn’t a ghost, no/
A: No/
A: There was a pre - there was a pretend, um, ghost/
M: You were not afraid?/
A: Nn-nn/
A: I thought it was a real ghost, but it wasn’t/
A: It was a -/
A: A pretend ghost/
In the following examples, LS contrasts his thoughts with reality in general: the Chinese
restaurant serves chicken wings, chickens have muscles. He practices the lexical frame "I didn’t
know X", using it five times in three minutes.
LS, 49 months, V4, Meal, 09:00
L: I didn’t know they had the wing/
M: You didn’t know chickens had wings?/
M: Or you didn’t know they gave it to you at that 
restaurant?/
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L: I don’t know if - if they had -/
L: I didn’t know that they wings/
M: You didn^t know chickens had wings?/
L: No, I didn’t - know - that - the Chinese 
place had chicken wings/
M: Oh, oh/
LS, 49 months, V4, Meal, 11:50
M: Do you know what you’re eating?/
M: You’re eating the chicken muscles/
M: Is that a yucky thought?/
L: What did you say?/
M: You’re eating the chicken’s muscles/
L: Oh!/
L: I didn’t know chicken had muscles/
M: Yep/
M: You have to have muscles to be able to walk/
M: Your muscles help you walk/
Sense. The only three- year- old who gave some demonstration that she had placed think 
or know into a system with related verbs was ERo. In the first example, ERo’s mother questions 
ERo about a recent visit to a pizzeria. ERo contrasts think and know in answer to her 
mother’s question about who ate a pizza slice - she thinks but doesn’t know that the babysitter 
did.
ERo, 44 months,V3, Meal, 03:06, 03:08
M: Who ate the other half?/ pizza slice
E: Laurie’s babysitter/
M: Oh, good/
E: I think but not - 1 don’t know/
M: Did you have anything else there?/
M: Something to drink, or-/
E: Yeah, I did/
In another example, ERo contrasts know and think in a similar way she did while 
discussing who ate the pizza - she is unable to provide a direct answer to a question 
about the past ("I don’t know"), and she prefaces her tentative reply with "I think".
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ERo, 44 months, V3, Play, 10:46,10:48
E: That block was my favorite/
M: And it’s got teeth marks on it/
L: Why was that one your favorite?/
E: I don’t know/
E: I think maybe it was my favorite color/
ERo’s ability to contrast think and know may have its origin in experiences of 
conversation such as one that she had with her mother at a previous visit. In this example, her 
mother refuses to provide an answer to her daughter’s query about the identity of an object ("I 
don’t know") instead asking twice that she guess ("What do you think it is?"). Her mother 
thus shows ERo that when she doesn’t know what something is, she can say what she thinks it
ERo, 43 months, VI, Doll House, 53:17, 53:18, 53:20
E: What is this?/
M: I don’t know/
M: What do you think it is?/
E: What is this?/
M: What do you think it is?/
E (to L): What is this?/
E: This/
E points
L: It’s a wall/
Here’s an example in which ERo mentions the presupposition of know - she doesn’t 
know where her cat’s toys are as she does not see them:
ERo, 44 months, V3, Meal, 06:47
M: Where’s his busy balls?/ cat
E: I don’t know/
E: I don’t - I don’t see them/
M: He must have hidden them away/
Again, ERo’s mother has demonstrated the presupposition of know at a previous visit -
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part of the example presented in the section above on contrasting thought and reality in which 
ERo looks in a manila envelope but finds nothing. In this excerpt, the mother provides an 
opportunity for her daughter to find out that looking (seeing) can lead to knowing:
ERo, 43 months, VI, Hide and Find, 48:09
E: But what is in it?/
manila
M: I don’t know/ envelope
M: Why don’t you look?/ M gives
envelope to E
E: Okay/ E takes
E: I’m going to look/ envelope
Summary: Parental input to children’s advanced uses of think and know. From the 
above examples it is possible to identify a number of potential clues that parents provide 
their children as to the meanings of the words think and know. And yet to call them clues 
to individual word meaning is to diminish the task, that is also to learn the functions and 
roles that the words have in actual conversations. Among those observed in just the small 
number of examples presented here are the following:
1. Questioning for details to sort out what the child wants to tell about the past or 
future. This is necessary because away from the here and now, the child must learn what 
to present to the listener so that speaker and listener share enough background for the 
listener to understand the speaker’s message.
2. Asking for or suggesting presuppositions of the mental verbs (as in, "How do 
you know she had a rocket?" and "Why don’t you look?")
3. Introducing and extending discussions about the past, future, and general.
4. Contrasting related mental verbs.
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5.Using relevant vocabulary, such as "usually", "always", "what happens" for 
generalizations, and past and future tenses.
6. Making logical statements and purpose explanations (as in, "You have to have 
muscles to be able to walk"; "Natu has to drink special kinds because he has allergies"; "I 
thought that ghosts - just scared people away because they want the house all for 
themselves"). Knowledge is not obtained merely through the senses, but is socially 
shared, scientific or otherwise cultural: muscles are needed for walking, Natu has 
allergies, ghosts’ behavior is motivated by their wants, the game of tag has rules.
7. Discussing alternate sources of knowledge besides direct observation, such as 
introspection and deduction ("I don’t know what it means to be a ghost"; "I usually 
assume it’s you in there").
All of these types of information, and probably other ones as well, are needed for 
the child to participate fully in the conversations that include think and know, to use the 
words to denote, to place them in a system of related words. In focussing on one source 
of knowledge alone - vision - and in one task alone - location of objects - theory of mind 
experiments oversimplify both the meaning of words as they are used in actual 
conversations and the nature of human knowledge. There is much more to be known: 
procedures, names, what we had for lunch, chicken body parts, ghost motivation; and 
many sources of knowledge: to begin with, experience, hearsay, books, introspection, 
deduction, faith.
Learning about the myriad (and perhaps haphazard) categories of knowledge and 
the multiplicity of human sources of knowledge contributes to the child’s concept of 
knowledge and thus to the meaning of the word know. An individual’s language games
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multiply and expand over the lifetime as new ways of using words, new understandings 
of the world, and new interconnections between word meanings are acquired through 
language participation and formed through the individual’s reorganization of what is 
already known.
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Chapter 6: Summary: Orientation Revisited 
In the orientation, I asked a number of questions about mothers’ and children’s 
uses of think and know. In this section, I return to those questions to examine if and how 
they have been answered by this study. In doing so I will present a brief summary of the 
data in a way which allows us to keep in focus the main goals and findings of the study. 
As in the orientation, the headings will be Maternal Input, Children’s First Uses, and 
Mother and Child Comparisons.
Maternal Input
Verb Comparisons
To what extent do maternal uses of think and know differ? Four 
variables revealed differences in usage between the two verbs: person reference, time 
reference, lexical frames, and mental verb code. The mothers used think to refer to 
themselves more than to their children, but this difference did not occur with know. The 
mothers made more generalizations with know than with think. "I think (that) X” was the 
most frequently used frame with think, while wh-questions were the most frequently used 
with know. The mothers directed the interaction more with think than with know, but 
directed reflection more with know than with think.
Are the two verbs used in completely different ways, or do their uses overlap? 
Despite the documented significant differences in frequencies of use described above, 
this type of analysis emphasizes the differences between verb usage. There is, of course, 
overlap in the categories: for example with mental verb code, both verbs were used for 
three functions in common: to refer to internal states, to direct the interaction, and to
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direct reflection. Statistical analysis for differences emphasizes the differences between 
the verbs, obfuscating commonalities in usage. Similarities in use, beyond noting the 
common coding categories which the two verbs share with each other, are difficult to 
document using the methods of this study.
Are the verbs explicitly contrasted in some way, so that children can construct 
sense meanings for the words? Sense meanings in general, including explicit contrasts 
between related verbs and mentioning presuppositions, were provided by the mothers at 
rates ranging from 1.0 per hour with think by mothers of three-year-olds, to 1.9 per hour 
with know by mothers of three-year-olds, (with the rates per hour for mothers of two- 
year-olds for the two verbs falling in between). Thus children are being exposed to the 
explicit information needed which would allow them to construct sense meanings for 
themselves. It is not so mysterious then, the process by which children learn 
presuppositions and how verbs can be contrasted; this information is provided to them in 
everyday conversations.
Age Comparisons
How do mothers tailor their uses of think and know to the age of the 
child? Does it differ by verb or variable examined? No differences by age of child were 
found. Thus at a constitutive level the mothers did not appear to tailor their uses of think 
and know to the age of the child. These results argue for the stability of the constitutive 
contexts in which think and know participate in, which did not vary by child age.
It is unsatisfying to leave the matter of maternal input at a rest after finding no 
differences to two- and three-year-olds in these constitutive measures, however. The 
differences between the embedded-meaning conversations that two-year-olds engage in
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with their mothers and away-from-the-here-and-now conversations that the older children 
participated in were both partially constituted by and furthered by differences in maternal 
conversational practices, as described in the process sections. For the two-year-olds, 
examples were found primarily of mothers demonstrating correct conversational use in 
here-and-now activities, as well as basic demonstrations o f culturally important activities 
such as pretending about dolls and story-telling. Although related verbs are contrasted 
and knowledge sources are introduced, these tend to be done in an incidental, fleeting 
manner.
With the three-year-olds, knowledge sources are discussed explicitly and more in 
depth, including discussion of more advanced sources such as introspection and 
deduction. Incorporation of the verbs into conversations about the past, future and 
general is supported through maternal insistence on the provision of background 
information, and use of relevant time-marking vocabulary. More advanced explanations 




Is Nelson and Lucariello’s developmental theory supported by the data, or 
is the learning of word meaning an all-or none phenomenon, with labels quickly mapped 
on to previously existing concepts? Two sources of data were examined to answer this 
question: meaning levels demonstrated over the four visits by individual children, and a 
comparison of meaning level attainment by the two-year-olds and three-year-olds as 
groups. Does each child demonstrate the order of meaning level attainment predicted by
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the theory? Although not all the children used denotation, the results in general support 
the prediction: the children for the most part either showed embedded use only or used 
denotation at a later visit than embedded use. Some of the children, especially the three- 
year-olds, displayed both embedded use and denotation at the same visit, but this does not 
violate the predicted pattern. Out of the 46 total cases of child by word (23 children x 2 
words), there was only one case of violation, a two-year-old’s use of denotation without 
embedded use. Do three-year-olds use more of the higher level meanings than two-year- 
olds? A significant age by meaning level interaction was not found, although the children 
in general showed embedded use more than denotation. (The interaction was significant 
only at the .04 level, and thus did not meet the study’s more stringent .01 alpha 
requirement for significance.) Sense meanings were not in common evidence for either 
age group, suggesting that this level of word meaning development was not yet attained 
for the age studied ( the three-year-olds had become young four year-olds by the final 
visit). Thus the individual trajectories, but not the age group comparisons, support the 
Nelson and Lucariello theory of word meaning development.
Other variables
What changes were documented between two- and three-year-olds? 
Other than totals (the three-year-olds used both verbs more than the two-year-olds), 
significant age differences as measured by constitutive variables in the use of think and 
know were not found.
Is there individual variation in children’s initial uses of think and 
know? The examination of a subset of the two-year-olds’ initial language game roles 
with these verbs suggested that there is some individual variation: different children used
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different subsets of the language game roles. The range of language game roles used as a 
whole by the group, however, was limited: nine language game roles were identified with 
know, and five roles with think, which accounted for the majority of the two-year-olds’ 
uses.
Self and Other
Do children refer to themselves before they refer to others with think 
and know, or do the two types of reference occur simultaneously? The data reported here 
show that children use think and know to refer to themselves before they refer to other 
people such as the mother. Important to keep in mind, however, is that most of the 
children’s uses of these verbs are not for actual references to internal states. Thus the 
argument that children develop concepts of their own mental states which they later 
extend to other people can be made only weakly from these data. A better test of this 
theory could be carried out looking at the individual initial uses of person references 
with only mental state utterances.
Verb comparisons
Are children’s first uses of think and know constituted differently?
While clear differences were found in a number of variables for the mothers’ uses of the 
two verbs, the only variable which showed significant differences between the children’s 
uses of the two verbs was mental verb code: directing the interaction was done more with 
think than with know. The description of the two-year-olds’children’s language games, 
however, suggests that even from the beginning the two verbs take on different language 
game roles. No significant verb by age by variable differences were found.
Mother and Child Comparisons
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Do children’s initial uses depend on the type of input they receive? 
Contrary to prediction, large numbers of straightforward correlations between mothers’ 
uses and children’s uses were not found. The acquisition of these verbs thus cannot be 
explained by a simple imitation model; a more complex model is required.
Processes
Straightforward mother-child correlations between constitutive variables 
were shown to be inadequate in accounting for child acquisition of the meanings of think 
and know. What processes then can be identified in mother-child interactions that 
account for the increasingly complex uses of think and know by young children? With 
the two-year-olds, a number of processes were identified which can contribute to young 
children’s understanding and use of the verbs: repetition; use tied to a particular event; 
use with the same topic, and same lexical frame, but a different event than a previous use; 
role reversal; use with wh-questions; and maternal contrasting of two mental verbs.
These processes were presented as existing on a continuum from more event-based to 
more language-based. In addition to these processes, the role of conversation in the 
acquisition of embedded uses was explored. The children’s initial uses were seen to be 
tied to specific, limited conversational situations. Both think and know were most often 
used in the language games of guiding, naming, guessing, and play-acting. For each 
word between one and three roles (identified by lexical frame and conversational relation 
to adjacent utterances) for each language game accounted for the majority of uses. Each 
of the two words participated in its own set of roles that did not overlap with that of the 
other word.
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I looked at the three-year-old child’s first attempts to move beyond the here-and- 
now, to use think and know in conversations about the past, the future, to make 
generalizations, to contrast thought and reality, and beginning uses by one child of verb 
contrasts. The children appeared to have less trouble in making generalizations than in 
talking about the past and the future, to judge by the difficulty their mothers had in 
understanding their children’s talk about the past and future, and the extra work mothers 
had to do during these conversations to establish this understanding. Help that mothers 
provided during these conversations took the forms of questioning for pertinent details, 
asking for or providing presuppositions, introducing and extending discussions away 
from the here and now, using time-related vocabulary and verb tenses; and providing 
logical statements and purpose explanations.
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Chapter 7: Discussion
Beyond Point and Name: Differential language game roles
and conversational complexity
In the opening literature review, I suggested that the processes of abstract word
acquisition may differ from those for object words. For object words, ostension -
pointing and naming - has been taken by many to be the predominant acquisition method.
However, studies by Lucariello, Kyratzis, and Engel (1986) demonstrated that children
were better at answering questions, discussed more topics, and had more conversations
about non-present activities during familiar event contexts. Further, object word use
became increasingly decontextualized (requesting, initiating, narrating, planning,
evoking) within a familiar event context over time. This work indicates that the point and
name paradigm oversimplifies the process of word learning, even for object names.
*
Nelson, Hampson, and Kessler Shaw (1991) provided evidence that non-object nouns are 
used in regular, specific pragmatic and sentential contexts. These regularities can be used 
by the child to support their initial uses; as well encountering new words in regular 
contexts can contribute to the formation of new concepts.
On the basis of this groundwork, I set off to discover how think and know are 
regularly used by children and their adult conversational partners. As well, I looked for 
conversational processes which may support both initial uses and more advanced, non­
present uses. I found that both mothers and children used think and know in regular, 
differentiated ways. The mothers differentiated the verbs by person reference, time 
reference, lexical frame, and mental verb code. Seventy-five percent of the mothers’ uses
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of think and know were accounted for by the five lexical frames identified for think and 
the eight lexical frames identified for know. The differentiation of the verbs can provide 
clues to the child as to how the meanings of these related verbs differ from each other; 
think was used more for a planning function, to express what the mother herself thinks, to 
suggest ideas for activity. In contrast, know was used to talk about generalizations, to 
direct reflection through wh-questions, to ask about what the child knows. In addition, 
the use of regular lexical frames can give the child an opportunity to learn how to use the 
terms appropriately in conversation. This finding of differentiation is an important 
contribution to the literature on early mental verb use, as most observational studies of 
these and related verbs have grouped the verbs together into one "mental verb" category. 
That method obscures the process by which the verbs are initially acquired, which is by 
individual verb.
Evidence that the children use and differentiate the verbs in ways similar 
to the mothers was not as abundant as predicted. The only significant difference between 
verbs was the function, as measured by mental verb code: directing the interaction was 
done more with think than with know. However, examination of the language game roles 
in which two-year-olds initially used the verbs generated a clearer picture of regularities 
of use: know was used predominantly in nine language game roles, whereas think was 
used in a different set of five. Children thus seem to be latching on to regularities in 
function and topic, to accomplish specific conversational purposes, before they produce 
more structural, constitutive regularities (such as person reference or lexical frames, as 
the mothers demonstrated).
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As well as looking for statistical regularities and differentiation of use, I looked 
for conversational support for both initial and more advanced uses. Over the age range of 
the children in the study, from two-and-a -half to four years, I found a progression from 
simply directly repeating what the mother said and using the terms during events similar 
to the ones in which they were introduced, at the initial ages, to using the terms to make 
generalizations, discuss the past and future, to contrast thought and reality, and even one 
three-year-old child’s contrasts of the terms themselves. Along the way, the two-year- 
olds progressed to using the verbs with the same topic and lexical frames but in different 
events; in storytelling role reversal; to first answer wh-questions appropriately, and then 
to introduce new information using wh-questions and statements.
The mothers provided a variety of types of conversational support for their 
children’s increasingly complex uses, in addition to the regularities in their sentential 
structure. The mothers questioned and prompted their children for the information 
necessary to relate past events, in the face of the children’s omission of relevant details; 
they asked for or provided presuppositions for mental state reference uses; they 
introduced and extended discussions about the past, future, and general; they contrasted 
related mental verbs; they used relevant time-related vocabulary and tenses; they 
provided logical statements and purpose explanations that went beyond simply stating 
what was known or thought; and they discussed alternate sources of knowledge besides 
direct observation, such as introspection and deduction. This last point is especially 
important to make in light of the emphasis in experimental research on direct observation 
and object location [e.g., Johnson and Maratsos (1977), Miscione et al. (1978), Johnson 
and Wellman (1980)]. Human beings use alternate sources of knowledge about a variety
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of knowledge topic categories. Adult-child conversations using think and know even at 
these ages reflect this complexity, as these uses are part of the uses and thus meanings of 
the verbs.
Maternal support for the acquisition of these new abstract words thus goes well 
beyond establishing mere reference, as the point-and-name game can accomplish for 
object words. This is necessary, for the tasks facing the child - to learn appropriate 
contextual use; to use think and know to apply to situations outside of the here and now; 
and to learn what the relations between words are- go well beyond establishing reference. 
The words are learned as parts of conversational packages that also involve learning to 
engage in narratives away from the here-and-now. Regularly occurring uses also provide 
for the explicit demonstration of how words relate to each other, through the 
conversational contrast of the verbs, through the discussion of presuppositions, through 
the asking and answering of wh-questions. What is to be known or thought about include 
such mundane matters as object location and identity, but also more culturally- and child­
relevant matters as exemplified here by discussions of ghost motivation , chicken 
anatomy, and who in the family generally locks himself in the bathroom. Sources of 
information are an important topic to be learned along with other meaning features of the 
mental verbs. As well as direct observation, these include hearsay, introspection, 
deduction, reading, and religious inspiration. Undoubtedly this list could be expanded by 
other sources of knowledge, both internal and external.
As far as I know, no other study has approached the problem of children’s abstract 
word meaning acquisition at both of these levels, taking into account both the level of 
cultural and conversational meanings and functions, as well as the level of the more
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minute details of lexical frame, person reference, and so on. The child must learn both; 
the point is that they are learned together in the process o f participating in socially shared 
language games.
Reconciliation of Observational and Experimental Studies: 
Conversationally Embedded Uses. Denotation, and Sense 
I began this dissertation with an examination of experimental and observational 
studies on mental state terms. While the observational studies found that two- and three- 
year-olds were able to use the terms appropriately in conversation [Shatz et al (1983), 
Bloom et al (1989), Furrow et al (1992), Brown et al 1996)], children of this age fail at 
experimental "theory of mind" tasks requiring them to have a grasp of the contrasting 
meanings of the terms [Johnson and Maratsos (1977), Miscione et al (1978), (Johnson 
and Wellman (1980), Abbeduto and Rosenberg (1985), Moore et al (1989), Moore and 
Davidge (1989)].
I proposed that this situation of competence in conversation and incompetence in 
experiments could be resolved and understood if children’s word meaning development is 
viewed as the development of three aspects of meaning. To review, following Lyons
(1977), Lucariello and Nelson (1985) classified early word meaning theories into three 
types: reference, denotation, and sense. Rather than choosing one aspect over another, 
they affirmed that all three are necessary to a fully developed lexical system. To 
simplify, children’s first words are prelexical - they are bound up in their holistic event 
representations. First children learn to refer to objects within the events. As the event 
representations are further analyzed into their component parts, such as actor, object, and 
action, they develop concepts for parts of the event, and their terms denote the concepts.
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However, sense meanings - parts of a lexical system with the relations between the 
meanings of words established - continue to develop through the preschool years and 
beyond, with further differentiation and integration of the conceptual system and 
linguistic experience. An expansion of their view was necessary to accommodate more 
abstract words and concepts such as mental state verbs that don’t fit into the actor-object- 
action categories; I took children’s usages of mental verbs in conversational contexts 
away from the here and now as evidence that children were developing concepts apart 
from uses embedded in the ongoing event. Adoption of the term "conversationally 
embedded" as a substitute for "reference" was necessary to avoid the idea that the word 
was referring to any "mental object", but instead to emphasize that the word had not been 
differentiated from the utterance. As well, I used Wittgenstein’s notion of language games 
to explore how children’s first usages are embedded in conversational events.
Returning to the original problem, we can see why children without a sense 
system in place would fail at the experimental tasks requiring knowledge of the relations 
between terms, and yet still be able to use the terms appropriately in naturalistic 
situations. In conversation, children can use their embedded and, later, denotational 
skills; however, these are inadequate when knowledge of contrasts is required.
The Nelson and Lucariello theory, while based on the previous work of many 
child language studies, had never had longitudinal research directed specifically to test its 
premises. For this it was necessary to follow children’s word meaning development and 
to see if their uses followed the order of use predicted by the theory; first embedded use, 
then denotation, then sense. Since their theory and the data it was based on dealt 
primarily with object words, for this study with mental verbs the working definitions of
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the meaning aspects had to be expanded. Conversationally embedded uses were defined 
as those where think or know were used in talking about some aspect of the here-and- 
now situation. Denotational uses were those that demonstrate that the child had a concept 
of think or know apart from the here-and-now: they could use the target verbs to discuss 
the past or future, make generalizations, or to contrast thought with reality. These 
accomplishments signal the child’s ability to disembed meanings and concepts from the 
ongoing activity, and not merely an ability to talk about other time frames. This is 
rendered especially clear when the data are examined: children’s early (two-year-old) 
uses were nearly all embedded in the ongoing activity; only later, the three-year-olds, 
with much assistance on the part of their mothers, began to use think and know to discuss 
other times. Sense meanings were demonstrated only when related verbs were 
contrasted, or the presuppositions, such as source of knowledge, were mentioned.
The data from this study supported the Nelson and Lucariello theory, and the 
reconciliation of the experimental/observational discrepancy based on that theory. An 
analysis of each child’s uses showed that denotation is not attained without embedded use 
first: of the 46 total cases of child by word, there was only one case of violation of the 
predicted pattern; all other children demonstrated embedded use alone, embedded use 
before denotation or sense, or embedded use and denotation or sense at the same visit. 
Sense meaning demonstration was very rare, despite some exposure to these uses in the 
speech of their mothers.
While these data are in concordance with and supportive of their theory, they are 
far from a solid foundation for it. More observational work is needed with a greater 
variety of words (two mental state verbs, although a start, do not constitute a
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representative sample of the lexicon!); with larger group sizes, and with older children as 
well, so that the progression to sense meanings can be better documented.
Although only the tip of the iceberg in relation to an overarching theory of word 
meaning development, these data present a stronger argument in the narrower field of the 
development of mental verb meaning. Children leam to use mental verbs in embedded 
ways, and then denotationally, before they can express sense meanings. Indeed, the older 
children in this study, most of whom attained their fourth birthdays by the final visit, for 
the most part did not display sense meanings at all. The observational/experimental 
discrepancy now becomes no discrepancy at all, but further support for the Nelson and 
Lucariello developmental sequence: younger children use mental terms appropriately in 
conversation, but display no sense meanings in tasks which specifically probe for them.
Can lexical principles account for mental verb acquisition?
Can the principles of early word learning as laid out by Golinkoff and colleagues 
(1994, 1995) account for the child’s acquisition of the verbs think and know? Here I 
comment briefly on each of the principles. This is not at all a full-size critique of the 
principles/constraints paradigm, but simply an indication of some places in which the 
account falls short.
1. Reference. The two-year-olds’ uses did not show evidence of referring to 
mental states or processes; they were instead embedded in conversational routines.
2. Extendibilitv: Little evidence was found that the two-year-olds’ uses were 
flexible; indeed, without reference, it’s difficult to pin down what would count as 
extension beyond the original "exemplar", unless it were extension beyond the original
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conversational context. Each two-year-old’s uses occurred in just a few roles in a small 
number of language games, in a small number of lexical frames.
3. Object labeling and the whole object assumption: If children used the verb- 
identifying syntactic cues with think and know to place them in the category of action 
words, they would be incorrect. There is no evidence to suggest that they do this, 
however; they do not use the verbs to refer to actions. As for labeling larger or smaller 
units of activity, since the uses are embedded in routines and have not yet been 
differentiated from those routines, it is not possible to speculate as to what size unit they 
refer.
4. Categorical scope: This principle fails because of its reliance on the 
componential view of word meaning. Even if children use semantic components in some 
cases to define some verbs, there is no evidence that children use them in the cases of 
think and know. The polysemic adult definitions of the verbs do not differ by single 
components, nor do the children’s.
5. Novel words naming nameless categories: This would require that two-year-old 
children have available discrete conceptual categories of thinking and knowing to which 
the correct words would apply. At age two, the evidence from theory of mind research 
implies that this is not the case.
6. Conventional forms: This is the only principle to which I shall not provide any 
objection; children do leam to use the standard forms of think and know.
In summary then, the principles account is not applicable to children’s early uses 
of think and know. Even if the principles view were correct for children’s acquisition of
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more concrete object and action labels, it does not explain how other types of words are 
acquired nor what their meanings are.
Methodological Issues: Observational Studies 
Here I briefly point out some of the differences between this research and two 
other observational studies on mental verbs. I conclude that what looks like simple 
coding differences turns out to reflect differences in overall goals and theoretical 
approaches. I single out Shatz et al.’s (1983) work because it was a pioneering study on 
the development of mental verbs, and Bartsch and Wellman’s (1995) because it is a 
recent, large-scale report on mental verbs. Both used the study of mental verbs in 
conversation to try to understand what children know about the mind. This is in contrast 
to this study, which focuses on the process of meaning acquisition.
Shatz, Wellman, and Silber’s (1983) coding category of contrastives - "sentences 
which mark an understanding of a difference or discrepancy between some mental state 
and present or observable reality" - pools together what would be coded as both 
denotational and sense utterances in this study’s coding scheme. Recall that denotational 
utterances in this scheme include those which make a contrast between thought and 
reality; in order to count as sense, the utterance had to either contrast with a related verb, 
or mention a presupposition.
Similarly, Bartsch and Wellman’s thought-reality contrastives (Table 3.4, pages 
52-53) divided into four contrastive types: fiction-reality, ignorance-fact, advance belief, 
and false belief, can be recoded in this study’s coding scheme as examples of all three 
meaning levels: embedded use, denotation, or sense. Their five ignorance-fact and 
advance belief examples that involve thinking or not knowing about the current location
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of objects would be coded as embedded use in this study’s scheme. Most of their 
examples in this table were denotational usages: their fiction-reality contrastives were 
predominantly denotation about the past; advance belief is recoded as denotation about 
the future; and false belief as denotation with contrast between thought and reality. Only 
2 of their 21 given examples of thought-reality contrastives would be coded as sense in 
this study’s coding scheme. On the other hand, their 7 examples of "assertions about 
sources", from Table 3.8, would all be coded as sense, because they all mention the 
presupposition (source of knowledge) of the verb know. Only two of the seven examples 
of presupposition mention the senses (direct observation) as a source; three have social 
sources, one talks about the individual originator of an idea; another one talks about 
causality by constituence (Abe at age 3;9 asks, "Do you know this is wheat bread made 
from wheat?"). According to their Table 3.9, there were some scattered examples (6 in 
all) of mentioning knowledge source before age 3; at age 3 all 4 of their main children 
had mentioned knowledge source, with a range of individual (from 3 to 27). The other 
four children in their study provided hardly any knowledge source utterances - 5 in all.
The purpose in pointing out in such detail the alternate ways the same utterances 
can be coded is to show that in other coding schemes, it is not clear what overall meaning 
level a child has attained for particular words; the other schemes’ categories conflate both 
basic and more advanced uses. By looking at conversational intent from an adult point of 
view, these researchers may be overattributing capabilities and intentions to the child 
which may be due to the child’s initial attempts to produce more advanced uses. The 
extent to which the child is simply taking over conversational functions presented earlier 
by the mother is not addressed. Neither are the myriad adult contributions to the child’s
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understanding. Although these sources are mentioned briefly - Dunn’s work on social 
origins is cited - Bartsch and Wellman’s methods and conclusions leave little doubt that 
they believe it is the child’s theories that are the causal factors at work in the production 
of more advanced utterances.
Bartsch and Wellman, with their goal of establishing the nature of the child’s 
theory of mind, take the child’s contrastive utterances and meanings at their face values - 
similar to what these phrases would mean if they were uttered by adults. For them, the 
source of the meanings o f the utterances is the child’s developing theory of mind. In their 
view, the concepts come first, and the utterances are mere reflections of, or windows into, 
the individual child’s underlying conceptual schemes. However, learning to use think and 
know in these more advanced ways is part of a process of participating in language 
games with more competent speakers. It is through participation and experience with 
these games that children come to know their language group’s way of parceling out 
meaning to related terms and to which situations they apply. Through further analysis, a 
system of inter-related concepts and meanings is built up over time. It is not an all-or- 
none phenomenon, but an extended process.
Methodological Issues: Experimental Studies 
Many of the experimental studies included in the literature review either explicitly 
or indirectly ask children to contrast related mental verbs. As we have seen, however, 
children by their fourth birthdays, while able to use mental verbs appropriately in 
embedded and denotational ways, show very little evidence of being able to use the terms 
contrastively, or of knowing their presuppositions. This is possible because many of 
these verbs’ language game roles do not require this level of knowledge.
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Here I discuss one experiment in detail, Johnson and Maratsos’(1977) study. I 
concentrate on this one because the verbs they included, think and know, are the same 
ones as in this dissertation. [Wellman and Johnson (1979) followed a similar procedure 
for the verbs remember and forget! .To review in brief, in their study three and four year 
old children were told stories about hiders hiding objects in one location, and then lying 
to a seeker, telling the seeker it was in a different location. The following questions 
containing think and know were then asked:
1) Does the seeker think it’s under (wrong location)?
2) Does the seeker know it’s under (correct location)?
3) Does the seeker think it’s under (wrong location) or know it’s under (wrong 
location)?
Let’s take a look at what this task requires of the child, and how this experimental 
situation compares with what was seen in conversation. First of all, all three questions 
ask about the mental state of a non-present other. As we have seen, in conversation 
almost all utterances containing think and know by both mothers and children referred to 
either the mother or the child. The mental states of other people were rarely discussed. 
And although talking about the location of objects was one of the topics engaged in with 
the two verbs, it was not a predominant one. The hide and find context, included to elicit 
mental state verbs, actually yielded the lowest rates of the verbs of the four contexts, 
especially for know.
On at least two counts, then - talk about a nonpresent other and talk about location 
of hidden objects - this is an unusual conversation for young children. The third 
experimental question - asking the child to choose explicitly between think and know - is
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not only an unusual question; the two verbs are not used interchangeably in everyday 
conversation; they are rarely directly contrasted, and even when they are, it is usually to 
negate know; but its correct response requires that children have constructed sense 
meanings of the verbs, how the verbs contrast with each other. And as we have seen, 
there is litde evidence in the conversational data that children by their fourth birthdays 
have done so. (The four-year-old children in Johnson and Maratsos’ study, with a mean 
age of 4 years, 5 months, performed well on these contrast questions, while the three- 
year-olds did not.)
It remains to be seen whether older four-year-olds use think and know with sense 
contrasts and presuppositions in conversation. Evidence from one precocious three-and- 
a-half-year-old (ERo) who did demonstrate sense meanings suggests that it may be 
possible to document this accomplishment conversationally at a slightly older age than 
this sample.
Johnson and Maratsos define the verbs in the following way: "In mature usage, 
the verb think means to hold a belief, whether correct or incorrect. Know in contrast 
refers to a belief which the speaker presumes to be true" (p. 1743). Their study 
investigated "that thinking can be false; that knowing presumes truth; that thinking is not 
equivalent to saying" (p 1743). The three-year-olds, in failing, showed "little evidence of 
differential comprehension of the terms" (p. 1747). Their study is limited in what it can 
conclude because it starts with too narrow a range of definition of the verbs: mature 
usage in reality includes a variety of interrelated definitions; and also, as with the other 
experimental studies, because it ignores the socially dependent process of acquisition. 
There is no explanation in Johnson and Maratsos of how the child gets from confusion at
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three years to competence at four years, other than an inborn maturational one: "This skill 
is remarkable given the abstract and complex implications of the verbs and the 
presumably short time these terms have been in the children’s repertoire. If there is a 
period of systematic confusion in the developing comprehension of these mental verbs, it 
is apparently short" (p. 1747). As I have documented in the process chapters, there are a 
variety of ways mothers steer conversations with mental verbs that can contribute to the 
child’s eventual more complex understanding of the verbs. Rather than simply 
establishing age differences, it is more elucidating to search for explanations for 
development.
A number of other studies, rather than present children with stories involving 
other people, provide children with a hidden-object-location experience, and then ask 
questions contrasting mental verbs based on this [These studies include Miscione et al
(1978) on know and guess: Johnson and Wellman (1980) on remember, know, and guess: 
Moore and Davidge (1989) on know, think, and sure: and Moore, Bryant, and Furrow 
(1989) on know, think, and guess.1. While their procedures at least avoided the problem 
of asking children about absent-others- in- the- past, similar criticisms can be applied to 
their limited definitions of the verbs, their use of hidden object locations as the only 
context, and their questions asking for verb contrasts, an unfamiliar linguistic situation 
for a young child (One of Miscione et al.’s questions, for example, was "Did you know 
that the shape was in that box or were you guessing that the shape was in that box?"). All 
of these lead to the underrepresentation of the young child’s capabilities, and 
mystification as to the process of development.
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Miscione et al. (1978) offer a Piagetian interpretation of why children younger 
than four years were not able to differentiate between know and guess in a hidden object 
location task. The development of children’s mental verb meanings is seen as based on 
specific cognitive capacities: whether or not children are able to attend to the abstract, 
conceptual aspects of events. Their interpretation of how children come to differentiate 
cognitive verbs will not go far towards the understanding of a more general lexical 
system because the relations between most words in the lexicon are not based on the 
concrete/abstract distinction or other logically based dimensions. Indeed, the nature of 
the differences in the way know and think are used in everyday conversations is difficult 
to pin down. Psychologists whose work is based on the logician’s definitions of cognitive 
verbs, rather than the actual uses of the verbs, will not be able to trace the development of 
the child’s meanings of the verbs because their view of the endpoint of development is 
too restricted.
Methodological Issues: Hide and Find 
The original inspiration for including the hide and find context in these home 
visits to elicit mental state verbs came from Miscione et al.’s (1978) study of know and 
guess, in which the researcher used magic boxes with false bottoms to manipulate the 
outcome of a hide and find game played with the children. In this study’s version, the 
mothers and children were to be provided with similar materials as a way of holding the 
dyad’s interest and stimulating mental talk. In practice, however, the box mechanism 
proved to be too delicate to withstand the manipulation of two-year-old children. More 
child-compatible cups with lids were substituted, with satisfactory results.
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Beyond its utility as a means of eliciting mental verb talk, the hide and find 
situation presents an opportunity to observe mothers and children in a hidden object- 
location task most similar to experimental tasks, but with a number of advantages:
1) Because the children were followed over the course of six months, progression 
in their understanding and participation in the task could be followed developmentally.
2)More importantly, we could see how mothers, and mother-child interaction, 
contribute to the children’s growing understanding of what it means to hide an object, to 
guess its location, and just as revealing, to allow another person to guess. A preliminary 
review of these tapes suggests that it is this last aspect of the game that the two-year-olds 
find especially difficult. The two-year-old children did not always make certain that their 
mothers were not watching while placing the toy in a cup; refrain from telling their 
mothers where the object was hidden; place the lids on all three cups so that there were 
alternate possible hiding places; and allow their mothers to open the cups unaided.
A number of factors seemed to impede the children in carrying out this task 
successfully.
1. They had to make the connection between not seeing, not knowing, and 
guessing. This is the "presupposition" factor.
2. Then they had to monitor their mothers’ eyes, to make sure they were shut 
before they hid. This is the "eyes closed - then hide" sequencing factor.
3. They had to remain quiet as to location. As Vygotsky (1978) has emphasized, 
young children verbalize their thoughts; they do it automatically. Speech accompanies 
action; they said, "I’m putting it in the red cup" as they performed that activity. Even if 
they understood that they shouldn’t tell their mothers, which didn’t seem the case, they
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had to work against the impulse to verbalize their action. This is the "speech 
accompanies action" factor.
4. They had to realize that if not all the lids were replaced on the cups, there 
would not be a choice of location for the other person. Even if  they knew this, they still 
had to remember to do it. The youngest children seemed focussed on where the object 
was - performing an action to create a negative location appeared difficult. This is the 
"focus on the positive" factor.
5. They had to allow unimpeded action by their mothers. This required not 
handling or opening the cups. It’s difficult for a two-year-old to not touch toys, to allow 
another person to take control of the situation, to not show off knowledge. I call this the 
"Let me do it!" factor.
Many of the children in the older group showed increasing competence at this 
game, especially by the fourth visit. From two-and-a-half to four years seemed to be a 
transitional age for this activity. But as can see from the above analysis, it’s not simply 
awareness of presuppositions of mental verbs that comes into play, but a conglomerate of 
cognitive, linguistic, and executive issues. The observation of children’s experiences 
with such materials with a more expert other person can shed light on how children 
become more competent at social-cognitive games such as this. In what ways do children 
and parents work together to increase the child’s awareness and control of the 
complexities of this task? I view children’s progress at such cognitive games as amenable 
to the method of searching for mother-child conversational processes as was carried out 
here for the words think and know. How does performance on this more child-controlled
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task correlate with more advanced mental verb usage, and other theory of mind tasks? 
Answers to these important questions await further research.
Language Games: Publicly Observable Criteria or Embedded Roles?
In his (1997) paper on Wittgenstein’s private language argument, Montgomery 
presents a strong case that children’s mental state word meanings must be based on 
publicly shared rules and criteria, and not on introspection or independently constructed 
theories of mind. Thus far I concur. Where his statement and mine differ is on the types 
of criteria involved in the word learning. Montgomery argues, citing Wittgenstein, that 
"public observables", outward, perceptually available, non-verbal signs, natural 
expressions of internal states - such as groans and grimaces in the presence of pain - are 
used as criteria of correctness for the application of a word in learning situations. This is 
so even though the presence of the outward sign does not necessarily entail the term’s 
correct application. There are cases of mismatch between outward sign and internal state, 
as when a person pretends to experience an internal state or tries to deceive another 
person as to their internal state. Despite these mismatches, outward criteria are necessary 
in order to initially establish equivalent meanings between self and other. But meanings 
are not the same as the outward criteria; as the child encounters mismatches word 
meanings must be adjusted to accommodate the differences.
This study’s view of the word learning situation for mental state terms differs 
from this view in that I don’t see establishing initial embedded use as learning which 
mental state term applies to what particular mental state, as identified by outward signs. 
The learning of words’ roles in language games is more complicated than this. Language
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game roles do not necessarily involve the explicitly mental meanings of the terms. The 
meanings of each of these abstract words is multifold; the task for the child is not simply 
to learn what term refers to what internal state, but how the term is used in here-and-now 
talk; in there-and-not-now, and general talk; how terms relate to one another. Learning 
the presuppositions of the verbs is a relatively late development which stands on the work 
of years of acquiring conversational procedures. Because these everyday conversational 
uses are consistent with and based (in the adult) on the more central mental meanings, 
repeated use in everyday conversational contexts contributes to the establishment of the 
core meanings. Outward criteria are not irrelevant to this process, but they are by no 
means the sole initial resource applied by the child in establishing multilevel abstract 
meanings.
This view is preferable to Montgomery’s because it is applicable to a wide range 
of abstract terms, and not simply mental state terms. While not denying their importance 
in the lexicon, the range of abstract words in the language is far greater than the small 
mental state verb group. Any general theory of word meaning development must be able 
to account for the acquisition of this great variety. It would not be possible for children 
to acquire this great range of words if their focus was on external, observable 
nonlinguistic behavior. Many socially defined words are not definable outside of the 
roles in language games they participate in (see, for example, Nelson, 1996, for a 
discussion of the construction of culturally constituted concepts of time through 
language, p.288-291).
As well, this study’s approach emphasizes the interrelated multidimensionality of 
meanings of particular terms, both with each other and related terms. Words do not mean
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only what philosophers declare that they mean, although these meanings are legitimate; 
but they play other equally valid roles. Acknowledging the polysemy of words 
demystifies the process of acquisition, because it then no longer becomes necessary for 
the child to leam a difficult abstract term in an all-or-none fashion, or to have in place a 
complex theory of a domain before a term can be used appropriately. Word meaning 
instead is an incremental process, with various shades and aspects of meaning building 
upon each other.
Shore (1996) writes of the age-grading rites of the Mumgin of Australia. Over 
the course of childhood and youth, young Mumgin males (their ages are not specified) 
participate in three major rites, each of which is based on the Mumgin creation myth.
Each ceremony involves the acting out of aspects of the myth narrative, although the 
narrative is never actually delivered in spoken form to the novices. It is through the 
experiencing of the acting out of the myth itself over time that the narrative is gradually 
constructed by the individual, and aspects of the meanings of the symbolism of the rituals 
and the narrative itself are gradually transformed and re-understood.
Though logically the myth precedes the rites, in experience the rituals 
come first. The understanding made possible by such a myth-ritual complex 
is inevitably shaped by the dependence of the narrative on the ritual for its 
ongoing life and its regeneration as narrative. The difference, of course, is that 
ritual transmission is inevitably "embodied" to a much greater degree than any 
narrative transmission, with a significant effect on the quality of the resulting 
understanding.
Shore, 1996, p.256
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In some significant way, the meanings of words too are embodied in the experience of 
learning them through conversation in context over a period of years; they are multi­
leveled, with our understandings growing and changing as we participate in ever-more- 
sophisticated forms of life. And though logically the definition precedes usage, in 
experience the usage comes first.
Acquisitional processes
Levy and Nelson (1994), recognizing that previous proposals concerning the 
process of word learning based primarily on early acquisition of object names were 
inadequate for the explanation of the acquisition of the variety of types of words learned 
by young children, and the gradual accrual of word meaning over the lifespan, argued 
that instead a more general model of the process was needed. They proposed that 
meaning is derived from discourse context in a multi-step process via a dialectical 
exchange between the child and her social/linguistic environment. The child acquires 
new words based on broad discourse patterns and syntactic context, along with their 
distributional relations with other words. The child interprets discourse patterns on the 
basis of event representations. Use of new words may at first be limited to the particular 
activities in which they were first encountered. Levy and Nelson emphasize that the 
child’s interpretation of the relevant event context may be different from the adult’s 
interpretation. With further exposure to adult uses, the child can form an idea of how the 
word is to be used with particular topics and syntactic formats.
Levy and Nelson place special emphasis on how the child’s own uses - especially 
in contrastive alternation with other related words - brings the target word into the
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foreground, so that additional knowledge about the meaning implied by the word’s uses 
by other speakers can be incorporated into the child’s representation. The child also 
compares her own uses with those of other speakers, leading to a resystematization of the 
meaning of the word with other closely related words. At this point, although the child 
can use the word appropriately, experimental testing may reveal that the full acquisition 
of adult meaning is incomplete. Attainment of adult meaning may require further 
reorganization over a period of years after the word is first used.
What evidence is there in the data presented here on think and know that supports 
this view of the process of acquisition? The examples in the section on two-year-olds’ 
embedded uses speak to this model. In the examples labeled repetition, use tied to a 
particular event, and use tied to a particular topic and lexical frame, are seen the 
borrowed uses of newly acquired words, tied closely to the broad discourse patterns and 
syntactic patterns as used by the adult conversational partner. The examples labeled role 
reversal give a good picture of a child who has formed "a discourse notion regarding the 
use of the form and subsequently use[s] it [him]self in [a] closely constrained syntactic 
format’., and in the context of [a] specific topic" (Levy and Nelson, p. 385): he uses "you 
know what happened" to introduce more information into a storytelling, and "you know" 
to elicit details about the story from the listener.
The examples of three-year-olds’ later uses provide a look at resystematization.
Not only are there contrasts of the target verbs with each other and other related verbs, as 
Levy and Nelson describe, but other interactions are described that can assist in the 
children’s use of the words away from restricted contexts (as in conversations about the 
past, future, and the general) and in working out semantic details: pointing out
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presuppositions, and establishing the role of knowledge and thought in their larger 
cultural contexts. While we get glimpses of these processes at work here, more research 
is needed to provide quantitative data on the relation of these aspects of conversational 
experience to meaning acquisition.
Future research
The most important change that needs to be made in the field of research on the 
development of children’s understanding of mental state terms, and their understanding of 
mental states in general, is a recognition of the complex interdependencies between the 
developing linguistic and conceptual systems. The field has been held back in its 
progress by its division between observational and experimental methodology and views 
of the problem. Children’s behavior in response to language-laden theory of mind tasks 
may very well be a function of their level of lexical development; what is called a 
conceptual difference may be due to incomplete development of the lexical system. This 
is not to imply that one system necessarily precedes the other. As Nelson (1996) has 
argued, abstract, socially defined concepts must be learned through language and may be, 
at least at first, indefinable apart from it.
At the same time, observational measurement of linguistic levels of particular 
children would benefit from experimental probing of children’s knowledge. Observation 
is a time-consuming, hit-or-miss procedure: it is all too possible to miss a child’s most 
advanced uses because the child simply did not have occasion to use a relatively 
infrequently used variation of a term. Testing of individual children should thus include 
both a period of observation with a parent, [but see Brown et al. (1996) for an argument 
that a friend makes a better conversational partner for the elicitation of more complex
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mental conversation], with attention to embedded, denotational, and sense levels of use; 
but also experimental probing for the more advanced levels, to see if  the child can 
correctly contrast related terms and knows their presuppositions. Note too, how many 
theory of mind tasks ask children to answer questions about mental states which occurred 
in the past or to speculate about what someone might think in the future. I surmise that 
children’s experiences with engaging in such conversational practices as observed in 
naturalistic contexts would correlate with their performance on theory of mind tasks 
which prerequisitely ask them to answer questions about the past or future.
I further predict that a child’s performance on theory of mind tasks in general will 
correlate with the lexical development of the interrelations of mental state terms. 
(Evidence for this has already been advanced by Moore, Pure, & Furrow, 1990, who 
found positive correlations between four-year-old children’s ability to contrast between 
know and think in a hidden object task, and their performance on representational 
change, false belief, and appearance-reality tasks.) This is because the development of an 
understanding of the relations between people’s states of mind is acquired only with an 
understanding of the relations between the terms themselves. Acquisition of the subtle 
intricacies in how a language community has decided to categorize and name mental 
phenomena is a socially dependent phenomenon and not solely a maturational one.
The findings of this dissertation challenge the field to acknowledge that there are 
many other topics of knowledge besides object location and object identity, and other 
ways of obtaining knowledge besides direct visual observation. The field’s emphasis on 
such limited scenarios not only distorts recognition of the kaleidoscopic complexity of 
knowledge to be gained and the myriad methods for its discovery, but also limits what
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can be discovered about the child’s developing understanding of what and how 
knowledge is obtained.
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Appendix A: Mothers’ Results
Because of the large number of analyses performed, an alpha level of .01 was 
taken as the criterion for statistical significance in this dissertation. Findings at the .05 
level were considered only suggestive; further statistical tests were not carried out on the 
basis of MANOVAs or ANOVAs with results at this level. However, in the interest of 
completeness, findings at both levels are reported here.
Part 1. Some General Findings.
1.Totals of verb and age
A repeated measures analysis of variance was run on the mothers’ total rates of 
production of think and know with verb (think, know) as the within subject variable, and 
age as the between subject variable. A suggestive result only was found for the verb by 
age interaction, F(l,21)=5.95, p < .03. Further analyses were not carried out because the 
result did not meet the .01 criterion.
2. Gender
A repeated measures analysis of variance was performed with age of child (two, 
three) and gender of child (male, female) as between subject variables, and verb (think, 
know) as a within subject variable. None of the main effects (gender, age, or verb) were 
significant, nor were any of the interactions (age x gender; age x verb; gender x verb; age 
x gender x verb). The mothers thus did not appear to differentiate in their uses of think 
and know between their boy and girl children.
3. Context
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A repeated measures analysis of variance was carried out with the age of child 
(two, three) as a between subject variable, and context (play, meal, hide and find, doll 
house) and verb (think, know) as within subject variables. Suggestive differences were 
found for the age by context interaction, F(3,63) = 2.76, p < .05, and the verb by context 
interaction, F(3,63) = 2.82, p < .05. However, because these did not meet the .01 level of 
significance, further tests were not performed.
4. Meaning Levels 
Main Effects
A repeated measures analysis of variance was carried out with meaning 
level (embedded use, denotation, sense) and verb (think, know) as within subject 
variables, and age of child (two, three) as a between subjects variable. There was a 
significant effect of meaning level F (2,42) = 120.39, p < .001. There were no verb or 
age by variable (here, meaning level) interactions.
A repeated measures analysis of variance was carried out with meaning level 
alone as a within subjects variable. This analysis confirmed the significant results:
F(2,44) = 111.14, p < .001. Two Roy post hoc tests with Helmert contrasts were then 
carried out, to see if the mothers’rate of embedded use was higher than each of 
denotation and sense. As well, a paired sample one-tailed t-test was performed to see if 
their rate of use of denotation was higher than that of sense meanings. The first two 
contrasts resulted in significant differences: embedded use was significantly higher than 
denotation, t = 11.48, p < .00001; embedded use was significantly higher than sense, t =
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13.80, p < .00001. The denotation versus sense contrast was also significant, t = 2.57, p < 
.0085.
Part 2. How mothers differentiate between verbs: different language games
1. Person References :
Main Effects
A repeated measure analysis of variance with person reference (mother, 
child) and verb (know, think) as within subject variables and age of child (two, three) as a 
between subjects variable showed a significant interaction between verb and person 
reference F(l,21) =83.7, p < .001.
Person reference by verb
A repeated measure analysis of variance with person reference (mother, 
child) as a within subject variable was carried out for the verb think. The mothers 
referred to themselves at a significantly higher rate than they referred to their children, 
F(l,22) = 212.5, p < .001. No difference in rate of reference to mother and child was 
found with the verb know.
Repeated measures analyses of variance were carried out to compare rates of 
reference to self and child by the mothers between the two verbs. In the first analysis, 
rate of reference to the self was looked at, with verb (know, think) as a repeated measure. 
The mothers referred to themselves at a significantly higher rate with the verb think than 
with the verb know: F(l,22) =10.53, p <.004. On the other hand, a second analysis 
showed that they referred to their child at a significantly higher rate with know than 
think. F(l,22) = 24.50, p < .001.




A repeated measures analysis of variance was performed with time 
reference (present, past, future, generalizations, fantasy) and verb (think, know) as within 
subject variables and age of child (two, three) as a between subject variable. A 
significant interaction between verb and time reference was found, F(4,84) = 4.53, p < 
.01 .
Time Reference by Verb Interacdon 
Time References within Verbs
For each verb, a repeated measure analysis of variance was carried 
out with time reference as a repeated measure. For think, overall significant differences 
were found for time reference, F(4,88) = 62.25, p < .001. Post hoc Roy tests with 
Helmert contrasts were carried out to compare the rate of reference to the present with the 
average rate of reference to the other four time values; and also the rate of fantasy 
reference when compared to the average of the remaining three values, excluding the 
present (future, past, and generalizations). Both comparisons were found to be 
significant, with the rate of the mothers’ references to the present with think higher than 
the average of the other time values (t=l 1.61, p < .001); and the rate of reference to 
fantasy higher than the average of future, past and generalizations (t=7.68, p < .001). As 
well, the rate of the mothers’ reference to the present was higher than the rate of reference 
to fantasy alone (t= -6.2, p < .001).
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Similar results were obtained when the parallel time reference analysis was ran 
for know. There was an overall effect found for differences between time references, 
F(4,88) = 94.8, p < .001. The mothers’ rate of reference to the present was significantly 
higher than their references to the average of the other time values, t= 14.98, p < .001; and 
the rate of references to fantasy was higher than that of the average of the three remaining 
variables excluding present (past, future, generalizations), t=6.94, p < .001. As with 
think, with know the mothers’rate of reference to the present was significantly higher 
than the rate of reference to fantasy alone, t = 10.85, p < .001.
Verbs within time references
The mothers’ rate of use of different time references differed 
somewhat by verb. A repeated measure analysis of variance with verb (think, know) as a 
within subject variable just for uses with generalizations showed that the mothers’ rate of 
use of generalizations was significantly higher for know than for think, F(l,22) = 12.35, p 
< .002. A repeated measure analysis of variance just for uses with fantasy talk with verb 
as a within subject variable (think, know) approached significance in the opposite 
direction; here the mothers’ rate of use of fantasy talk was higher with think than with 
know. F(l,22) = 5.19, p < .033. No significant difference was found between rate of use 
of the verbs with references to the present.
3. Lexical frames:
For this variable, verb comparisons were not performed, as the two verbs 
participate in different sets of lexical frames. Instead, for each verb, age by lexical frame 
analyses were carried out, as well as within verb lexical frame comparisons.
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Age by lexical frame
Think. A repeated measures analysis o f variance was performed 
for mothers’ rates of use of think with lexical frame as a within subject variable, and age 
of child (two, three) as a between subjects variable. The five lexical frames in the 
analysis were "I think (that) X" (frame 1); "I don’t think (that) X" (frame 2); "(Do) you 
think X?" (frame 3); "I/you don’t think so" (frame 4); and wh-questions (frame 5). Only 
differences between rates of lexical frame use were found, F(4,84) = 8.43, p < .001.
There were no significant age o f child differences or lexical frame by age interaction.
Know. Similar results were found for the repeated measures 
analysis of variance run with mothers’ lexical frame rates with know. Again lexical 
frame was the within subject variable, and age of child (two, three) was the between 
subjects variable. There were eight lexical frames identified with know: "I don’t know" 
(frame 1); "I don’t know if X" (frame 2); wh-question (frame 3); "I know X" (frame 4);
"X, you know" or "You know, X" (frame 5); "Do you know X?" (frame 6); "I know" 
(frame 7); and "(Do) (you) know what?" (frame 8). As with think, only the lexical frame 
effect was significant, F(7,147) = 4.27, p < .001. The age effect and lexical frame by age 
interaction were not significant.
Lexical frames within each verb
Rather than proliferate contrasts to discover all the intricacies of the 
different rates of lexical frame use for the rather large number of frames for each verb, it 
was considered sufficient only to pinpoint the one or two most common frames for each 
verb.
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Think. A repeated measure analysis of variance with lexical frame 
as a within subject variable ( frames 1 through 5) confirmed that there were overall 
significant differences between rates of lexical frame use, F(4,88) = 33.69, p < .001. A 
Roy post hoc test with a Helmert contrast showed that frame 1, "I think (that) X", was 
used by the mothers at a significantly higher rate than the average of all the other lexical 
frames, t = 11.88, p < .00001. As well, the rate of use of frame 1 was significantly higher 
than the rate of the next most frequent frame, Frame 5, wh-questions, t=6.85, p < .00001.
Know. A repeated measures analysis of variance for mothers’ uses 
of know with lexical frame as a within subject measure (frames 1 through 8) confirmed 
that there were overall differences between the lexical frames F(7,54) = 4.23, p < .001. 
Roy post hoc tests with Helmert contrasts showed that the most frequently used lexical 
frame, wh-questions (frame 3) was used at a significantly higher rate than the average of 
the other seven lexical frames, t=3.98, p < .001. It was not significantly higher than the 
rate of use of the next most frequent lexical frame alone, however (frame 1, "I don’t 
know"). To complicate matters further, a Roy test with a Helmert contrast was not 
significant comparing Frame 1 with the average of the other frames, excluding frame 3. 
The best way to summarize this situation is to state that unlike with think, which had one 
lexical frame which was clearly used more frequently than the others, know is used by 
the mothers with a wider variety of lexical frames, with no one frame clearly dominant in 
terms of frequency of use over the others. Examination of the actual rates of use of the 
various frames solidifies this view. (See Table 7)
4. Mental Verb code
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Main Effects
A repeated measures analysis of variance was performed with mental verb 
code (direct the interaction, direct reflection, refer to internal state) and verb (think, 
know) as within subject variables, and age of child (two, three) as a between subject 
variable. The mental verb code by verb interaction was significant, F(2,42) = 23.30, p < 
.001. The mental verb code by age interaction approached significance, F(2,42) = 3.44, 
p<.041.
Mental Verb Code by Verb Interaction
Mental verb codes within each verb
Think. A repeated measures analysis of variance 
for mothers’uses with think was performed with mental verb code as a within subjects 
variable. Significant differences were found, F(2,44) = 68.,31, p < .001. Roy post hoc 
tests with Helmert contrasts showed that with think, the mothers’ rate of directing the 
interaction was significantly higher than that of referring to an internal state, t = -4.54, p 
< .0002; the rate of directing the interaction was significantly higher than that of directing 
reflection, t= 10.84, p < .00001; and the rate of referring to an internal state was higher 
than the rate of directing reflection, t = -7.59, p <.00001.
Know. A slightly different pattern of rates of 
mothers’ mental verb uses appears with the verb know than with think.
For think,
direct the interaction > refer to internal state > direct reflection
For know, the results were
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refer to internal state -  direct the interaction > direct reflection 
A repeated measures analysis of variance with mental verb code as a within 
subjects variable was significant overall F(2,44) = 10.50, p < .001. Roy post hoc tests 
with Helmert contrasts showed that the rate of mothers directing reflection was 
significantly lower than the average of the other two values, directing the interaction and 
referring to internal states, t=-4.89, p < .0001. There was no significant difference 
between the rates of directing the interaction and referring to an internal state.
Contrasts between verbs within mental verb codes 
Three repeated measures analyses of variance were carried 
out with verb as a within subject variable, one for each of the three mental verb code 
values. For directing the interaction, the rate of mothers’ use was higher for think than 
for know F(l,22) =29.44, p < .001. For directing reflection, however, the mothers’rate 
was higher for know than for think FC1.22) =8.41, p < .01. There was no significant 
difference in the rates between verbs for referring to an internal state.
Part 3. How mothers differentiate according to age of child
There are no significant findings at the .01 level to report under this subheading.
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Appendix B: Children’s results
Part 1. General description of children’s uses
Totals
A repeated measure analysis of variance was carried out on the total number of 
uses by the children of think and know, with verb (think, know) as a within subject 
measure and age of the child (two, three) as a between subject measure. There was a 
significant effect of age, F(l,21) = 13.66, p <.001; the three-year-olds used the words and 
know significantly more than the two-year-olds. There was also a significant effect of 
verb, F(l,21) = 30.24, p<.001; the children used know more often than think. There was 
no significant age by verb interaction.
2. Gender:
Possible differences in total uses of think and know by boys and girls were 
investigated by performing a repeated measures analysis of variance with verb (think, 
know) as a within subject variable, and gender (boy, girl) and age (two, three) as between 
subject variables. No significant differences for gender, age by gender, or verb by gender 
were found.
3. Context:
Did the children use think and know differentially in the four different contexts 
studied, and did this differ by the age of the children? A repeated measure analysis of 
variance was performed with verb (think, know) and context (play, meal, hide and find, 
doll house) as within subject variables, and age of child (two, three) as a between subject 
variable. Only suggestive differences in context were found, F(3,63) = 3.53, p <.02. No
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age by context or verb by context differences were found. Further tests were not carried 
out on this basis.
4.Person references:
A repeated measure analysis of variance was performed with person reference 
(child, mother) and verb (think, know) as within subject variables, and age of child (two, 
three) as a between subject variable. There was a significant difference between the 
person references for the group as a whole, summing over the two verbs, F(l,21) = 3.87, 
p < .001, with the children referring to themselves significantly more than they referred to 
their mothers. There were no person reference by verb or person reference by age 
interactions.
5. Meaning Level:
A repeated measure MANOVA with the children’s meaning level (embedded use, 
denotation) and verb (think, know) as within subject variables, and age (two, three) as a 
between subject variable resulted in a significant main effect for meaning level, 
F(l,21)=78.23, p < .001. This demonstrates that the children engaged in embedded use 
significantly more than denotation. Two interactions also approached significance: age by 
meaning level, F( 1,21) = 5.15, p < . 04; and verb by meaning level, F(l,21) = 5.61, p < 
.03; further tests were not carried out on these interactions.
6. Time references:
A repeated measure analysis of variance was carried out with time reference 
(present, past, generalizations, fantasy) and verb (think, know) as within subject 
variables, and age of child (two, three) as a between subject variable. ( Note that 
reference to the future was omitted from the time reference variable because it was used
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with insufficient frequency to be included in the analysis.) A significant main effect was 
found for time reference, F(3,63)= 37.86, p < .001. The time reference by age interaction 
approached significance, F  (3,63) = 3.61, p < .02. Because a .01 level of significance was 
used, further testing was not carried out on this interaction.
A repeated measure ANOVA run for time reference alone with the two mental 
verbs (present, fantasy, past, generalizations) confirmed that there was a significant effect 
for time reference, F(3,66) = 33.19, p < .001. Roy post hoc tests with Helmert contrasts 
showed that the children referred to the present significantly more than an average of the 
three other time references, t = 6.32, p < .001. As well, they used fantasy talk 
significantly more than an average of talking about the past and making generalizations, t 
= 6.35, p < .001. The difference between referring to the present and fantasy talk 
approached significance, t = 2.7, p < .02. There was no significant difference between 
talking about the past and making generalizations.
Part 2. How children differentiate between verbs 
1.Mental Verb Code:
Because there were insufficient data to include Direct reflection (dir-r) as a value, 
only the values of Refer to internal state (is+) and Direct the interaction (dir-i) were 
included in the analyses of mental verb code. A repeated measure MANOVA was run 
with verb (think, know) and mental verb code (is+, dir-i) as within subject variables and 
age (two, three) as a between subject variable. A significant interaction between verb and 
mental verb code was found, F(l,21) = 14.80, p < .001. There was no significant age by 
mental verb code interaction.
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Repeated measure ANOVAs were run to see if there differences in the 
frequency of referring to an internal state or directing the interaction for each verb, think 
and know.
Think
A repeated measure ANOVA for uses of think with mental verb 
code (dir-i, is+) as a repeated measure suggested that the children directed the interaction 
more than they referred to internal states, F(l,22) = 5.81, p < .03.
Know
In contrast to think, with know the results suggest that the children 
referred to internal states more than they directed the interaction. A repeated measure 
ANOVA with mental verb code (dir-i, is+) as a within subject variable approached 
significance, F(l,22) = 6.60, p < .02.
Between verbs
Further analyses were carried out to see if there were differences between 
the two verbs for each of the two functions, Referring to an internal state and Directing 
the interaction.
Referring to an internal state (is+)
A repeated measure ANOVA for references to internal state with 
verb (think, know) as a within subject variable showed that the children referred to 
internal states significantly more often with think than with know, F (1,22) = 13.17, p < 
.001.
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Directing the interaction (dir-i')
A repeated measure ANOVA with verb (think, know) as a within 
subject variable for children’s directing the interaction revealed no significant differences 
between the verbs in children’s use of this function.
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Appendix C: Correlations
It was predicted that the mothers’ and children’ specific categories within variables 
would be positively correlated in a fairly straightforward manner. Thus for example, 
mothers’ using a particular lexical frame would be associated with the children’s using 
the same lexical frame within the same age group. With some exceptions, the prediction 
of large numbers of positive correlations between corresponding variable categories for 
mothers and their children was not substantiated. The total number of correlations 
performed was 271; the number of significant correlations was 22; this is 8% of the total 
number run. All correlations reported on below are Spearman rank-order correlations, 
which were performed using SPSS-X. Summaries of the significant correlations are 
provided in Tables C-l 1 (two-year-olds) and C-12 (three-year-olds).
Person References
For think. (Table C-i), the only mother-child categories which were significantly 
positively correlated were mothers of two-year-old children referring to the child ("You 
think") and the child referring to the mother (also, "You think"). There were no 
significant correlations for the three-year-old dyads. For know. (Table C-2), the only 
mother-child significant positive correlations were between the mothers of two-year-olds 
referring to the self ("I know") and the children referring to the mother ("You know").
As with think, there were no significant correlations among the three-year-olds for person 
references.
Mental Verb Codes
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Table C-3 shows that there were significant positive correlations between the 
mothers’ using think to refer to an internal state and their three-year-old children’s use of 
think also to refer to internal states. The mothers’total uses of think were also positively 
correlated with their three-year-old children’s use of think to refer to internal states. No 
significant mother by child correlations were found for mental verb codes for either age 
group with know (Table C-4), or with the two-year-olds with think (Table C-3).
Meaning Levels
There were insufficient numbers of children’s uses to perform correlations with 
think for either two- or three-year-olds. For know with the two-year-olds, (see Table C- 
5) both the mothers’ sense meanings with the contrast of two verbs (s/c2v) and total sense 
meanings were significantly positively correlated with two-year-old children’s embedded 
uses. Three of the mothers’ meaning categories, embedded use, sense with mention of 
presupposition, and total uses were significantly positively correlated with the children’s 
total denotational uses. Three of the mothers’sense meaning categories, contrasting two 
related mental verbs, mentioning presupposition, and the total sense demonstrations were 
positively correlated with the children’s’ totals. Among the three-year-olds, Table C-6), 
the mothers’ denotation with the past was positively correlated with the children’s total 
denotational uses; the mothers’ total denotational uses were positively correlated with the 
children’s denotational generalizations; and mothers’ denotational generalizations were 
negatively correlated with children’s denotations with the past.
Lexical Frames
For know with the two-year-old children (Table C-9), positive correlations were 
found between mothers’ use of the frame "I don’t know" and children’s’ use of wh-
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questions; also between both mothers’uses of "I don’t know" and the "other" category and 
children’s’ uses in the "other" category. There were surprisingly small numbers (only 3) 
of significant correlations between mothers’ and children’s ’ lexical frames with know for 
three-year-olds as well (Table C-10 ): positive correlations between mothers’use of "I 
don’t know" and children’s "I know X" and "I know"; and a negative correlations between 
mothers’ uses in the "other" category and children’s "I don’t know (if) X". These 
correlations between noncorresponding categories are difficult to explain and may very 
well be the spurious result of the large number of correlations carried out. There were no 
significant correlations between mothers’ and children’s ’ lexical frames with think for 
either age group (Tables C-7 and C-8). Indeed, only the categories of "I think (that) X" 
and Other had sufficient children’s data to run the analyses.
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Table 1
Mothers’Uses o f Know and Think with their 13-20 month-old Children: Context. Time. Person
word Na Context (%)b Time (%)c Person (%)d
P M B B P F G Y M C 0 MC
know (total) 141 48 38 14 2 86 3 8 0 46 50 3 0
know (IS+) 49 47 35 18 4 76 4 16 0 45 43 8 0
think 133 39 47 14 5 85 8 2 0 68 29 2 0
“Number o f tokens coded. ’’Percentage o f maternal uses in each activity context: Play (P) Meal (M) 
or Book-reading (B). “Percentage o f maternal uses in each time context: Past (B) Present (P) Future 
(F) Timeless Generalization (G) or Fantasy Play (Y). d Percentage o f  maternal uses in which mental 
verb is attributed to each person: Mother (M) Child (C) Other Person or Object (O) or Both Mother 
and Child (MC).
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Table 2
Mothers’ Uses of Know and Think with their 13-20 month-old Children: Mental Verb
Codes. Sense Meanines
Word Mental verb code (%) Sense meanings (%)
IS+“ MODb DIRC EDKd OP6 Cf PSg
Know 35 19 44 2 na 6 5
Know (IS+) 10 6
Think 9 36 44 na 11 7 1
“Internal state. bModifies proposition. cDirects interaction. d"I don’t know". eOpinion. 
fContrasts related mental states. sMentions presupposition.
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Table 3
Mothers’ Uses of Know and Think with their 13-20 month-old Children: Lexical Frames
Word Lexical Frame Percentage
Know You know how X? 8%
(Do) you know what (X)? 13%
Think What do you think? 9%
I think X. 39%
Do you think X? 10%
I don’t think X. 8%
I thought X. 8%
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 4
Total Uses of Think and Know by Mothers over Four Visits
Age of Child Total Mean per mother Mean rate per hour
Think
Two Years 602 50.2 15.7
Three Years 428 38.9 11.9
Know
Two Years 533 44.4 13.8
Three Years 534 48.5 15.3
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 5
Uses o f  Think and Know by Mothers o f Girls and B ovs over Four Visits
Age o f  Child Mothers o f Girls Mothers o f  Boys








Three Years 260 15.0 274 15.6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 6
Mothers’ Uses o f  Think and Know in Rate Per Hour in Four Contexts
Context
Age of Child Play Meal Hide and Find Doll House Mean
Two Years 13.3 11.9
Think
17.5 19.9 15.7
Three Years 13.8 16.0 9.1 9.0 12.0
Mean 13.6 14.0 13.3 14.5 13.9
Two Years 15.9 13.1
Know
15.1 11.0 13.8
Three Years 17.4 19.1 15.7 9.2 15.4
Mean 16.7 16.1 15.4 10.1 14.6
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Table 7
Mothers’ Meaning Levels in Rate per Hour for Think and Know
Age of Child Meaning Level
Embedded Use Denotation Sense
Think
Two Years 12.1 2.1 1.7
Three Years 7.8 2.8 1.0
Know
Two Years 10.3 2.2 1.5
Three Years 9.9 3.2 1.9
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Table 8
Person References in Mothers’ Uses of Think and Know in Rate Per Hour
Age of Child Person References
Child Mother C & Ma Other Total
Think
Two Years 5.3 9.8 0.04 0.5 15.7
Three Years 2.8 8.7 0.05 0.3 11.9
Mean 4.2 9.3 0.05 0.4 13.9
Know
Two Years 7.6 5.8 0.10 0.3 13.8
Three Years 7.5 6.8 0.29 0.7 15.3
Mean 7.6 6.2 0.19 0.5 14.5
aChild and mother.
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Table 9









Past 1.0 1.1 1.1
Future 0.6 0.9 0.7
Generalization 0.5 0.5 0.5
Fantasy 4.6 2.3 3.5




Past 1.0 1.3 1.1
Future 0.6 0.5 0.6
Generalization 0.8 1.6 1.1
Fantasy 2.4 2.2 2.3
Total 13.8 15.3 14.5
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Table 10
Mothers’ Lexical Frames with Think and Know in Rate Per Hour
Lexical Frame Two
Age of Child 
Three Total
"I think (that) X" 6.1
Think
4.9 5.5
"I don't think (that) X" 1.3 1.1 1.2
"(Do) you think X?" 2.2 0.8 1.6
"I/You (don’t) think so" 0.6 0.6 0.6
"Wh- do you think X?" (wh-question) 2.6 1.1 1.9
Other 2.8 3.4 3.1
Total 15.7 11.9 13.9
"I don't know" 1.5
Know
1.9 1.7
"I don’t know (if) X" 1.4 1.8 1.6
"(Do) you know wh- (X)?" (wh-question) 3.1 2.5 2.8
"I know X" or "X, I know" 1.0 1.5 1.2
"X, you know" or "You know, X" 0.9 1.0 1.0
"(Do) you know X?" or "X, do you know? " 0.4 0.2 0.3
"I know" 0.7 0.7 0.7
"(Do) (you) know what?" 1.3 1.5 1.4
Other 3.4 4.2 3.8
Total 13.8 15.3 14.5
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Table 11
Mothers’ Mental Verb Codes with Think and Know in Rate per Hour
Age of Child
Two Years Three Years Total
Think
Refers to internal state 4.2 3.5 3.8
Directs the interaction 7.4 5.3 6.4
Directs reflection 1.4 0.8 1.1
Opinion 0.8 0.5 1.1
Other 2.0 1.9 1.9
Total 15.7 11.9 13.8
Know
Refers to internal state 3.8 5.4 4.5
Directs the interaction 3.8 3.1 3.4
Directs reflection 2.7 2.3 2.5
"I don’t know" 1.6 1.9 1.7
Other 1.9 2.6 2.2
Total 13.8 15.3 14.4
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Table 12
Total Uses of Think and Know bv Children over Four Visits








Three Years 284 25.8
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Table 13
Uses of Think and Know bv Girls and Bovs over Four Visits
Age Girls Boys
N Total Mean N Total Mean
Two Years 7 24
Think
3.4 5 17 3.4
Three Years 5 48 9.6 6 41 6.8
Two Years 7 70
Know
10.0 5 35 7.0
Three Years 5 111 22.2 6 173 28.8
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Table 14
Children’s Uses of Think and Know in Four Contexts
Context
Age Play Meal Hide and Find D oll House Total
Two Years 10 2
Think
5 24 41
Three Years 32 25 19 13 89
Total 42 27 24 37 130
Two Years 38 29
Know
9 41 117
Three Years 101 99 30 71 301
Total 139 128 39 122 418
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Table 15
Children’s Person References with Think and Know
Age Person References
Child Mother C & Ma Other Total
Think
Two Years 35 8 0 1 44
Three Years 76 12 0 1 89
Total 111 20 0 2 133
Know
Two Years 67 37 1 12 117
Three Years 158 122 1 21 302
Total 225 159 2 33 419
“Child and mother.
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Table 16
Children’s Mental Verb Codes with Think and Know
Age
Two Years Three Years Total
Refers to internal state 7
Think
22 29
Directs the interaction 26 40 66
Directs reflection 1 5 6
Opinion 0 6 6
Other 7 16 23
Total 41 89 130
Refers to internal state 29
Know
52 81
Directs the interaction 7 34 41
Directs reflection 15 28 43
"I don’t know" 27 68 95
Other 27 102 129
Total 105 284 389
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Table 17
Meaning Levels in Children’s Uses of Think
Meaning Level
Context ea d/bb d/crc d/f1 d/ge sf
Two-Year- Olds
Play 7 0 1 0 2 0
Meal 1 0 0 1 0 0
Hide and Find 5 0 0 0 0 0
Doll House 25 1 0 0 0 1
Three-Year-Olds
Play 30 0 0 1 0 1
Meal 16 3 2 2 1 1
Hide and Find 18 0 1 0 0 0
Doll House 13 0 0 0 0 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
cdenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 18
Meaning Levels in Children’s Uses of Know
Meaning Level
Context ea d/bb d/crc di f d/ge sf
Two-Year- Olds
Play 33 1 0 3 1 0
Meal 17 10 0 0 1 1
Hide and Find 9 0 0 0 0 0
Doll House 38 0 1 0 1 1
Three-Year-Olds
Play 91 5 0 0 4 1
Meal 70 14 5 0 8 2
Hide and Find 28 1 0 0 1 0
Doll House 65 0 1 0 6 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
cdenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 19




"I think (that) X" 32
Think
55 87
"I don't think (that) X" 0 3 3
"(Do) you think X?" I 4 5
"I/You (don’t) think so" 2 8 10
"Wh- do you think X?" (wh-question) 1 7 8
Other 8 12 20
Total 44 89 133
"I don't know" 16
Know
36 52
"I don’t know (if) X" 6 19 25
"(Do) you know wh- (X)?" (wh-question) 19 37 56
"I know X" or "X, I know" 12 35 47
"X, you know" or "You know, X" 8 3 11
"(Do) you know X?" or "X, do you know?" 1 2 3
"I know" 13 20 33
"(Do) (you) know what?" 8 80 88
Other 16 36 52
Total 117 302 419
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Table 20
Time References in Children’s Uses of Think and Know
Time Reference
Age 




Past 1 8 9
Future 1 2 3
Generalization 2 1 3
Fantasy 24 24 48




Past 14 37 51
Future 3 2 5
Generalization 4 21 25
Fantasy 49 93 142
Total 117 302 419
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Table 21, page 1 of 4
Individual Two-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Know bv Visit
Meaning Level
Child Visit e“ d/bb d/crc d/f1 d/ge sf
CB 1,2 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 1 0 0 0 0
CF 1 7 0 0 0 0 1
2 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 4 0 0 2 0 0
4 9 0 0 0 0 0
DV 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 8 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 1 0 0 0 0
4 2 0 0 1 1 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. °denotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
cdenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 21, page 2 of 4
Individual Two-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Know bv Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
ea d/bb d/cr° d/f* d/ge sf
EM 1 3 0 0 0 0 0
2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 2 0 0 0 0 0
IK 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 2 0 1 0 1 0
JA 1 5 0 0 0 0 0
2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 0 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. Cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
cdenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 21, page 3 of 4
Individual Two-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Know bv Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
ea d/bb d/crc d/f1 d/ge sf
LB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 4 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 1 0 1 0 0
4 3 0 0 0 0 0
MD 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 4 0 0 0 0 1
3 3 0 0 0 0 0
4 4 0 0 0 0 0
RW 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 5 0 0 0 0 0
3 9 0 0 0 0 0
4 3 3 0 0 1 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
cdenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 21, page 4 of 4
Individual Two-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Know by Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
ea d/bb d/crc d /f1 d/ge sf
SM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 0 0
WH 1, 2, 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 0 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. Cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/fiiture. 
edenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 22, page 1 of 4
Individual Three-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Know by Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
ea d/bb d/crc d/f1 d/ge sf
AF 1 3 1 0 0 0 0
2 4 1 0 0 0 0
3 5 1 0 0 0 0
4 4 0 0 0 0 0
BC 1, 2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 3 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 5 0 0 0 1 0
2 9 0 0 0 1 0
3 12 0 0 0 0 0
4 7 0 0 0 2 0
aembedded use. bdenotation/past. °denotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
edenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 22, page 2 of 4
Individual Three-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Know by Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
ea d/bb d/cr° d/f*1 d/ge sf
ERi 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 0 1 0 0 0
3 1 1 0 0 1 0
4 1 0 0 0 0 0
ERo 1 2 4 0 0 1 0
2 2 0 0 0 0 0
3 3 0 0 0 1 3
4 13 0 0 0 1 0
KP 1 3 2 0 0 0 0
2 14 2 0 0 0 0
3 2 0 0 0 0 0
4 12 0 0 0 0 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
edenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 22, page 3 of 4
Individual Three-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Know by Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
ea d/bb d/crc d/f1 d/ge sf
LS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 15 0 5 0 0 0
NP 1 13 3 0 0 1 0
2 45 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 4 0 0 0 0 0
NR 1 3 0 0 0 0 0
2 5 0 0 0 0 0
3 7 0 0 0 0 0
4 2 0 0 0 2 0
aembedded use. bdenotation/past. cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
edenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 22, page 4 of 4
Individual Three-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Know by Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
ea d/bb d/crc d l f d/ge sf
PD 1 5 0 0 0 0 0
2 11 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 4 0 0 0 0 0
SL 1 3 0 0 0 0 0
2 6 0 0 0 3 0
3 8 1 0 0 0 0
4 2 0 0 0 0 0
aembedded use. bdenotation/past. cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
cdenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 23, page 1 of 3
Individual Two-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Think by Visit
Meaning Level
Child Visit ea d/bb d/crc d/f1 d/ge sf
CB 1,2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 0 0
CF 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 0 0 0 0
DV 1,2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 0 0
EM 1, 2, 3, 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
cdenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 23, page 2 of 3
Individual Two-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Think bv Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
ea d/bb d/cr° d/f1 d/ge sf
IK 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 0 0 0 0 0
3 6 0 0 0 0 0
4 2 0 0 0 0 1
JA I, 2, 3 ,4 0 0 0 0 0 0
LB I 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 2 0
LV 1,2 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 2 0 0 0 0 0
aembedded use. bdenotation/past. Cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/fiiture. 
edenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 23, page 3 of 3
Individual Two-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Think bv Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
e“ d/bb d/crc d/f1 d/ge sf
MD 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0
3,4 0 0 0 0 0 0
RW 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 7 0 0 0 0 0
SM 1,2, 3 ,4 0 0 0 0 0 0
WH 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 2 0 0 0 0 0
4 6 0 1 0 0 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. “denotation/contrast with reality. denotation/future. 
cdenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 24, page 1 of 4
Individual Three-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Think by Visit
Meaning Level
Child Visit ea d/bb d/crc d/f1 d/ge sf
AF 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0
BC 1,2,3* 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 5 0 0 0 0 0
BE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 0 0 0 0 0
3 2 0 0 0 0 0
4 3 0 0 0 0 0
ERi 1,2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 3 0 0 0 0 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. “denotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
“denotion/generalization. fsense.
*Visit 3 did not take place.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
242
Table 24, page 2 o f 4
Individual Three-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Think by Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
ea d/b° d/crc d/f1 d/ge sf
ERo 1 6 0 1 1 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 1 0 0 0 2
4 9 0 1 0 0 0
KP 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
2 4 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 0 0
LS 1, 2, 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 9 0 0 0 0 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. Cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
cdenotion/generalization. fsense.
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Table 24, page 3 of 4
Individual Three-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Think bv Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
ea d/bb d/crc d/f1 d/ge sf
NP 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 9 0 0 0 0 0
3*
4 2 0 0 0 0 0
NR 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 0 0 1 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 0 0
PD 1 4 0 0 0 0 0
2, 3*. 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
aembedded use. bdenotation/past. °denotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
cdenotion/generalization. fsense.
♦Visit 3 did not take place.
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Table 24, page 4 of 4
Individual Three-Year-Old Children’s Meaning Levels with Think by Visit
Child Visit
Meaning Level
ea d/bb d/crc d/f1 d/ge sf
SL 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 0 0 2 0 0
3 2 0 0 0 0 0
4 3 0 0 0 0 0
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. cdenotation/contrast with reality. ddenotation/future. 
cdenotion/generalization. fsense.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
245
Table 25
Individual Two-Year-Old Children’s Person References with Think bv Visit
Person References
Child Visit 1 Visit 2 Visit 3 Visit 4
C* Mb Oc C“ Mb Oc Ca Mb Oc Ca Mb Oc
CB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
CF 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0
DV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
EM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IK 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 0 0 3 0 0
JA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LB 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0
MD 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RW 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 6 0
SM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WH 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 6 0 1
“Child. bMother. cOther Person.
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Table 26
Individual Three-Year-Old Children's Person References with Think bv Visit
Person References
Child Visit 1 Visit 2 Visit 3 Visit 4
C“ Mb Oc C“ Mb Oc Ca Mb Oc C* Mb Oc
AF 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
BC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0
BE 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 I 3 0 0
ERi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
ERo 8 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 10 0 0
KP 0 2 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
LS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0
NP 1 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
NR 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
PD 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SL 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 0 3 0 0
“Child. bMother. cOther Person.
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Table 27
Individual Two-Year-Old Children’s Person References with Know by Visit
Person References
Child Visit I Visit 2 Visit 3 Visit 4
C“ Mb Oc C“ Mb Oc C“ Mb Oc C“ Mb Oc
CB 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
CF 5 3 0 1 0 0 1 4 1 2 7 0
DV 0 1 0 2 0 6 1 0 0 3 1 0
EM 3 0 0 0 0 0 n.a. 2 0 0
IK 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 0
JA 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
LB 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 3 0 0
LV 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
MD 0 0 0 4 I 0 3 0 0 4 0 0
RW 0 0 0 2 3 0 2 6 1 2 2 3
SM 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
WH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
“Child. bMother. °Other Person.
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Table 28
Individual Three-Year-Old Children’s Person References with Know bv Visit
Person References
Child Visit 1 Visit 2 Visit 3 Visit 4
Ca Mb Oc C“ Mb Oc Ca Mb Oc Ca Mb Oc
AF 5 0 0 1 4 0 5 0 1 4 0 0
BC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
BE 5 2 0 8 2 0 6 4 1 4 5 0
ERi 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0
ERo 5 2 0 2 0 0 6 I 0 6 8 0
KP 2 3 0 11 5 0 2 0 0 10 2 0
LS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 7 13 0
NP 3 1 13 1 43 1 0 0 0 3 1 0
NR 1 1 1 1 3 1 7 0 0 4 1 0
PD 5 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
SL 0 2 1 0 9 0 5 3 0 1 0 1
“Child. ‘’Mother. cOther Person.
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Table 29
Two-year-olds’ uses of think and know in the four most frequent language games







% of total uses in four games 80% 72%
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Table 30, page 1 of 2
Two-vear-old children’s roles in four most frequent language games with think
Language Game Role Frequency
Guiding
"I think" + choice 6
Other 3
Total 9
% of uses in role 67%
Naming
"I think" + name 4
Other 2
Total 6
% of uses in role 67%
Guessing
"I think" + location 5
Other 2
Total 7
% of uses in role 71%
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 30, page 2 of 2
Two-year-old children’s roles in four most frequent language games with think
Language Game Role Frequency
Play-acting
"I think s/he wants" + doll’s desire 5
"I think" + pretend situation 4
Other 2
Total 11
% of uses in roles 82%
Total % of uses in five roles in four language games 73%
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 31, page 1 of 2
Two-year-old children’s roles in four most frequent language games with know
Language Game Role Frequency
Guiding
"I/you (don’t) know how (+X) [takes control] 9
"I/you know (+X)"
[makes, accepts, or rejects suggestion] 7
Other 3
Total 19
% of total uses in roles 84%
Naming
"I don’t know" [name] 6
What-question [asks name] 4
Other 5
Total 15
% of total uses in roles 67%
Guessing
"Know wh- (+X)" [invites guessing] 3
"I don’t know" [location] 3
Other 2
Total 8
% of uses in roles 75%
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Table 31, page 2 of 2
Two-year-old children’s roles in four most frequent language games with know
Language Game Role Frequency
Play-acting
Wh-question [introduces pretend activity] 11
"[doll] (does/doesn’t) know how (+ activity)" 8




% of uses in roles 85%
Total % of uses in nine roles in four language games 80%
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 32, page 1 of 4
Individual two-year-old children’s uses of roles in language games with think over four
visits
Child Visit Language Games and Roles
Guiding Naming Guessing Playacting Other
role Ia other role2b other roIe3c other role4d roles' other
CB 1,2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
CF 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 0 11 0 0 0 0
total 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
DV 1,2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
total 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a,,I think" +  choice b"I think" + name C,,I think" + location d"I think s/he wants" + doll’s desire 
c "I think" + pretend situation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 32, page 2 o f 4
Individual two-year-old children’s uses o f roles in language games with think over four
visits
Child Visit Language Games and Roles
Guiding Naming Guessing Playacting Other
role Ia other role2b other role3c other role4d roIe5e other
IK 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
3 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
total 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 4
LB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
total I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
LV 1,2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
total 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
a"I think" + choice b"I think" + name C"I think” + location d”I think s/he wants" + doll’s desire 
6 "I think" + pretend situation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 32, page 3 o f  4
Individual two-year-old children’s uses o f  roles in language eames with think over four
visits
Child Visit Language Games and Roles
Guiding Naming Guessing Playacting Other
ro!ela other ro!e2b other role3c iother ro!e4d roles' other
MD 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3,4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
RW I 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
total 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
a"I think" +  choice b”I think" + name c"I think" + location d”I think s/he wants" + doll’s desire 
' "I think" + pretend situation
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Table 32. page 4  o f  4
Individual two-vear-old children’s uses o f  roles in language games with think over four
visits
Child V isit Language Games and Roles
Guiding Naming Guessing Playacting Other
rolel1 other ro!e2b other role3c other ro!e4d role5e other
WH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
4 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 1 0 1
total 0 0 1 0 2 0 4 2 1 1
Totals for 9 children 6 2 3 1 5 2 5 4 2 8
a"I think” + choice b"I think" + name C"I think” + location d”I think s/he wants” + doll’s desire 
c 'T think” + pretend situation
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Table 33, page 1 o f 6
Individual two-vear-old children’s uses of roles in language games with know over four
visits
Child Visit Language Games and Roles
Guiding NaminO'c? Guessing Play-acting Other
l a 2b O' 3C 4d O' 5C 6f O' 78 8h 9s o'
CB 1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
total 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
CF 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 0
4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 4
total 4 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 2 5 0 0 3 6
3"I/you (don’t)know how (+X)" [takes control]
b"I/you know” (+ X) [makes, accepts, or rejects suggestion]c"I don’t know"[name] 
dwhat question [asks name]cknow wh-? [invites gu essin g]f "I don’t know" [location] 
^ h -  question [introduces pretend activity] h[doll] (does/doesn’t) know how (+  activity) 
'"I (don’t) know" [in answer to wh-question about pretend activity] JOther
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Table 33, page 2 o f 6
Individual two-vear-old children’s uses o f roles in language games with know over four
visits
Child Visit Language Games and Roles
Guiding Naming Guessing Play-acting Other
l a 2b O' 3C 4d O’ 5e 6f O’ 7s 8h 9’ O’
DV I 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
total 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 2 1 3
EM 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
total 0 1 0 0 0 I 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0
a"I/you (don’t)know how (+X)" [takes control]
b"I/you know" (+ X ) [makes, accepts, or rejects suggestion]0 !  don't know"[name] 
dwhat question [asks name] “know wh-? [invites gu essin g ]f "I don’t know" [location] 
®wh- question [introduces pretend activity] h[doll] (does/doesn’t) know how (+ activity) 
‘"I (don’t) know" [in answer to wh-question about pretend activity] ’Other
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Table 33, page 3 o f 6
Individual two-vear-old children’s uses o f  roles in language games with know over four
visits
Child Visit Language Games and Roles
Guiding Naming G uessing Play-acting Other
l a 2b O’ 3° 4d O’ 5° 6 f O’ 7g 8h 9* O
IK 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
total 0 1 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
JA 1 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
total 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
a"I/you (don’t)know how (+X)" [takes control]
b"I/you know" (+ X) [makes, accepts, or rejects suggestion]0' !  don’t know”[name] 
dwhat question [asks name] 'know wh-? [invites guessing] f "I don’t know" [location] 
swh- question [introduces pretend activity] h[doll] (does/doesnt) know how (+ activity) 
'"I (don’t) know" [in answer to wh-question about pretend activity] ’Other
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Table 33, page 4 o f 6
Individual two-vear-old children’s uses o f roles in language games with know over four visits
Child V isit Language Games and Roles
Guiding Naming Guessing Play-acting Other
la 2b O' 3C 4d O' 5e 6f O' 7g 8h 9' O'
LB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
total 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5
LV 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
total 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
a"Fyou (don’t)kxiow how (+X)" [takes control]
b”I/you know ” (+  X) [makes, accepts, or rejects suggestion]0 !  don’t know"[name] 
dwhat question [asks name] 'know wh-? [invites guessing]f ”1 don’t know" [location] 
^ h -  question [introduces pretend activity] h[doll] (does/doesn’t) know how (+- activity) 
‘"I (don’t) know ” [in answer to wh-question about pretend activity] JOther
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Table 33, page 5 o f 6
Individual two-vear-old children's uses o f roles in language games with know over four
visits
Child Visit Language Games and Roles
Guiding Naming Guessing Play-acting Other
la 2b O’ 3C 4d O’ 5e 6f O’ 78 8h 9‘ O’
MD 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
total 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 2
RW 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 2
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5
total 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 6 1 0 1 7
a,,I/you (don’t)know how (+X)" [takes control]
b"I/you know" (+ X) [makes, accepts, or rejects suggestion]c"I don't know"[name] 
dwhat question [asks name] 'know wh-? [invites gu essin g]f "I don’t know" [location] 
Ewh- question [introduces pretend activity] h[doll] (does/doesn’t) know how (+  activity) 
"'I (don't) know" [in answer to wh-question about pretend activity] ’Other
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Table 33, page 6 of 6
Individual two-year-old children’s uses o f roles in language games with know over four
visits
Child Visit Language Games and Roles
Guiding Naming Guessing Play-acting Other
r 2b O’ 3C 4d O' 5e 6f O' 7® 8h 9' O’
SM 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
WH 1,2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Totals 9 7 3 6 4 5 3 3 3 11 8 9 4 31
a"I/you (don’t)know how (+X)" [takes control]
b"I/you know" (+ X) [makes, accepts, or rejects suggestion]c”I don’t know"[name] 
dwhat question [asks name] 'know wh-? [invites guessing]f "I don’t know” [location] 
®wh- question [introduces pretend activity] h[doll] (does/doesn't) know how (+ activity) 
‘"I (don’t) know” [in answer to wh-question about pretend activity] JOther
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Table A-l
Mothers’Total Uses of Think and Know by Age of Child: MANOVA Results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Mothers’Total Uses of Think and Know: Repeated Measure MANOVA
verb (think, know) x age (1,21) .04
age (two, three) verb (1,21) 1.07
age x verb (1,21) 5.95*
* p < .05
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Table A-2
Mothers’Uses of Think and Know by Gender of Child: MANOVA Results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Mothers’Uses of Think and Know bv Gender of Child: Repeated Measure MANOVA
Age of child (two, three) x 
Gender of child (boy, girl) x 
Verb (think, know) gender (1,19) .96
age (1,19) .38
verb (1,19) .48
age x gender (1,19) .24
age x verb (1,19) .02
gender x verb (1,19) .68
age x gender x 
verb (1,19) 1.89
Note: There were no significant F-values found in this analysis.
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Table A-3
Mothers’ Uses of Think and Know bv Context: MANOVA Results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Mothers Uses of Think and Know in Four Contexts: Repeated Measure MANOVA
Age (two, three) x 
Context (play, hide and 
find, doll house) x 
verb (think, know) age (1,21) .05
verb (1,21) .46
context (3,63) 1.86
age x verb (1,21) 2.23
age x context (3,63) 2.16*
verb x context (3,63) 2.82*
age x verb x context (3,63) 1.81
* p < .05
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Table A-4
Mothers’ Meaning Levels with Think and Know: MANOVA. ANOVA. and Post Hoc Results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Repeated Measure M ANOVA: Mothers’Meaning Levels bv Verb and A ge  
Meaning Level (embedded use, denotation.
sense) x  verb (think, know) x  age 







age (L 21) .06
meaning level x  verb (2,42) .30
meaning level x  age (2,42) 3.14
verb x age (1,21) 5.28*
meaning level x  verb 
x age (2,42) 1.32
Repeated Measure ANOVA: Mothers’Meaning Levels
Meaning Level (embedded use, denotation, 
sense) meaning level (2,44) 111.14**
R ov Post Hoc Tests. Helmert Contrasts: Mothers’ M eaning Levels
Contrast t-value
embedded vs. denotation 11.48**
embedded vs. sense 13.80**
Paired Sample One-Tailed t-test
denotation vs. sense 2.57**
*p <  .05 * * p < .0 1
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Table A-5, Page 1 of 2 
Mothers'Person References with Think and Know: MANOVA and ANOVA Results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
MANOVA: Mothers’person references bv verb bv age of child
Person reference (mother, child) x 
verb (think, know) x age of child 
(two, three) age 0 ,21) .18
verb (1,21) 1.78
age x verb (1,21) 4.66*
person reference (1,21) 13.43**
age x person reference (1,21) 1.31
verb x person reference (1,21) 33.99**
age x verb x person
reference (1,21) .33
* p < . 0 5  * * p < . 0 l
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
269
Table A-5, Page 2 of 2
Mothers’ Person References with Think and Know: MANOVA and ANOVA Results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Person References within verbs
Repeated measure ANOVA: Mothers’Person References with Think
Person reference (mother, child) person reference (1,22) 
Repeated measure ANOVA: Mothers’ Person References with Know
212.5**
Person reference (mother, child) person reference (1,22) 1.22
Verbs within Person References
Repeated measure ANOVA: Mothers’references to self
Verb (think, know) verb
Repeated measure ANOVA: Mothers’ references to child
(1,22) 10.53**
Verb (think, know) verb (1,22) 24.50**
* p < .05 ** p < .01
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Table A-6, Page 1 o f 2
Mothers’Time References with Think and Know: MANOVA. ANOVA and Post Hoc Results
Variable Levels Effect d f F-value
Mothers’ time references bv verb bv age o f  child: repeated measure MANOVA
Time reference (present, past, 
future, generalization, fantasy) x 




age x verb (1.21) 3.70
time reference (4.84) 118.30**
age x time reference (4.84) 1.78
verb x time reference (4.84) 4.53**
age x verb x
time reference (4.84) .96
Mothers’ Time References Within Verb
Mothers’ time references with think: repeated measure ANO VA
Time reference (present, past, future, 
generalization, fantasy) time reference (4.88) 62.25**
Mothers’ time references with think: Rov Post Hoc tests. Helmert contrasts
Contrast t-value
present vs. average o f (past, future, generalization, fantasy) 11.61 **
fantasy vs. average o f (past, future, generalization) 7.68**
present vs. fantasy -6.22**
T  < .01
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Table A-6, Page 2 o f 2
Mothers* Time References with Think and Know: MANOVA. ANOVA and Post Hoc Results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Mothers’Tim e References Within Verb, continued
Mothers’ time references with Know: reoeated measure ANO VA
Tim e reference (present, past, future,
generalization, fantasy) time reference (4,88) 94.8**
Mothers’ time references with Know: R ov Post Hoc tests. Helmert contrasts
Contrast t-value
Present vs. average o f  (past, future, generalization, fantasy) 14.98**
Fantasy vs. average o f  (past, future, generalization) 6.94**
Present vs. fantasy 10.85**
M others’ verbs within time references
Generalizations: Repeated Measure ANOVA
Verb (think, know) verb (1,22) 12.35*:*
Fantasy Talk: Reoeated Measure ANOVA
Verb (think, know) verb (L 22) 5.19*
Reference to the Present: Repeated Measure A N O V A
Verb (think, know) verb ( 1,22) 2.64
* p <  .05 * * p < . 0 1
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Table A-7, Page 1 of 2
Mothers’Lexical Frames with Think and Know: MANOVAs, ANOVAs and Post Hoc Tests
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Mothers’Lexical Frames with Think : Reoeated Measure MANOVA
lexical Frame (frames 1 to 5) x 
age of child (two, three) age (1,21) 1.70
lexical frame (4,84) 34.04**
age x lexical frame (4,84) 1.34
Mothers’ Lexical Frames with Know:: Reoeated Measure MANOVA
lexical frame (frames 1 to 8) x 
age of child (two, three) age (1,21) .00
lexical frame (7,147) 4.27**
age x lexical frame (7,147) .77
** p <  .01
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
273
Table A-7, Page 2 of 2
Mothers’ Lexical Frames with Think and Know: MANOVAs. ANQVAs and Post Hoc Tests
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Mothers’ Lexical Frames with Think: Repeated Measure ANOVA
lexical Frame (frames 1 to 5) lexical frame (4,88) 33.69**
Mothers’ Lexical Frames with Think: Rov Post Hoc Tests with Helmert Contrasts
Contrast t-value
frame 1 vs. average of (frames 2 to 5) 11.88**
frame 1 vs. frame 5 6.85**
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Mothers’ Lexical Frames with Know: Repeated Measure ANOVA
lexical Frame (frames 1 to 8) lexical frame (7,54) 4.23**
Mothers’ Lexical Frames with Know: Rov Post Hoc Tests with Helmert Contrasts
Contrast t-value
frame 3 vs. average of (other 7 lexical frames) 3.98**
frame 3 vs. frame 1 -1.50
frame 1 vs. average of (other 6 frames, excluding frame 3) 1.66
** p < .01
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table A-8, Page 1 of 2
Mothers’Mental Verb Codes with Think and Know: MANOVAs. ANOVAs. and Post Hoc Tests
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Mothers Mental Verb Codes bv Verb and bv Age of Child: Repeated Measure MANOVA
Mental Verb Code (direct the
interaction, direct reflection, age (1,21) .08
refer to internal state) x verb
(think, know) x age of child verb (1,21) .20
(two, three)
mental verb code (2,42) 51.92**
age x verb (1,21) 1.72
age x mental verb code (2,42) 3.44*
verb x mental verb code (2,42) 23.30**
age x verb x mental verb code (2,42) .29
Mothers’ Mental Verb Codes within Each Verb
Mothers’ Mental Verb Codes with Think: Repeated Measure ANOVA
Mental Verb Code (direct the interaction,
direct reflection, refer to internal state) Mental verb code (2,44) 68.31**
Mothers’Mental Verb Codes with Know: Repeated Measure ANOVA 
Mental Verb Code (direct the interaction,
direct reflection, refer to internal state) Mental verb code (2,44) 10.50**
* p < .05 **p< .01
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Table A-8, Page 2 of 2
Mothers’Mental Verb Codes with Think and Know: MANOVAs, ANOVAs. and Post Hoc Tests
Mothers’ Mental Verb Codes with Think: Rov Post Hoc Tests with Helmert Contrasts
Contrast t-value
Direct the interaction vs. refer to internal state -4.54**
Direct the interaction vs. direct reflection 10.84**
Refer to internal state vs. direct reflection -7.59**
Mothers’Mental Verb Codes with Know: Rov Post Hoc Tests with Helmert Contrasts
Contrast t-value
Direct reflection vs. average of (direct the
interaction and refer to internal state) -4.89**
direct the interaction vs. refer to internal state -1.84
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Mothers’Verbs within each Mental Verb Code
Mothers’verbs within directing the interaction: repeated measure ANOVA
Verb (think, know) verb (1,22) 29.44**
Mothers’ verbs within directing reflection: repeated measure ANOVA
Verb (think, know) verb (1,22) 8.41**
Mothers’ verbs within referring to internal states: repeated measure ANOVA
Verb (think, know) verb (1,22) 2.45
**p < .01
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Table B-l
Children’Total Uses of Think and Know bv Age: MANOVA
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Children’s Total Uses of Think and Know: Reoeated Measure MANOVA
verb (think, know) x age ( 1,21) 13.66**
age (two, three) verb ( 1,21) 30.24**
age x verb ( 1,21) 1.51
**p < .01
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Table B-2
Children’s Uses of Think and Know bv Gender: MANOVA results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value




age x gender (1,19) .62
age x verb (1,19) 1.61
gender x verb (1,19) .43
age x gender x 
verb (1,19) .63
** p < .01
Age (two, three) x 
Gender(boy, girl) x 
Verb (think, know)
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Table B-3
Children’s Uses of Think and Know bv Context: MANOVA Results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Children’s Uses of Think and Know in Four Contexts: Reoeated Measure MANOVA
Age (two, three) x 
Context (play, hide and 
find, doll house) x 
verb (think, know) age ( 1,21) 13.21**
verb ( 1,21) 31.58**
context (3,63) 3.53*
age x verb ( 1,21) 2.76
age x context (3,63) 1.97
verb x context (3,63) 1.87
age x verb x context (3,63) .38
* p < .05
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Table B-4
Children’s Person References with Think and Know: MANOVA results 
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
MANOVA: Children’s person references bv verb bv age
Person reference (mother, child) x 
verb (think, know) x age 
(two, three) age (1,21) 14.86**
verb ( 1,21) 45.24**
age x verb (1,21) 4.87*
person reference (1,21) 23.87**
age x person reference ( 1,21) .74
verb x person reference (1,21) 1.26
age x verb x person
reference (1,21) 1.37
p < .0 5  **p< .01
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Table B-5, Page 1 of 2
Children’s Mental Verb Codes with Think and Know: MANOVAs and ANOVAs
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Children’s Mental Verb Codes bv Verb and bv Age: Repeated Measure MANOVA 
Mental Verb Code (direct the
interaction, refer to internal age ( 1,21) 7.48*
state) x verb (think, know)
x age of child(two, three) verb ( 1,21) 1.25
mental verb code ( 1,21) .07
age x verb ( 1,21) .35
age x mental verb code ( 1,21) .10
verb x mental verb code ( 1,21) 14.80**
age x verb x mental verb code ( 1,21) .21
Children’s Mental Verb Codes within Each Verb 
Children’s Mental Verb Codes with Think: Repeated Measure ANOVA 
Mental Verb Code (direct the interaction,
refer to internal state) Mental verb code (1,22) 5.81*
Children’s Mental Verb Codes with Know: Repeated Measure ANOVA 
Mental Verb Code (direct the interaction,
refer to internal state) Mental verb code (1,22) 6.60*
* p < .05 ** p < .01
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Table B-5, Page 2 of 2
Children’s Mental Verb Codes with Think and Know: MANOVAs and ANOVAs
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Children’s Verbs within each Mental Verb Code
Children’s verbs within directing the interaction: repeated measure ANOVA
Verb (think, know) verb (1,22) 13.17**
Children’s verbs within referring to internal states: reDeated measure ANOVA
Verb (think, know) verb (1,22) 2.45
**p < .01
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Table B-6
Children’s Meaning Levels with Think and Know: MANOVA Results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Repeated Measure MANOVA: Children’s Meaning Levels bv Verb and Age
Meaning Level (embedded use, denotation)
x verb (think, know) x age meaning level ( 1,21) 78.23**
(two, three)
verb ( 1,21) 32.88**
age ( 1,21) 13.62**
meaning level x verb ( 1,21) 5.61*
meaning level x age ( 1,21) 5.15*
verb x age ( 1,21) 3.70
meaning level x verb
x age ( 1,21) .02
*p < .05 **p < .01
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Table B-7, Page 1 of 2
Children’s Time References with Think and Know: MANOVA. ANOVA and Post Hoc Results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Children’s time references bv verb by age: repeated measure MANOVA
Time reference (present, past, 
generalization, fantasy) x 




age x verb ( 1,21) 4.55*
time reference (3,63) 37.86**
age x time reference (3,63) 3.61*
verb x time reference (3,63) 1.21
age x verb x
time reference (3,63) .36
* p < .05 **p < .01
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Table B-7, Page 2 of 2
Children’s Time References with Think and Know: MANOVA, ANOVA and Post Hoc Results
Variable Levels Effect df F-value
Children’s time references: repeated measure ANOVA
Time reference (present, past, 
generalization, fantasy) time reference (3,63) 37.86**
Children’s time references: Rov Post Hoc Tests with Helmert Contrasts
Contrast t-value
present vs. (fantasy + past + generalization) 6.32**
fantasy vs. (past + generalization) 6.35**
present vs. fantasy 2.67*
past vs. generalization 1.64
* p < .0 5  **p<.01
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Table C-l
Spearman Rank-Order Correlations between Children’s and Mothers’ Person References
with Think
Children’s Person References
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Table C-2
Spearman Rank-Order Correlations between Children’s and Mothers’Person References
with Know
Mothers’ Person References
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Table C-3
Spearman Rank-Order Correlations between Children’s and Mothers’Mental Verb Codes
with Think
Children’s Mental Verb Codes
Mothers’Mental Verb Codes IS+a Dir-Rb Dir-F Total
Two-Year- Olds
IS+a i.d. i.d. .11 .23
Dir-Rb i.d. i.d. .09 .16
Dir-F i.d. i.d. .10 .22
Total i.d. i.d. -.06 .05
Three-Year-Olds
IS+a .66* .14 -.05 .04
Dir-Rb .34 .00 .04 .15
Dir-F .57 .14 .31 .39
Total .67* .21 .24 .37
a Refers to internal state. b Directs reflection.c Directs the interaction. 
*2 < .05




Children’s Mental Verb Codes
Mothers’ Mental Verb Codes IS+a Dir-Rb D ir-f Total
Two-Year- Olds
IS+a .47 .42 -.07 .34
Dir-Rb .32 .37 .06 .35
Dir-F -.05 .30 -.28 .11
Total .43 .47 -.05 .28
Three-Y ear-Olds
IS+a .14 -.12 -.25 -.51
Dir-Rb .46 .28 -.11 .15
Dir-T -.25 .03 -.28 -.16
Total .23 .19 -.15 -.01
a Refers to internal state. b Directs reflection.c Directs the interaction. 
*2 < 05
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Table C-5
Spearman Rank-Order Correlations between Two-Year-Old Children’s and






emb“ .22 .63* .31
den/bb -.04 .00 -.04
den/f° -.16 .20 -.09
den/gd .34 .18 .31
den/totf .17 .24 .18
s/presupg .53 .68* .58*
s/c2vh .81** .48 79**
s/total1 .70* .55 .70*
total .20 .58* .28
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. cdenotation/fiiture. ddenotation/generalization. 
edenotation/contrast with reality. fdenotation/total. gsense/presupposition. 
hsense/contrasts two mental verbs, ‘sense/total 
*P < .05 **p_< .01
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Table C-6
Spearman Rank-Order Correlations between Three-Year-Old Children’s and





emba den/bb den/gd den/totftotaI
emba -.14 -.14 .29 .01 -.13
den/bb .17 .24 .42 .70* .35
den/f0 .09 -.58 .46 -.08 -.08
den/gd -.29 -.76** .44 .10 -.22
den/ce -.06 .60 .24 .45 .09
den/totf -.11 -.41 .69* .30 -.02
sg -.29 .23 -.25 .11 -.12
total -.11 -.11 .37 .30 -.01
“embedded use. bdenotation/past. °denotation/future. ddenotation/generalization. 
edenotation/contrast with reality. fdenotation/total. gsense.
*2 < .05 **2 <.01
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Table C-7
Spearman Rank-Order Correlations between Two-Year-Old Children’s and Mothers’
Lexical Frames with Think
Children’s Lexical Frames
Mothers’Lexical Frames Of la
o f -.41 .02





a,,I think (that) X". b’l  don’t think (that)X". c"(Do) you think X?". 
d"I/You (don’t) think so". e"How/What/Where/Which/Who/Why do you think (Y)?". 
fOther.
*2 < .05 <.01
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
292
Table C-8
Spearman Rank-Order Correlations between Three-Year-Old Children’s and Mothers’ 
Lexical Frames with Think
Children’s Lexical Frames







a"I think (that) X". b"l don’t think (that)X". c,’(Do) you think X?". d"I/You (don’t) think so". 
e"How/What/Where/Which/Who/Why do you think (Y)?". fOther.
*2 < .05 **g <.01
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Table C-9
Spearman Rank-Order Correlations between Two-Year-Old Children’s and Mothers’ 
Lexical Frames with Know
Mothers’ Lexical Frames
Children’s Lexical Frames
Os l a 3C 4d 7g
O* .63* -.24 .37 .08 .35
la .65* -.17 71* * .02 .08
2b .07 -.02 .33 -.21 .15
3° .49 .02 .51 -.11 .13
4d -.06 -.04 -.30 -.34 -.19
5e .21 .05 .52 -.28 .11
6f .51 .15 .43 -.04 .49
7s -.26 -.23 .01 -.27 -.06
8h -.14 .25 .02 -.64* -.38
a"I don’t know". b "I don’t know (if) X". c "(Do) you know how/what/when/where/which/ 
who/ why (X)?".d "I know X" or "X, I know". e"X, you know" or "You know, X". 
f (Do) you know X?" or "X, do you know?". s "I know". 1 Other.
*2 < .05 **£<.01
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Table C-10
Spearman Rank-Order Correlations between Three-Year-Old Children’s and Mothers’
Lexical Frames with Know
Children’s Lexical Frames
o* la 2b 3C 4d 7s 8h
Mothers’ Lexical Frames
<y -.28 .09 -.67* -.15 -.10 -.18 -.43
l a .10 .27 .37 .37 .66* .61* .26
2b .14 .25 .35 -.12 -.35 .30 .19
3C .57 .12 -.15 .30 .08 -.50 .19
4d .24 .14 -.00 -.02 -.31 -.13 .06
5e .16 .19 -.60 .04 -.16 -.13 -.01
6f .12 .56 -.04 -.48 -.48 -.09 .02
7s .10 .19 -.28 .23 .11 -.10 -.07
8h .47 .11 -.27 .29 .11 -.27 .27
a"I don’t know". b "I don’t know (if) X". c "(Do) you know how/what/when/where/which/ 
who/ why (X)?".d "I know X" or "X, I know". e"X, you know" or "You know, X". 
f (Do) you know X?" or "X, do you know?". g "I know". 1 Other.
*2 < -05
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Table C-11
Summary of Significant Correlations Between Mothers’ and Two-Year-Old Children’s Measures
Word Variable Mother’s Category Child’s Category Direction
think person reference child mother +
know person reference mother mother +
know meaning level embedded use denotation/total +
know meaning level sense/contrast two verbs embedded use +
know meaning level sense/contrast two verbs total +
know meaning level sense/total embedded use +
know meaning level sense/total total +
know meaning level total denotation/total +
know lexical frame other other +
know lexical frame ”1 don’t know" other +
know lexical frame ”1 don’t know" wh-question +
know lexical frame "I know" "I know X" -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
296
Table C-12
Summary of Significant Correlations Between Mothers’ and Three-Year-Old Children’s Measures
Word Variable Mother’s Category Child’s Category Direction
think mental verb code internal state internal state +
think mental verb code total internal state +
know meaning level denotation/past denotation/total
know meaning level denotation/generalization denotation/past -
know meaning level denotation/total denot./generalization +
know lexical frame other "I don’t know (if) X" -
know lexical frame "I don’t know" "I know X" +
know lexical frame ”1 don't know" "I know" +
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